BARNETT v. KINNEY, Sheriff.

The supreme court of the territory held that a nonresident could not make an assignment, with preferences, of personal property situated in Idaho, that would be valid as against a nonresident attaching creditor, the latter being entitled to the same rights as a citizen of Idaho; that the recognition by one state of the laws of another state governing the transfer of property rested on the principle of comity, which always yielded when the policy of the state where the property was located had prescribed a different rule of transfer from that of the domicile of the owner; that this assignment was contrary to the statutes and the settled policy of Idaho, in that it provided for preferences; that the fact that the assignee had taken and was in possession of the property could not affect the result; and that the distinction between a voluntary and an involuntary assignment was entitled to no consideration.

Undoubtedly there is some conflict of authority on the question as to how far the transfer of personal property by assignment or sale, lawfully made in the country of the domicile of the owner, will be held to be valid in the courts of another country. where the property is situated, and a different local rule prevails.

We had occasion to consider this subject somewhat in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 129, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269, and it was there said: 'Great contrariety of state decision exists upon this general topic, and it may be fairly stated that, as between citizens of the state of the forum, and the assignee appointed under the laws of another state, the claim of the former will be held superior to that of the latter by the courts of the former; while, as between the assignee and citizens of his own state and the state of the debtor, the laws of such state will ordinarily be applied in the state of the litigation, unless forbidden by, or inconsistent with, the laws or policy of the latter. Again, although, in some of the states, the fact that the assignee claims under a decree of a court or by virtue of the law of the state of the domicile of the debtor and the attaching creditor, and not under a conveyance by the insolvent, is regarded as immaterial, yet, in most, the distinction between involuntary transfers of property, such as work by operation of law, as foreign bankrupt and insolvent laws, and a voluntary conveyance is recognized. The reason for the distinction is that a voluntary transfer, if valid where made, ought generally to be valid everywhere, being the exercise of the personal right of the owner to dispose of his own, while an assignment by operation of law has no legal operation out of the state in which the law was passed. This is a reason which applies to citizens of the actual situs of the property when that is elsewhere than at the domicile of the insolvent, and the controversy has chiefly been as to whether property so situated can pass even by a voluntary conveyance.'

We have here a voluntary transfer of his property by a citizen of Utah for the payment of his debts, with preferences, which transfer was valid in Utah, where made, and was consummated by the delivery of the property in Idaho, where it was situated, and then taken on an attachment in favor of a creditor not a resident or citizen of Idaho. Was there anything in the statutes or established policy of Idaho invalidating such transfer?

Title 12 of part 3 of the Revised Statutes of the Territory of Idaho, entitled 'Of proceedings in insolvency,' (Rev. St. §§ 5875-5932,) provided that 'no assignment of any insolvent debtor, otherwise than as provided in this title, is legal or binding on creditors;' that creditors should share pro rata, 'without priority or preference whatever;' for the discharge of the insolvent debtor upon compliance with the provisions of the title, by application for such discharge by petition to the district court of the county in which he had resided for six months next preceding, with schedule and inventory annexed, giving a true statement of debts and liabilities, and a description of all the insolvent's estate, including his homestead, if any, and all property exempt by law from execution. The act applied to corporations and partnerships, and declared that, if the partners resided in different counties, that court in which the petition was first filed should retain jurisdiction over the case. Nothing is clearer from its various provisions than that the statute had reference only to domestic insolvents. As pointed out by Judge Berry in his dissenting opinion, the first section of the 58 upon this subject, in providing that 'every insolvent debtor may upon compliance with the provisions of this title, be discharged from his debts and liabilities,' demonstrates this. The legislature of Idaho certainly did not attempt to discharge citizens of other jurisdictions from their liabilities, nor intend that personal property in Idaho, belonging to citizens of other states or territories, could not be applied to the payment of their debts unless they acquired a six months' residence in some county of Idaho, and went through its insolvency court.

The instrument in controversy did not purport to be executed under any statute, but was an ordinary common-law assignment, with preferences, and as such was not, in itself, illegal. Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, 434, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193. And it was found as a fact that it was valid under the laws of Utah. While the statute of Idaho prescribed pro rata distribution, without preference, in assignments under the statute, it did not otherwise deal with the disposition of his property by a debtor, nor prohibit preferences between nonresident debtors and creditors through an assigument valid by the laws of the debtor's domicile. No just rule required the courts of Idaho, at the instance of a citizen of another state, to adjudge a transfer, valid at common law and by the law of the place where it was made, to be invalid, because preferring creditors elsewhere, and therefore in contravention of the Idaho statute and the public policy therein indicated in respect of its own citizens, proceeding thereunder. The law of the situs was not incompatible with the law of the domicile.

In Halstead v. Straus, 32 Fed. Rep. 279, which was an action in New Jersey, involving an attachment there by a New York creditor as against the voluntary assignee of a New York firm, the property in dispute being an indebtedness of one Straus, a resident of New Jersey, to the firm, Mr. Justice Bradley remarked: 'It is true that the statute of New Jersey declares that assignments in trust for the benefit of creditors shall be for their equal benefit, in proportion to their several demands, and that all preferences shall be deemed fraudulent and void; but this law applies only to New Jersey assignments, and not to those made in other states, which affect property or creditors in New Jersey. It has been distinctly held by the courts of New Jersey that a voluntary assignment made by a nonresident debtor, which is valid by the law of the place where made, cannot be impeached in New Jersey, with regard to property situated there, by nonresident debtors. Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N. J. Eq. 462; Moore v. Bonnell, 31 N. J. Law, 90. The execution of foreign assignments in New Jersey will be enforced by its courts as a matter of comity, except when it would injure its own citizens; then it will not. If Deering, Milliken & Co. were a New Jersey firm, they could successfully resist the execution of the assignment in this case. But they are not; they are a New York firm. New York is their business residence and domicile. The mere fact that one of the partners resides in New Jersey cannot alter the case. The New Jersey courts, in carrying out the policy of its statute for the protection of its citizens, by refusing to carry into effect a valid foreign assignment, will be governed by reasonable rules of general jurisprudence; and it seems to me that to refuse validity to the assignment in the present case would be unreasonable and uncalled for.' In May v. Bank, 122 Ill. 551, 13 N. E. Rep. 806, the supreme court of Illinois held that the provision in the statute of that state prohibiting all preferences in assignments by debtors applied only to those made in the state, and not to those made in other states; that the statute concerned only domestic assignments and domestic creditors; and the court, in reference to the contention that, if not against the terms, the assignment was against the policy of the statute, said: 'An assignment giving preferences, though made without the state, might, as against creditors residing in this state, with some reason, be claimed to be invalid, as being against the policy of the statute in respect of domestic creditors; that it was the policy of the law that there should be an equal distribution in respect to them. But, as the statute has no application to assignments made without the state, we cannot see that there is any policy of the law which can be said to exist with respect to such assignments, or with respect to foreign creditors. and why nonresidents are not left free to execute voluntary assignments, with or without preferences, among foreign creditors, as they may see fit, so long as domestic creditors are not affected thereby, without objection lying to such assignments that they are against the policy of our law. The statute was not made for the regulation of foreign assignments, or for the distribution, under such assignments, of a debtor's property among foreign creditors.'

In Frank v. Bobbitt, 155 Mass. 112, 29 N. E. Rep. 209, a voluntary assignment made in North Carolina, and valid there, was held valid and enforced in Massachusetts, as against a subsequent attaching creditor of the assignors, resident in still another state, and not a party to the assignment. The supreme judicial court observed that the assignment was a voluntary, and not a statutory, one; that the attaching creditors were not resident in Massachusetts; that at common law, in that state, an assignment for the benefit of creditors which created preferences was not void for that reason; and that there was no statute which rendered invalid such an assignment when made by parties living in another state, and affecting property in Massachusetts; citing Train v. Kendall, 137 Mass. 366. Referring to the general rule that a contract, valid by the law of the place where made, would be regarded as valid elsewhere, and stating that 'it is not necessary to inquire whether this rule rests on the comity which prevails between different states and countries, or is a recognition of the general right which every one has to dispose of his property or to contract conterning it as he chooses,' the court said that the only qualification annexed to voluntary assignments made by debtors living in another state had been 'that this court would not sustain them if to do so would be prejudicial to the interests of our own citizens, or opposed to public policy;' and added: 'As to the claim of the plaintiffs that they should stand as well as if they were citizens of this state, it may be said, in the first place, that the qualification attached to foreign assignments is in favor of our own citizens as such, and, in the next place, that the assignment being valid by the law of the place where it was made, and not adverse to the interests of our citizens, nor opposed to public policy, no cause appears for pronouncing it invalid.' And see, among numerous cases to the same effect, Butler v. Wendell, 57 Mich. 62, 23 N. W. Rep. 460; Receiver v. First Nat. Bank, 34 N. J. Eq. 450; Egbert v. Baker, 58 Conn. 319, 20 Atl. Rep. 466; Chafee v. Bank, 71 Me. 514; Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29; Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 372, 1 S. W. Rep. 168; Thurston v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 474.

We do regard our decision in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 7 Wall. 139, as to the contrary. That case was fully considered in Cole v. Cunningham, supra, and need not be re-examined. The controversy was between two creditors of the owner of personalty in Illinois, one of them having obtained judgment in a suit in which the property was attached, and the other claiming under a chattel mortgage. By the Illinois statute such a mortgage was void as against third persons, unless acknowledged and recorded as provided, or unless the property was delivered to and remained with the mortgagee; and the mortgage in that case was not so acknowledged and recorded, nor had possession been taken. All parties were citizens of New York, but that fact was not considered sufficient to overcome the distinctively politic and coercive law of Illinois.

In our judgment the Idaho statute was inapplicable, and the assignment was in contravention of no settled policy of that territory. It was valid at common law, and valid in Utah, and, the assignee having taken possession before the attachment issued, the district court was right in the conclusions of law at which it arrived.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the supreme court of the state of Idaho for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed.