LIVERPOOL & G. S. STEAM CO. v. PHENIX INS. CO.
9 S.Ct. 469
129 U.S. 397
32 L.Ed. 788
LIVERPOOL & G. S. STEAM CO.
PHENIX INS. CO.1
March 5, 1889.
F.A. Wilcox and S. P. Nash, for appellant.
[Syllabus, Statement of case, and Arguments of Counsel from Pages 398-434 intentionally omitted]
Wm. Allen Butler, for appellee.
This is an appeal by a steamship company from a decree rendered against it upon a libel in admiralty, 'in a cause of action arising from breach of contract,' brought by an insurance company, claiming to be subrogated to the rights of the owners of goods shipped on board the Montana, one of the appellant's steam-ships, at New York, to be carried to Liverpool, and lost or damaged by her stranding, because of the negligence of her master and officers, in Holyhead bay, on the coast of Wales, before reaching her destination. In behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the loss was caused by perils of the sea, without any negligence on the part of master and officers; that the appellant was not a common carrier; that it was exempt from liability by the terms of the bills of lading; and that the libelant had not been subrogated to the rights of the owners of the goods.
It is to be remembered that the jurisdiction of this court to review the decree below is limited to questions of law, and does not extend to questions of fact. Act Feb. 16, 1875, c. 77, § 1, 18 St. 315; The Gazelle, 128 U. S. 474, 484, 9 S.Ct. 139, and cases there cited. In the findings of fact the circuit court, after stating, in much detail, the course of the ship's voyage, the conduct of her master and officers, the position and character of the various lighthouses and other safeguards which she passed, and other attendant circumstances immediately preceding the stranding, distinctly finds as facts: 'Those in charge of the navigation of the Montana were negligent, in that, without having taken cross-bearings of the light at South Stack, and so determined their distance from the light, they took an east three-quarters south course before passing the Skerries, and without seeing the Skerries light; and in that they continued at full speed after hearing the fog-gun at North Stack; and in that they took a north-east by east magnetic course on hearing said fog-gun, instead of stopping and backing and taking a westerly course out of Holyhead bay; and in that they did not ascertain their position in Holyhead bay by means of the lights and fog-signals, or by the use of the lead, or by stopping until they should, by those means or otherwise, learn where their ship was.' 'On the foregoing facts,' the only conclusion of law stated by the circuit court (except those affecting the right of subrogation and the amount to be recovered) is in these words: 'The stranding of the Montana, and the consequent damage to her cargo, having been the direct result of the negligence of the master and officers of the steamer, the respondent is liable therefor.' Negligence is not here stated as a conclusion of law, but assumed as a fact already found. The conclusion of law is, in effect, that, such being the fact, the respondent is liable, notwithstanding any clause in the bills of lading.
The question of negligence is fully and satisfactorily discussed in the opinion of the district court reported in 17 Fed. Rep. 377, and in that of the circuit court, reported in 22 Blatchf. 372, 22 Fed. Rep. 715. It is largely, if not wholly, a question of fact, the decision of which by the circuit court cannot be reviewed here; and, so far as it can possibly be held to be or to involve a question of law, it is sufficient to say that the circumstances of the case, as found by the circuit court, clearly warrant, if they do not require, a court or jury, charged with the duty of determining issues of fact, to find that the stranding was owing to the negligence of the officers of the ship.
The contention that the appellant is not a common carrier may also be shortly disposed of. By the settled law, in the absence of some valid agreement to the contrary, the owner of a general ship, carrying goods for hire, whether employed in internal, in coasting, or in foreign commerce, is a common carrier, with the liability of an insurer against all losses, except only from such irresistible causes as the act of God and public enemies. Moll. De J. Mar. bk. 2, c. 2, § 2; 2 Bac. Abr. 'Carrier,' A; Barclay v. Cucullav Gana, 3 Doug. 389; 2 Kent, Comm. 598, 599; Story, Bailm. § 501; The Niagara, 21 How. 7, 23; The Lady Pike, 21 Wall. 1, 14. In the present case the circuit court has found as facts: 'The Montana was an ocean steamer, built of iron, and performed regular service as a common carrier of merchandise and passengers between the ports of Liverpool, England, and New York, in the line commonly known as the 'Guion Line.' By her, and by other ships in that line, the respondent was such common carrier. On March 2, 1880, the Montana left the port of New York, on one of her regular voyages, bound for Liverpool, England, with a full cargo, consisting of about twenty-four hundred tons of merchandise, and with passengers.' The bills of lading, annexed to the answer and to the findings of fact, show that the four shipments in question amounted to less than 130 tons, or hardly more than one-twentieth part of the whole cargo. It is clear, therefore, upon this record, that the appellant is a common carrier, and liable as such, unless exempted by some clause in the bills of lading. In each of the bills of lading, the excepted perils, for loss or damage from which it is stipulated that the appellant shall not be responsible, include 'barratry of master or mariners,' and all perils of the seas, rivers, or navigation, described more particularly in one of the bills of lading as 'collision, stranding, or other peril of the seas, rivers, or navigation, of whatever nature or kind soever, and howsoever such collision, stranding, or other peril may be caused,' and in the other three bills of ading described more generally as any 'accidents of the seas, rivers, and steam navigation, of whatever nature or kind soever;' and each bill of lading adds, in the following words in the one, and in equivalent words in the others, 'whether arising from the negligence, default, or error in judgment of the master, mariners, engineers, or others of the crew, or otherwise howsoever.' If the bills of lading had not contained the clause last quoted, it is quite clear that the other clauses would not have relieved the appellant from liability for the damage to the goods from the stranding of the ship through the negligence of her officers. Collision or stranding is, doubtless, a peril of the seas; and a policy of insurance against perils of the seas covers a loss by stranding or collision, the seas covers a loss by stranding or collision, the master or crew, because the insurer assumes to indemnify the assured against losses from particular perils, and the assured does not warrant that his servants shall use due care to avoid them. Insurance Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. 351, 364, 365; Insurance Co. v. Adams, 123 U. S. 67, 73, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; Copeland v. Insurance Co., 2 Metc. 432, 448-450. But the ordinary contract of a carrier does involve an obligation on his part to use due care and skill in navigating the vessel and carrying the goods; and, as is everywhere held, an exception, in the bill of lading, of perils of the sea or other specified perils does not excuse him from that obligation, or exempt him from liability for loss or damage from one of those perils to which the negligence of himself or his servants has contributed. Navigation Co. v. Bank, 6 How. 344, Express Co. v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129; Grill v. Screw Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 600, and L. R. 3 C. P. 476; The Xantho, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 503, 510, 515.
We are then brought to the consideration of the principal question in the case, namely, the validity and effect of that clause in each bill of lading by which the appellant undertook to exempt itself from all responsibility for loss or damage by perils of the sea, arising from negligence of the master and crew of the ship. This question appears to us to be substantially determined by the judgment of this court in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357. That case, indeed, differed in its facts from the case at bar. It was an action brought against a railroad corporation by a drover who, while being carried with his cattle on one of its trains under an agreement which it had required him to sign, and by which he was to pay certain rates for the carriage of the cattle, to pass free himself, and to take the risks of all injuries to himself or to them, was injured by the negligence of the defendant or its servants. The judgment for the plaintiff, however, was not rested upon the form of the agreement, or upon any difference between railroad corporations and other carriers, or between carriers by land and carriers by sea, or nbetween carriers of passengers and carriers of goods, but upon the broad ground that no public carrier is permitted by law to stipulate for an exemption from the consequences of the negligence of himself or his servants. The very question there at issue, defined at the baginning of the opinion as 'whether a railroad company, carrying passengers for hire, can lawfully stipulate not to be answerable for their own or their servants' negligence in reference to such carriage,' was stated a little further on in more general terms as 'the question before propounded, namely, whether common carriers may excuse themselves from liability for negligence;' and a negative answer to the question thus stated was a necessary link in the logical chain of conclusions announced at the end of the opinion as constituting the ratio decidedi. 17 Wall. 359, 363, 384. The course of reasoning, supported by elaborate argument and illustration, and by copious references to authorities, by which those conclusions were reached, may be summed up as follows:
By the common law of England and America before the declaration of independence, recognized by the weight of English authority for half a century afterwards, and upheld by decisions of the highest courts of many states of the Union, common carriers could not stipulate for immunity for their own or their servants' negligence. The English railway and canal traffic act of 1854, declaring void all notices and conditions made by those classes of common carriers, except such as should be held by the court or judge before whom the case should be tried to be just and reasonable, was substantially a return to the rule of the common law. The only important modification by the congress of the United States of the previously existing law on this subject is the act of 1851, to limit the liability of ship-owners, (act March 3, 1851, c. 43, 9 St. 635; Rev. St. §§ 4282-4289,) and that act leaves them liable without limit for their own negligence, and liable to the extent of the ship and freight for the negligence or misconduct of the master and crew. The employment of a common carrier is a public one, charging him with the duty of accommodating the public in the line of his employment. A common carrier is such by virtue of his occupation, not by virtue of the responsibilities under which he rests. Even if the extent of those responsibilities is restricted by law or by contract, the nature of his occupation makes him a common carrier still. A common carrier may become a private carrier, or a bailee for hire, when, as a matter of accommodation or special engagement, he undertakes to carry something which it is not his business to carry. But when a carrier has a regularly established business for carrying all or certain articles, and especially if that carrier is a corporation created for the purpose of the carrying trade, and the carriage of the articles is embraced within the scope of its chartered powers, it is a common carrier, and a special contract about its responsibility does not divest it of that character. The fundamental principle upon which the law of common carriers was established was to secure the utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duties. That end was effected in regard to goods, by charging the common carrier as an insurer, and in regard to passengers, by exacting the highest degree of carefulness and diligence. A carrier who stipulates not to be bound to the exercise of care and diligence seeks to put off the essential duties of his employment. Nor can those duties be waived in respect to his agents or servants, especially where the carrier is an artificial being, incapable of acting except by agents and servants. The law demands of the carrier carefulness and diligence in performing the service; not merely an abstract carefulness and diligence in proprietors and stockholders who take no active part in the business. To admit such a distinction in the law of common carriers, as the business is now carried on, would be subversive of the very object of the law. The carrier and his customer do not stand upon a footing of equality. The individual customer has no real freedom of choice. He cannot afford to higgle or stand out, and seek redress in the courts. He prefers rather to accept any bill of lading, or to sign any paper, that the carrier presents, and in most cases he has no alternative but to do this, or to abandon his business. Special contracts between the carrier and the customer, the terms of which are just and reasonable, and not contrary to public policy, are upheld; such as those exempting the carrier from responsibility for losses happening from accident, or from dangers of navigation that no human skill or diligence can guard against; or for money or other valuable articles, liable to be stolen or damaged, unless informed of their character or value; or for perishable articles or live animals, when injured without default or negligence of the carrier. But the law does not allow a public carrier to abandon altogether his obligations to the public, and to stipulate for exemptions which are unreasonable and improper, amounting to an abnegation of the essential duties of his employment. It being against the policy of the law to allow stipulations which will relieve the railroad company from the exercise of care or diligence, or which, in other words, will excuse it for negligence in the performance of its duty, the company remains liable for such negligence. This analysis of the opinion in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood shows that it affirms and rests upon the doctrine that an express stipulation by any common carrier for hire, in a contract of carriage, that he shall be exempt from liability for losses caused by the negligence of himself or his servants, is unreasonable and contrary to public policy, and consequently void. And such has always been the understanding of this court, expressed in several later cases. Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, 268; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123, 134; Bank v. Express Co., 93 U. S. 174, 183; Railway Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655; Hart v. Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331, 338, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151; Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 322, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750, 1176; Inman v. Railway Co., 129 U. S. 128, ante, 249.
The general doctrine is nowhere stated more explicitly than in Hart v. Railroad Co. and Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co., just cited, and there does not appear to us to be anything in the decision or opinion in either of those cases which supports the appellant's position. In the one case, a contract fairly made between a railroad company and the owner of the goods, and signed by the latter, by which he was to pay a rate of freight based on the condition that the company assumed liability only to the extent of an agreed valuation of the goods, even in case of loss or damage by its negligence, was upheld as just and reasonable, because a proper and lawful mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier might be responsible and the compensation which he received, and of protecting himself against extravagant or fanciful valuations, which is quite different from exempting himself from all responsibility whatever for the negligence of himself and his servants. In the other, the decision was that, as a common carrier might lawfully obtain from a third person insurance on the goods carried against loss by the usual perils, though occasioned by negligence of the carrier's servants, a stipulation in a bill of lading that the carrier, when liable for the loss, should have the benefit of any insurance effected on the goods, was valid as between the carrier and the shipper, even when the negligence of the carrier's servants was the cause of the loss. Upholding an agreement by which the carrier receives the benefit of any insurance obtained by the shipper from a third person is quite different from permitting the carrier to compel the shipper to obtain insurance, or to stand his own insurer, against negligence on the part of the carrier.
It was argued for the appellant that the law of New York, the lex loci contractus, was settled by recent decisions of the court of appeals of that state in favor of the right of a carrier of goods or passengers, by land or water, to stipulate for exemption from all liability for his own negligence. Mynard v. Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 180; Spinetti v. Steamship Co., 80 N. Y. 71. But on this subject, as on any question depending upon mercantile law and not upon local statute or usage, it is well settled that the courts of the United States are not bound by decisions of the courts of the state, but will exercise their own judgment, even when their jurisdiction attaches only be reason of the citizenship of the parties, in an action at law of which the courts of the state have concurrent jurisdiction, and upon a contract made and to be performed within the state. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368; Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Carpenter v. Insurance Co., 16 Pet. 495, 511; Swift v. Tyson, Id. 1; Railroad Co. v. Bank, 102 U. S. 14; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 33, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Bucher v. Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 555, 583, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 974. The decisions of the state courts certainly cannot be allowed any greater weight in the federal courts when exercising the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction exclusively vested in them by the constitution of the United States.
It was also argued in behalf of the appellant that the validity and effect of this contract, to be performed principally upon the high seas, should be governed by the general maritime law, and that by that law such stipulations are valid. To this argument there are two answers: First. There is not shown to be any such general maritime law. The industry of the learned counsel for the appellant has collected articles of codes, decisions of courts, and opinion of commentators in France, Italy, Germany, and Holland, tending to show that, by the law administered in those countries, such a stipulation would be valid. But those decisions and opinions do not appear to have been based on general maritime law, but largely, if not wholly, upon provisions or omissions in the codes of the particular country, and it has been said by many jurists that the law of France, at least, was otherwise. See 2 Pard. Droit Com. No. 542; 4 Goujet & Meyer Dict. Droit Com. (2d Ed.) Voiturier, Nos. 1, 81; 2 Troplong Droit Civil, Nos. 894, 910, 942, and other books cited in Navigation Co. v. Shand, 3 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 272, 278, 285, 286; 25 Laurent Droit Civil Francais, No. 532; MELLISH, L. J., in Cohen v. Railway Co., L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 253, 257. Secind. The general maritime law is in force in this country, or in any other, so far only as it has been adopted by the laws or usages thereof; and no rule of the general maritime law (if any exists) concerning the validity of such a stipulation as that now before us has ever been adopted in the United States or in England, or recognized in the admiralty courts of either. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 29, 33; The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 369, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; The Hamburg, 2 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 289, 319, Brown. & L. 253, 272; Lloyd v. Guibert, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115, 123, 124, 6 Best & S. 100, 134, 136; The Gaetano, L. R. 7 Prob. Div. 137, 143.
It was argued in this court, as it had been below, that as the contract was to be chiefly performed on board of a British vessel, and to be finally completed in Great Britain, and the damage occurred in Great Britain, the case should be determined by the British law, and that by that law the clause exempting the appellant from liability for losses occasioned by the negligence of its servants was valid. The circuit court declined to yield to this argument, upon two grounds: (1) That as the answer expressly admitted the jurisdiction of the circuit court asserted in the libel, and the law of Great Britain had not been set up in the answer nor proved as a fact, the case must be decided according to the law of the federal courts as a question of general commercial law; (2) that there was nothing in the contracts of affreightment to indicate a contracting in view of any other law than the recognized law of such forum in the United States as should have cognizance of suits on the contracts. 22 Blatchf. 397, 22 Fed. Rep. 728. The law of Great Britain since the declaration of independence is the law of a foreign country, and, like any other foreign law, is matter of fact, which the courts of this country cannot be presumed to be acquainted with, or to have judicial knowledge of, unless it is pleaded and proved. The rule that the courts of one country cannot take cognizance of the law of another without plea and proof has been constantly maintained, at law and in equity, in England and America. Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 236; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 426, 427; Dainese v. Hale, 91 U. S. 13, 20, 21; Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Ex parte Cridland, 3 Ves. & B. 94, 99; Lloyd v. Guibert, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115, 129, 6 Best & S. 100, 142. In the case last cited, Mr. Justice WILLES, delivering judgment in the exchequer chamber, said: 'In order to preclude all misapprehension, it may be well to add that a party who relies upon a right or an exemption by foreign law is bound to bring such law properly before the court, and to establish it in proof. Otherwise the court, not being entitled to notice such law without judicial proof, must proceed according to the law of England.' The decision in Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221, and 114 U. S. 218, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857, did not in the least qualify this rule, but only applied the settled doctrine that the circuit courts of the United States, and this court on appeal from their decisions, take judicial notice of the laws of the several states of the Union as domestic laws; and it has since been adjudged, in accordance with the general rule as to foreign law, that this court, upon writ of error to the highest court of a state, does not take judicial notice of the law of another state, not proved in that court and made part of the record sent up, unless by the local law that court takes judicial notice of it. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277, 285, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1194.
The rule is as well established in courts of admiralty as in courts of common law or courts of equity. Chief Justice MARSHALL, delivering judgment in the earliest admiralty appeal in which he took part, said: 'That the laws of a foreign nation, designed only for the direction of its own affairs, are not to be noticed by the courts of other countries, unless proved as facts, and that this court, with respect to facts, is limited to the statement made in the court below, cannot be questioned.' Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38. And in a recent case in admiralty, Mr. Justice BRADLEY said: 'If a collision should occur in British waters, at least between British ships, and the injured party should seek relief in our courts, we would administer justice according to the British law, so far as the rights and liabilities of the parties were concerned, provided it were shown what that law was. If not shown, we would apply our own law to the case. In the French or Dutch tribunals they would do the same.' The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 29. So Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, in the high court of admiralty, said: 'Upon all principles of common jurisprudence, foreign law is always to be proved as a fact.' Le Louis, 2 Dod. 210, 241. To the same effect are the judgments of the judicial committee of the privy council in The Prince George, 4 Moore, P. C. 21, and The Peerless, 13 Moore, P. C. 484. And in a more recent case, cited by the appellant, Sir ROBERT PHILLIMORE said: 'I have no doubt whatever that those who rely upon the difference between the foreign law and the law of the forum in which the case is brought are bound to establish that difference by competent evidence.' The Duero, L. R. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 393, 397. It was therefore rightly held by the circuit court, upon the pleadings and proofs upon which the case had been argued, that the question whether the British law differed from our own was not open.
But it appears by the supplemental record, certified to this court in obedience to a writ of certiorari, that after the circuit court had delivered its opinion and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and before the entry of a final decree, the appellant moved for leave to amend the answer by averring the existence of the British law, and its applicability to this case, and to prove that law; and that the motion was denied by the circuit court, because the proposed allegation did not set up any fact unknown to the appellant at the time of filing the original answer, and could not be allowed under the rules of that court. 22 Blatchf. 402-404, 22 Fed. Rep. 730. On such a question we should be slow to overrule a decision of the circuit court. But we are not prepared to say that if, upon full consideration, justice should appear to require it, we might not do so, and order the case to be remanded to that court, with directions to allow the answer to be amended and proof of the foreign law to be introduced. The Adeline, 9 Cranch, 244, 284; The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1, 38; The Charles Morgan, 115 U. S. 69, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1172; Insurance Co. v. Allen, 121 U. S. 67, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821; The Gazelle, 128 U.S. 474, 9 S.Ct. 139. And the question of the effect which the law of Great Britain, if duly alleged and proved, should have upon this case has been fully and ably argued. Under these circumstances, we prefer not to rest our judgment upon technical grounds of pleading or evidence, but, taking the same course as in Insurance Co. v. Allen, just cited, proceed to consider the question of the effect of the proof offered, if admitted.
It appears by the cases cited in behalf of the appellant, and is hardly denied by the appellee, that under the existing law of Great Britain, as declared by the latest decisions of her courts, common carriers, by land or sea, except so far as they are controlled by the provisions of the railway and canal traffic act of 1854, are permitted to exempt themselves by express contract from responsibility for losses occasioned by negligence of their servants. The Duero, L. R. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 393; Taubman v. Pacific Co., 26 Law T. (N. S.) 704; Steel v. Steam-Ship Co., L. R. 3 App. Cas. 72; Railway Co. v. Brown, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 703. It may therefore be assumed that the stipulation now in question, though invalid by our law, would be valid according to the law of Great Britain. The general rule as to what law should prevail, in case of a conflict of laws concerning a private contract, was concisely and exactly stated before the declaration of independence by Lord MANSFIELD, (as reported by Sir William Blackstone, who had been of counsel in the case,) as follows: 'The general rule, established ex comitate et jure gentium, is that the place where the contract is made, and not where the action is brought, is to be considered in expounding and enforcing the contract. But this rule admits of an exception, where the parties (at the time of making the contract) had a view to a different kingdom.' Robinson v. Bland, 1 W. Bl. 234, 256, 258, 2 Burrows, 1077, 1078.
The recent decisions by eminent English judges, cited at the bar, so clearly affirm and so strikingly illustrate the rule, as applied to cases more or less resembling the case before us, that a full statement of them will not be inappropriate.
In Navigation Co. v. Shand, 3 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 272, 290, Lord Justice TURNER, delivering judgment in the privy council, reversing a decision of the supreme court of Mauritius, said: 'The general rule is that the law of the country where a contract is made governs as to the nature, the obligation, and the interpretation of it. The parties to a contract are either the subjects of the power there ruling, or as temporary residents owe it a temporary allegiance. In either case, equally, they must be understood to submit to the law there prevailing, and to agree to its action upon their contract. It is, of course, immaterial that such agreement is not expressed in terms. It is equally an agreement in fact, presumed de jure, and a foreign court interpreting or enforcing it on any contrary rule defeats the intention of the parties, as well as neglects to observe the recognized comity of nations.' It was accordingly held that the law of England, and not the French law in force at Mauritius, governed the validity and construction of a contract made in an English port between an English company and an English subject to carry him thence by way of Alexandria and Suez to Mauritius, and containing a stipulation that the company should not be liable for loss of passengers' baggage, which the court in Mauritius had held to be invalid by the French law. Id. 278. Lord Justice TURNER observed that it was a satisfaction to find that the court of cassation in France had pronounced a judgment to the same effect, under precisely similar circumstances, in the case of a French officer taking passage at Hong Kong, an English possession, for Marseilles in France, under a like contract, on a ship of the same company, which was wrecked in the Red sea, owing to the negligence of her master and crew. Julien v. Oriental Co., imperfectly stated in 3 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 282, note, and fully reported in 75 Journal du Palais, 225, (1864).
The case of Lloyd v. Guibert, 6 Best & S. 100, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115, decided in the queen's bench before, and in the exchequer chamber after, the decision in the privy council just referred to, presented this peculiar state of facts: A French ship owned by Frenchmen was chartered by the master, in pursuance of his general authority as such, in a Danish West India island, to a British subject, who knew her to be French, for a voyage from St. Marc, in Hayti, to Havre, London, or Liverpool, at the charterer's option, and he shipped a cargo from St. Marc to Liverpool. On the voyage, the ship sustained damage from a storm which compelled her to put into a Portuguese port. There the master lawfully borrowed money on bottomry, and repaired the ship, and she carried her cargo safe to Liverpool. The bondholder proceeded in an English court of admiralty against the ship, freight, and cargo, which being insufficient to satisfy the bond, he brought an action at law to recover the deficiency against the owners of the ship; and they abandoned the ship and freight in such manner as by the French law absolved them from liability. It was held that the French law governed the case, and therefore the plaintiff could not recover. It thus appears that in that case the question of the intent of the parties was complicated with that of the lawful authority of the master; and the decision in the queen's bench was put wholly upon the ground that the extent of his authority to bind the ship, the freight, or the owners was limited by the law of the home port of the ship, of which her flag was sufficient notice. 6 Best & S. 100. That decision was in accordance with an earlier one of Mr. Justice STORY, in Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465, as well as with later ones in the privy council, on appeal from the high court of admiralty, in which the validity of a bottomry bond has been determined by the law prevailing at the home port of the ship, and not by the law of the port where the bond was given. The Karnak, L. R. 2 P. C. 505, 512; The Gaetano, L. R. 7 Prob. Div. 137. See, also, The Woodland, 7 Ben. 110, 118, 14 Blatchf. 499. 503, and 104 U. S. 180.
The judgment in the exchequer chamber in Lloyd v. Guibert was put upon somewhat broader ground. Mr. Justice WILLES, in delivering that judgment, said: 'It is generally agreed that the law of the place where the contract is made is prima facie that which the parties intended, or ought to be presumed to have adopted, as the footing upon which they dealt, and that such law ought therefore to prevail in the absence of circumstances indicating a different intention, as, for instance, that the contract is to be entirely performed elsewhere, or that the subject-matter is immovable property situated in another country, and so forth; which latter, though sometimes treated as distinct rules, appear more properly to be classed as exceptions to the more general one, by reason of the circumstances indicating an intention to be bound by a law different from that of the place where the contract is made; which intention is inferred from the subject-matter and from the surrounding circumstances, so far as they are relevant to construe and determine the character of the contract.' L. R. 1 Q. B. 122, 123, 6 Best & S. 133.
It was accordingly held, conformably to the judgment in Navigation Co. v. Shand, above cited, that the law of England, as the law of the place of final performance or port of discharge, did not govern the case, because it was 'manifest that what was to be done at Liverpool was but a small portion of the entire service to be rendered, and that the character of the contract cannot be determined thereby,' although as to the mode of delivery the usages of Liverpool would govern. L. R. 1 Q. B. 125, 126, 6 Best & S. 137. It was then observed that the law of Portugal, in force where the bottomry bond was given, could not affect the case; that the law of Hayti had not been mentioned or relied upon in argument; and that, 'in favor of the law of Denmark, there is the cardinal fact that the contract was made in Danish territory, and, further, that the first act done towards performance was weighing anchor in a Danish port;' and it was finally, upon a view of all the circumstances of the case, decided that the law of France, to which the ship and her owners belonged, must govern the question at issue. The decision was, in substance, that the presumption that the contract should be governed by the law of Denmark, in force where it was made, was not overcome in favor of the law of England by the fact that the voyage was to an English port and the charterer an Englishman, nor in favor of the law of Portugal by the fact that the bottomry bond was given in a Portuguese port; but that the ordinary presumption was overcome by the consideration that French owners and an English charterer, making a charter-party in the French language of a French ship, in a port where both were foreigners, to be performed partly there by weighing anchor for the port of loading, (a place where both parties would also be foreigners,) partly at that port by taking the cargo on board, principally on the high seas, and partly by final delivery in the port of discharge, must have intended to look to the law of France as governing the question of the liability of the owner beyond the value of the ship and freight.
In two later cases, in each of which the judgment of the queen's bench division was affirmed by the court of appeal, the law of the place where the contract was made was held to govern, notwithstanding some of the facts strongly pointed towards the application of another law,—in the one case, to the law of the ship's flag; and in the other, to the law of the port where that part of the contract was to be performed, for the nonperformance of which the suit was brought. In the first case a bill of lading, issued in England, in the English language, to an English subject, by a company described therein as an English company, and in fact registered both in England and in Holland, for goods shipped at Singapore, an English port, to be carried to a port in Java, a Dutch possession, in a vessel with a Dutch name, registered in Holland, commanded by a Dutch master, and carrying the Dutch flag, in order to obtain the privilege of trading with Java, was held to be governed by the law of England, and not by that of Holland, in determining the validity and construction of a clause exempting the company from liability for negligence of master and crew; and Lords Justices BRETT and LINDLEY both considered it immaterial whether the ship was regarded as English or Dutch. Bank v. Navigation Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 118, and L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 521, 529, 536, 540, 544. As Lord Justice LINDLEY observed: 'This conclusion is not at all at variance with Lloyd v. Guibert, but rather in accordance with it. It is true that in that case the law of the flag prevailed; but the intention of the parties was admitted to be the crucial test, and the law of the ship's flag was considered as the law intended by the parties to govern their contract, as there really was no other law which they could reasonably be supposed to have contemplated. The plaintiff there was English; the defendant French; the lex loci contractus was Danish; the ship was French; her master was French; and the contract was in the French language. The voyage was from Hayti to Liverpool. The facts here are entirely different, and so is the inference to be deduced from them. The lex loci contractus was here English, and ought to prevail unless there is some good ground to the contrary. So far from there being such ground, the inference is very strong that the parties really intended to contract with reference to English law.' L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 540. In the remaining English case, a contract made in London between two English mercantile houses, by which one agreed to sell to the other 20,000 tons of Algerian esparto, to be shipped by a French company at an Algerian port on board vessels furnished by the purchasers at London, and to be paid for by them in London on arrival, was held to be an English contract, governed by English law, notwithstanding that the shipment of the goods in Algiers had been prevented by vis major, which, by the law of France in force there, excused the seller from performing the contract. Jacobs v. Cr edit Lyonnais, L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 589. That result was reached by applying the general rule expressed by DENMAN, J., in these words: 'The general rule is that where a contract is made in England between merchants carrying on business here, as this is, but to be performed elsewhere, the construction of the contract, and all its incidents, are to be governed by the law of the country where the contract is made, unless there is something to show that the intention of the parties was that the law of the country where the contract is to be performed should prevail;' and summed up by the court of appeal, consisting of BRETT, M. R., and BOWEN, L. J., as follows: 'The broad rule is that the law of a country where a contract is made presumably governs the nature, the obligation, and the interpretation of it, unless the contrary appears to be the express intention of the parties.' L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 596, 597, 600.
This court has not heretofore had occasion to consider by what law contracts like those now before us should be expounded. But it has often affirmed and acted on the general rule, that contracts are to be governed, as to their nature, their validity, and their interpretation, by the law of the place where they were made, unless the contracting parties clearly appear to have had some other law in view. Cox v. U. S., 6 Pet. 172; Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S. 406; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102; Lamar v. Micou, 114 U. S. 218, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 353, 362, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91. The opinion in Watts v. Camors, just cited, may require a word or two of explanation. It was there contested whether, in a charter-party made at New Orleans between an English owner and an American charterer of an English ship, for a voyage from New Orleans to a port on the continent of Europe, a clause regulating the amount payable in case of any breach of the contract was to be considered as liquidating the damages, or as a penalty only. Such was the question of which the court said that if it depended upon the intent of the parties, and consequently upon the law which they must be presumed to have had in view, they 'must be presumed to look to the general maritime law of the two countries, and not to the local law of the state in which the contract is signed.' The choice there was not between the American law and the English law, but between the statutes and decisions of the state of Louisiana and a rule of the maritime law common to the United States and England.
Some reliance was placed by the appellant upon the following observations of Mr. Justice STORY, sitting in the circuit court: 'If a contract is to be performed partly in one country and partly in another country, it admits of a double aspect, nay, it has a double operation, and is, as to the particular parts, to be interpreted distinctively; that is, according to the laws of the country where the particular parts are to be performed or executed. This would be clearly seen in the case of a bill of lading of goods deliverable in portions or parts at ports in different countries. Indeed, in cases of contracts of affreightment and shipment, it must often happen that the contract looks to different portions of it to be performed in different countries; some portions at the home port, some at the foreign port, and some at the return port.' 'The goods here were deliverable in Philadelphia; and what would be an effectual delivery thereof, in the sense of the law, (which is sometimes a nice question,) would, beyond question, be settled by the law of Pennsylvania. But to what extent the owners of the schooner are liable to the shippers for a non-fulfillment of a contract of shipment of the master—whether they incur an absolute or a limited liability—must depend upon the nature and extent of the authority which the owners gave him, and this is to be measured by the law of Massachusetts,' where the ship and her owners belonged. Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465, 484, 485. But in that case the last point stated was the only one in judgment; and the previous remarks evidently had regard to such distinct obligations included in the contract of affreightment as are to be performed in a particular port,—for instance, what would be an effectual delivery, so as to terminate the liability of the carrier, which, in the absence of express stipulation on that subject, is ordinarily governed by the law or usage of the port of discharge. Robertson v. Jackson, 2 C. B. 412; Lloyd v. Guibert, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 115, 126, 6 Best & S. 100, 137.
In Morgan v. Railroad Co., 2 Woods, 244, a contract made in New York, by a person residing there, with a railroad corporation having its principal office there, but deriving its powers from the laws of other states, for the conveyance of interests in railroads and steam-boat lines, the delivery of property, and the building of a railroad in those states, and which, therefore, might be performed partly in New York, and must be performed partly in the other states, was held by Mr. Justice BRADLEY, so far as concerned the right of one party to have the contract rescinded on account of non-performance by the other party, to be governed by the law of New York, and not by either of the diverse laws of the other states in which parts of the contract were to be performed.
In Hale v. Navigation Co., 15 Conn. 538, 546, goods were shipped at New York for Providence, in Rhode Island, or Boston, in Massachusetts, on a steam-boat employed in the business of transportation between New York and Providence; and an exemption, claimed by the carrier under a public notice, was disallowed by the supreme court of Connecticut, because by the then law of New York the liability of a common carrier could not be limited by such a notice. Chief Justice WILLIAMS, delivering judgment, said: 'The question is, by what law is this contract to be governed? The rule upon that subject is well settled, and has been often recognized by this court, that contracts are to be construed according to the laws of the state where made, unless it is presumed from their tenor that they were entered into with a view to the laws of some other state. There is nothing in this case, either from the location of the parties or the nature of the contract, which shows that they could have had any other law in view than that of the place where it was made. Indeed, as the goods were shipped to be transported to Boston or Providence, there would be the most entire uncertainty what was to be the law of the case if any other rule was to prevail. We have therefore no doubt that the law of New York, as to the duties and obligations of common carriers, is to be the law of the case.'
In Dyke v. Railway Co., 45 N. Y. 113, 117, a passenger traveling upon a ticket by which a railroad corporation, established in New York, and whose road extended from one place to another in that state, passing through the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey by their permission, agreed to carry him from one to another place in New York, was injured in Pennsylvania, by the law of which the damages in actions against railroads for personal injury were limited to $3,000. The court of appeals of New York held that the law of Pennsylvania had no application to the case; and Mr. Justice ALLEN, delivering the opinion, referred to the case of Navigation Co. v. Shand, before cited, as analogous in principle, and said: 'The contract was single, and the performance one continuous act. The defendant did not undertake for one specific act, in part performance, in one state, and another specific and distinct act in another of the states named, as to which the parties could be presumed to have had in view the laws and usages of distinct places. Whatever was done in Pennsylvania was a part of the single act of transportation from Attica or Waverly, in the state of New York, to the city of New York, and in performance of an obligation assumed and undertaken in this state, and which was indivisible. The obligation was created here, and by force of the laws of this state, and force and effect must be given to it in conformity to the laws of New York. The performance was to commence in New York, and to be fully completed in the same state, but liable to breach, partial or entire, in the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, through which the road of the defendant passed; but whether the contract was broken, and if broken the consequences of the breach, should be determined by the laws of this state. It cannot be assumed that the parties intended to subject the contract to the laws of the other states, or that their rights and liabilities should be qualified or varied by any diversities that might exist between the laws of those states and the lex loci contractus.'
In McDaniel v. Railway Co., 24 Iowa, 412, 417, cattle transported by a railroad company from a place in Iowa to a place in Illinois, under a special contract made in Iowa, containing a stipulation that the company should be exempt from liability for any damage, unless resulting from collision or derailing of trains, were injured in Illinois by the negligence of the company's servants; and the supreme court of Iowa, Chief Justice DILLON presiding, held the case to be governed by the law of Iowa, which permitted no common carrier to exempt himself from the liability which would exist in the absence of contract. The court said: 'The contract being entire and indivisible, made in Iowa, and to be partly performed here, it must, as to its validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, be governed by our law. And by our law, so far as it seeks to change the common law, it is wholly nugatory and inoperative. The rights of the parties, then, are to be determined under the common law, the same as if no such contract had been made.'
So in Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild, 69 Ill. 260, where a railroad company received in Indiana goods consigned to Leavenworth, in Kansas, and carried them to Chicago, in Illinois, and there delivered them to another railroad company, in whose custody they were destroyed by fire, the supreme court of Illinois held that the case must be governed by the law of Indiana, by which the first company was not liable for the loss of the goods after they had passed into the custody of the next carrier in the line of transit.
The other cases in the courts of the several states cited at the bar afford no certain or satisfactory guide. Two cases, held not to be governed by a statute of Pennsylvania, providing that no railroad corporation should be liable for a loss of passenger's baggage beyond $300, unless the excess in value was disclosed and paid for, were decided (whether rightly or not we need not consider) without much reference to authority, and upon their peculiar circumstances,—the one case, on the ground that a contract by a New Jersey corporation to carry a passenger and his baggage from a wharf in Philadelphia across the Delaware river, in which the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey had equal rights of navigation and passage, and thence through the state of New Jersey to Atlantic City, was a contract to be performed in New Jersey and governed by the law of that state; (Brown v. Railroad Co., 83 Pa. St. 316;) and the other case, on the ground that the baggage received at a town in Pennsylvania, to be carried to New York city, having been lost after its arrival by negligence on the part of the railroad company, the contract, so far as concerned the delivery, was to be governed by the law of New York, (Curtis v. Railroad Co., 74 N. Y. 116.) The suggestion in Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9, 29, that the question, whether the liability of a railroad corporation for goods transported through parts of two states was that of a common carrier or of a forwarder only, should be governed by the law of the state in which the loss happened, was not necessary to the decision, and appears to be based on a strained inference from the observations of Mr. Justice STORY in Pope v. Nickerson, above cited. In a later case, the supreme court of New Hampshire reserved any expression of opinion upon a like question. Gray v. Jackson, 51 N. H. 9, 39.
This review of the principal cases demonstrates that, according to the great preponderance, if not the uniform concurrence, of authority, the general rule that the nature, the obligation, and the interpretation of a contract are to be governed by the law of the place where it is made, unless the parties at the time of making it have some other law in view, requires a contract of affreightment, made in one country between citizens or residents thereof, and the performance of which begins there, to be governed by the law of that country, unless the parties, when entering into the contract, clearly manifest a mutual intention that it shall be governed by the law of some other country. There does not appear to us to be anything in either of the bills of lading in the present case tending to show that the contracting parties looked to the law of England, or to any other law than that of the place where the contract was made. The bill of lading for the bacon and hams was made and dated at New York, and signed by the ship's agent there. It acknowledges that the goods have been shipped 'in and upon the steam-ship called 'Montana,' now lying in the port of New York, and bound for the port of Liverpool,' and are to be delivered at Liverpool. It contains no indication that the owners of the steam-ship are English, or that their principal place of business is in England, rather than in this country. On the contrary, the only description of the line of steam-ships, or of the place of business of their owners, is in a memorandum in the margin, as follows: 'Guion Line. United States Mail Steamers. New York: 29 Broadway. Liverpool: 11 Rumford St.' No distinction is made between the places of business at New York and at Liverpool, except that the former is named first. The reservation of liberty, in case of an interruption of the voyage, 'to tranship the goods by any other steamer,' would permit transshipment into a vessel of any other line, English or American. And general average is to be computed, not by any local law or usage, but 'according to York-Antwerp rules,' which are the rules drawn up in 1864 at York, in England, and adopted in 1877 at Antwerp, in Belgium, at international conferences of representatives of the more important mercantile associations of the United States, as well as of the maritime countries of Europe. Lown. Av. (3d Ed.) app. Q.
The contract being made at New York, the ship-owner having a place of business there, and the shipper being an American, both parties must be presumed to have submitted themselves to the law there prevailing, and to have agreed to its action upon their contract. The contract is a single one, and its principal object, the transportation of the goods, is one continuous act, to begin in the port of New York, to be chiefly performed on the high seas, and to end at the port of Liverpool. The facts that the goods are to be delivered at Liverpool, and the freight and primage, therefore, payable there in sterling currency, do not make the contract an English contract, or refer to the English law the question of the liability of the carrier for the negligence of the master and crew in the course of the voyage. Navigation Co. v. Shand, Lloyd v. Guibert, and Bank v. Navigation Co., before cited.
There is even less ground for holding the three bills of lading of the cotton to be English contracts. Each of them is made and dated at Nashville, an inland city, and is a through bill of lading, over the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and its connections, and by the Williams and Guion Steam-Ship Company, from Nashville to Liverpool; and the whole freight from Nashville to Liverpool is to be 'at the rate of fifty-four pence sterling per 100 lbs. gross weight.' It is stipulated that the liability of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and its connections as common carriers 'terminates on delivery of the property to the steam-ship company at New York, when the liability of the steam-ship commences, and not before;' and that 'the property shall be transported from the port of New York to the port of Liverpool by the said steam-ship company, with liberty to ship by any other steam-ship or steam-ship line.' And in the margin is this significant reference to a provision of the statutes of the United States, applicable to the ocean transportation only: 'Attention of shippers is called to the act of congress of 1851: 'Any person or persons shipping oil of vitriol, unslacked lime, inflammable matches, [or] gunpowder, in a ship or vessel taking cargo for divers persons on freight, without delivering at the time of shipment a note in writing, expressing the nature and character of such merchandise, to the master, mate, or officer, or person in charge of the loading of the ship or vessel, shall forfeit to the United States one thousand dollars." Act March 3, 1851, c. 43, § 7, 9 St. 636; Rev. St. § 4288. It was argued that as each bill of lading, drawn up and signed by the carrier and assented to by the shipper, contained a stipulation that the carrier should not be liable for losses by perils of the sea arising from the negligence of its servants, both parties must be presumed to have intended to be bound by that stipulation, and must therefore, the stipulation being void by our law and valid by the law of England, have intended that their contract should be governed by the English law; and one passage in the judgment in Navigation Co. v. Shand gives some color to the argument. 3 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 291. But the facts of the two cases are quite different in this respect. In that case, effect was given to the law of England, where the contract was made, and both parties were English, and must be held to have known the law of their own country. In this case, the contract was made in this country, between parties one residing and the other doing business here; and the law of England is a foreign law, which the American shipper is not presumed to know. Both parties or either of them may have supposed the stipulation to be valid; or both or either may have known that by our law, as declared by this court, it was void. In either aspect, there is no ground for inferring that the shipper, at least, had any intention, for the purpose of securing its validity, to be governed by a foreign law, which he is not shown, and cannot be presumed, to have had any knowledge of.
Our conclusion on the principal question in the case may be summed up thus: Each of the bills of lading is an American, and not an English, contract, and, so far as concerns the obligation to carry the goods in safety, is to be governed by the American law, and not by the law, municipal or maritime, of any other country. By our law, as declared by this court, the stipulation by which the appellant undertook to exempt itself from liability for the negligence of its servants is contrary to public policy, and therefore void; and the loss of the goods was a breach of the contract, for which the shipper might maintain a suit against the carrier. This being so, the fact that the place where the vessel went ashore, in consequence of the negligence of the master and officers in the prosecution of the voyage, was upon the coast of Great Britain, is quite immaterial. This conclusion is in accordance with the decision of Judge BROWN in the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York in The Brantford City, 29 Fed. Rep. 373, which appears to us to proceed upon more satisfactory grounds than the opposing decision of Mr. Justice CHITTY, sitting alone in the chancery division, made since this case was argued, and, so far as we are informed, not reported in the law reports, nor affirmed or considered by any of the higher courts of Great Britain. In re Steam-Ship Co., 58 Law T. (N. S.) 377.
The present case does not require us to determine what effect the courts of the United States should give to this contract, if it had expressly provided that any question arising under it should be governed by the law of England. The question of the subrogation of the libelant to the rights of the shippers against the carrier presents no serious difficulty. From the very nature of the contract of insurance as a contract of indemnity, the insurer, upon paying to the assured the amount of a loss, total or partial, of the goods insured, becomes, without any formal assignment, or any express stipulation to that effect in the policy, subrogated in a corresponding amount to the assured's right of action against the carrier or other person responsible for the loss, and in a court of admiralty may assert in his own name that right of the shipper. The Potomac, 105 U. S. 630, 634; Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 321, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750, 1176. In the present case the libelant, before the filing of the libel, paid to each of the shippers the greater part of his insurance, and thereby became entitled to recover so much, at least, from the carrier. The rest of the insurance money was paid by the libelant before the argument in the district court, and that amount might have been claimed by amendment, if not under the original libel. The Charles Morgan, 115 U. S. 69, 75, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1172; The Gazelle, 128 U. S. 474, 9 S.Ct. 139. The question of the right of the libelant to recover to the whole extent of the insurance so paid was litigated and included in the decree in the district court, and in the circuit court on appeal; and no objection was made in either of those courts, or at the argument in this court, to any insufficiency of the libel in this particular.
The appellant does, however, object that the decree should not include the amount of the loss on the cotton shipped under through bills of lading from Nashville to Liverpool. This objection is grounded on a clause in those bills of lading which is not found in the bill of lading of the bacon and hams shipped at New York; and on the adjudication in Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750, 1176, that a stipulation in a bill of lading that a carrier, when liable for a loss of the goods, shall have the benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon them, is valid as between the carrier and the shipper, and therefore limits the right of an insurer of the goods, upon paying to the shipper the amount of a loss by stranding, occasioned by the negligence of the carrier's servants, to recover over against the carrier. But it behooves a carrier setting up such a defense to show clearly that the insurance on the goods is one which by the terms of his contract he is entitled to the benefit of. Inman v. Railway Co., 129 U.S. 128, ante, 249. The through bills of lading of the cotton are signed by an agent of the railroad companies and the steam-ship company, 'severally, but not jointly,' and contain, in separate columns, two entirely distinct sets of 'terms and conditions,' the first relating exclusively to the land carriage by the railroads and their connections, and the second to the ocean transportation by the steamship. The clause relied on, providing that in case of any loss or damage of the goods, whereby any legal liability shall be incurred, that company only shall be held answerable in whose actual custody the goods are at the time, 'and the carrier so liable shall have the full benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or on account of said goods,' is inserted in the midst of the terms and conditions defining the liability of the railroad companies, and is omitted in those defining the liability of the steam-ship company, plainly signifying an intention that this clause should not apply to the latter. It is quite clear, therefore, that the appellant has no right to claim the benefit of any insurance on the goods. See Railroad Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wall. 594, 602. The result of these considerations is that the decree of the circuit court is in all respects correct and must be affirmed.
FULLER, C. J., and LAMAR, J., were not members of the court when this case was argued, and took no part in its decision.
Affirming 22 Fed. Ren. 715.
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