FELICIANO v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 23–861

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NICK FELICIANO, PETITIONER v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit

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 Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson join, dissenting.

 Federal civilian employees who also serve as military reservists are entitled to “differential pay” when they are called to active-duty service “during a national emergency.” See 5 U. S. C. §5538; 10 U. S. C. §101(a)(13)(B). Differential pay compensates such reservists for the difference between their military and civilian salaries when active-duty service would otherwise cause a pay cut. The question before us is what Congress meant by the phrase “during a national emergency.” Depending on the context, that phrase could require only that a national emergency be concurrently ongoing, or it could require that a reservist’s service also be in support of a particular national emergency. Given the context here, I would conclude that a reservist is called to serve “during a national emergency” only if his call comes in the course of an operation responding to a national emergency. Because the Court requires only that an emergency be concurrently ongoing, I respectfully dissent.

I

A

 “Tens of thousands” of federal civilian employees also serve our Nation as military reservists. Ante, at 1. Sometimes these individuals earn lower salaries when called into  active-duty military service than they do in their regular jobs. To mitigate this disparity, in 2009 Congress passed the so-called “differential pay” statute, which ensures that qualifying reservists will continue to receive the amount of their civilian Government salaries while on active duty. See §751, 123 Stat. 693–695, as amended, 5 U. S. C. §5538. The reservist’s civilian employer is responsible for paying the difference. §5538(c)(1).

 The statute does not, however, grant a blanket authorization for differential pay. Instead, it makes a federal civilian employee eligible if, as relevant here, he is called to active duty “under . . . a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10.” §5538(a).

 Section 101(a)(13)(B) is one part of the military’s definition of “ ‘contingency operation.’ ” This statute defines a “contingency operation” as “a military operation that”:

 “(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or

 “(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 13 of this title, section 3713 of title 14, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.”

 The list of cross-referenced provisions in §101(a)(13)(B) has evolved since Congress first enacted this definition in 1991, but Congress has throughout maintained a catchall for calls to active-duty service under other provisions “during a war or during a national emergency.” See §631(a), 105 Stat. 1380.

 B

 Petitioner Nick Feliciano is an air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) who also served as a reserve officer for the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard called him to active-duty service for much of the period between July 2012 and February 2017.

 Pursuant to Coast Guard policy, each time it called him to active duty, the Coast Guard provided Feliciano orders listing the basis for its call. As relevant here, three of Feliciano’s calls specified that he was being “called up under 10 U. S. C. 12301(d) per Executive Order 13223.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a–76a; App. in No. 22–1219 (CA Fed.), p. 129. Section 12301(d) is not one of the provisions specifically enumerated in §101(a)(13)(B). It authorizes the Government to “order a member of a reserve component . . . to active duty, . . . with the consent of that member.” §12301(d).

 Executive Order 13223, in turn, authorizes the military to call reservists to active duty in furtherance of the national emergency declared after the September 11 terrorist attacks. 66 Fed. Reg. 48201 (2001). Consistent with that directive, Feliciano’s §12301(d) orders noted that he was being called “in support of a DOD contingency operation,” while also listing the relevant operations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a–76a; App. in No. 22–1219, at 129.

 Feliciano did not immediately seek differential pay from the FAA for his service under these orders. He instead raised the issue in a 2018 appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), as part of a complaint alleging that the FAA had subjected him to a hostile work environment. The MSPB denied Feliciano’s request for differential pay.

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 2023 WL 3449138, *1 (May 15, 2023). Feliciano’s case turned on whether he had established that his service occurred “during a national emergency” within the meaning of §101(a)(13)(B). The Federal Circuit concluded that he had not: Under Circuit precedent, Feliciano needed  to show a “connection between his service and [an] ongoing national emergency,” id., at *2, such that he was “directly called to serve in a contingency operation.” Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, 3 F. 4th 1375, 1379 (CA Fed. 2021). But, notwithstanding the language on the face of his orders suggesting that his service was connected to the post-September 11 emergency, Feliciano did not “alleg[e] any connection.” 2023 WL 3449138, *2. Instead, he argued only that the Federal Circuit’s precedent was wrong, and that any active-duty service should count if there is a national emergency ongoing. We granted certiorari.

II

A

 This case turns on the meaning of the word “during” in §101(a)(13)(B). The parties dispute whether the phrase “during a national emergency” covers any reservist who performs active-duty service while a national emergency is ongoing, or whether it requires a connection between the service and the emergency.

 As with other common words, the meaning of “during” “depends on the context in and purpose for which it is used.” Wachovia Bank, N. A. v. Schmidt, 546 U. S. 303, 318 (2006). Sometimes, “during” can merely “denot[e] a temporal link,” wherein one event need only occur while another event is ongoing. United States v. Ressam, 553 U. S. 272, 274 (2008). Other times, however, we use “during” in a narrower, relational sense, to reference only events that are substantively connected to the ongoing event—that is, events that occur “in the course of ” or “in the process of ” the ongoing event. See 3 Oxford English Dictionary 1055 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis deleted); 4 id., at 1134.

 Case law reflects this variation. In Ressam, for example, we held that the word “during” was used in the broader temporal sense in 18 U. S. C. §844(h), which mandates a  sentencing enhancement for defendants who “ ‘carr[y] an explosive during the commission of [a] felony.’ ” 553 U. S., at 274–275 (quoting §844(h)(2)). That enhancement thus applies to any defendant whose carrying was “contemporaneous with” his felony, even if it was not “ ‘in relation to’ the underlying felony.” Id., at 273–275.

 Conversely, courts in other contexts have held that the word “during” contains a relational component. For instance, several Circuits have recognized this component in the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of “relevant conduct,” which encompasses all actions by the defendant “that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (Nov. 2024); see, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 128 F. 4th 1170, 1180–1183 (CA10 2025) (collecting cases, and distinguishing Ressam). “[W]hen defining ‘relevant conduct,’ ” they have explained, “the term ‘during’ conveys a linkage that is more than a mere temporal overlap; it also conveys a qualitative overlap such that the conduct must be related or connected to the crime of conviction.” United States v. Agyekum, 846 F. 3d 744, 751 (CA4 2017).

 Title 10 also reflects this variation. The Government has suggested that the similar phrase “[i]n time of national emergency” in §12302 “speaks only temporally.” Ante, at 7 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62). But, other provisions in Title 10 appear to speak in relational terms. For example, as the majority acknowledges, when Congress defined “ ‘captured record’ ” to mean certain “material captured during combat operations,” it presumably was describing only material captured in the course of those combat operations. §427(g)(1); see ante, at 10.

 The upshot is that the word “during” does not have a  single definition on which to hang our analysis. Instead,  to determine its meaning here, we must read the §101(a)(13)(B) catchall “in [its] context and with a view to  [its] place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989).

B

 The context of §101(a)(13)(B) makes clear that active-duty service occurs “during a national emergency” within the meaning of that provision only if the service occurs in the course of a national emergency. In other words, the reservist must be called to serve in an operation responding to a national emergency. Several important textual clues counsel in favor of this reading.

1

 To start, the scope of the phrase “during a national emergency” is limited by §101(a)(13)(B)’s location within Congress’s definition of “contingency operation.” Because “an entirely artificial definition is rare,” we typically expect the meaning of a definition to be “closely related to the ordinary meaning of the word being defined.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 228 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). Thus, the “ordinary meaning of a defined term” often “plays a . . . limiting role” when choosing between possible interpretations. Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 861–862 (2014).

 This canon applies with full force here. As a matter of ordinary meaning, the term “contingency operation” in Title 10 refers to the subset of military operations that relates to a particular contingency. We should therefore expect §101(a)(13) to cover only operations that are part of the military’s response to “emergency” situations or otherwise necessitated by “required military operations.” Dept. of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 86 (JCS Pub. 1–02 1989). Otherwise, there would be no reason for Congress to use “contingency” as a modifying adjective. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. 9, 19 (2018) (“Adjectives modify nouns—they pick out a subset of a category that possesses a certain quality”).

  The other categories of “contingency operations” in §101(a)(13) conform to this understanding. Section 101(a)(13)(A) covers a paradigmatic kind of contingency operation—those wherein members of the military are likely to be engaged in opposition to “an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force.” Several of the enumerated provisions in §101(a)(13)(B) similarly cover operations directly responding to specific exigent situations. See, e.g., §12304a (“assistance in response to a major disaster or emergency”); §12406 (“invasion” or “rebellion”). And, although the remaining cross-referenced provisions are not pegged to specific exigencies, they too sound in exigency, each signaling some reason why a reservist is called to active duty. See, e.g., §§12301(a), 12302, 12304.

 Because the common thread among these categories is that they contemplate only exigent military operations, it follows that the same should be true of the “during a national emergency” catchall. We ordinarily read catchall “clauses . . . as bringing within a statute categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated.” Federal Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 734 (1973). The catchall here should not be read in a way that eviscerates §101(a)(13)’s “contingency” focus.

 Tellingly, the military itself has understood the term “contingency operation” to have a finite scope. Notwithstanding the existence of ongoing national emergencies, it has for some troop activations issued “orders stat[ing] that they are ‘non-contingency’ activation orders.” Adams, 3 F. 4th, at 1377. For example, like Feliciano, the plaintiff in Adams consented to “ ‘voluntary active duty under [§]12301(d),’ ” but his orders stated that he was being activated in a “ ‘non-contingency’ ” capacity. Id., at 1377, 1380.

 It follows that the phrase “during a national emergency” cannot be understood in purely temporal terms. A purely temporal construction would eviscerate the specification of  “contingency operation”: If all military operations that occur concurrent with a national emergency are contingency operations, then any military operation requiring a call to active-duty service could be a contingency operation, regardless of whether there is any contingency involved. Such a capacious reading would implausibly divorce the term from its ordinary meaning.

 A review of the other provisions in Title 10 that use the term “contingency operation” confirms this implausibility. Because §101(a)(13) is a definition that “appl[ies throughout] this title,” see §101, as well as in other provisions where it is incorporated by reference, its definition must fit the broader statutory scheme, Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 222 (2008). There are “dozens of provisions inside and outside Title 10 that are applicable to” contingency operations, and a broad reading of that term would lead to untold consequences. Brief for Respondent 22. For example, for contracting provisions such as §2662(f ) (1)(E)—where Congress created a reporting requirement but provided an exception for contingency operations—a purely temporal interpretation of “contingency operation” would invite the exception to swallow the rule. Likewise, such an interpretation would mean that—under a provision applying the Uniform Code of Military Justice to civilians who accompany the U. S. military in the field “[i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation”—the availability of civilian court-martial could be quite open-ended. §802(a)(10); see United States v. Ali, 71 M. J. 256, 261–262 (C. A. Armed Forces 2012). That possibility would run up against our normal understanding of court-martial as a “narrow exception” to the civilian justice system, and exacerbate any constitutional infirmities of this provision. Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 21, 31–33 (1957) (plurality opinion). This implausibility is “strong evidence” that the term “contingency operation” must retain limiting force. Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U. S. 533, 548 (2023).

 2

 The need for “contingency operation” to retain limiting force is particularly apparent because Congress enacted §101(a)(13)(B) against a backdrop of indefinite and continual national emergencies. With the exception of a 1-year interregnum from 1978 to 1979, the United States has had at least one national emergency in effect at all times since 1933.¹ Thus, when Congress passed §101(a)(13)(B) in 1991, it would have expected that some national emergency or other would generally be in effect. It strains credulity to think that Congress could have meant “contingency operation” to mean, as a practical matter, essentially every military operation.²

 To the extent there could be any doubt, the structure of §101(a)(13)(B) confirms that Congress did not intend for  the “during a national emergency” catchall to be all  encompassing. After all, Congress created that provision as  a catchall to a long list of enumerated provisions. As originally enacted, §101(a)(13)(B) specified that a “military operation” would qualify as a “ ‘contingency operation’ ” if it “results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty” of troops pursuant to one of seven enumerated provisions, one enumerated chapter of provisions, or “any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency.” 105 Stat. 1290. Congress has maintained this structure since then. The only changes it has made have been to enumerate additional statutes. See §101(a)(13)(B).

 Congress’s focus on a reservist’s “call or order” to active duty and whether that “call or order” arises under specific provisions of law suggests that Congress cared about the contents of and the basis for a reservist’s activation orders. If Congress had meant to effectively deem all operations requiring calls to active-duty service as occurring “during a national emergency,” then its list of enumerated provisions would have been unnecessary. Because some emergency is invariably ongoing, Congress could have omitted all those enumerations without any meaningful difference.

 The superfluity involved in a purely temporal reading is a strong sign that a military operation occurs “during a national emergency” only if it occurs in the course of the Government’s response to a national emergency. Because we interpret statutes, where possible, to avoid superfluity, we strive to avoid interpretations that “would in practical effect render [statutory language] entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 29 (2001). We likewise strive to avoid “unbounded interpretation[s]” of a catchall that would “render superfluous” Congress’s provision of “a reticulated list” elsewhere in the statute. Fischer v. United States, 603 U. S. 480, 493 (2024). Reading “during a national emergency” in §101(a)(13)(B) to reach only operations undertaken in the course of the national emergency would avoid these disfavored interpretive outcomes.

 3

 The postenactment history of both §101(a)(13)(B) and the differential-pay statute that incorporates that provision further counsel in favor of reading “during a national emergency” narrowly. It is well established that “subsequent acts can shape or focus” our selection between possible statutory meanings. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 143 (2000). And, in particular, we must read “a change in [statutory] language . . . , if possible, to have some effect.” American Nat. Red Cross v. S. G., 505 U. S. 247, 263 (1992). But here, Congress’s postenactment amendments would be superfluous if all military operations were already contingency operations through the “during a national emergency” catchall.

 Most notably, Congress in 2013 amended §101(a)(13)(B) to specify that military operations requiring troop activations under what is now 14 U. S. C. §3713—a provision allowing for the emergency activation of Coast Guard reservists in certain circumstances—would henceforth qualify as contingency operations. §681(a), 126 Stat. 1795. Congress also specified that this amendment would be “retroactive” for one year for purposes of differential pay. §681(d)(2)(A), id., at 1796. But, if the phrase “during a national emergency” makes all military operations contingency operations while a national emergency is in effect, then this amendment and its retroactivity provision would have been wholly superfluous. With emergencies always in effect, including for the entirety of the 1-year retroactivity period, reservists activated pursuant to the Coast Guard provision would already have been participants in contingency operations and so entitled to differential pay.

 Other congressional amendments reflect the same problem. In 2011, Congress amended §101(a)(13)(B) to deem as contingency operations military operations requiring activations through §12304a, which allows certain reservists to  be called to active duty “[w]hen a Governor requests Federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency.” §515(b), 125 Stat. 1395. And, in 2018, Congress amended the differential-pay statute to entitle reservists activated under 10 U. S. C. §12304b to differential pay. §605, 132 Stat. 1795. That provision allows activations for “preplanned mission[s] in support of a combatant command.” §12304b(a). But, given the backdrop of constant national emergencies, these changes could have little, if any, practical effect if §101(a)(13)(B) already made all military operations contingency operations so long as an emergency is ongoing.

 Because we disfavor statutory interpretations that would render statutory language all but superfluous “in practical effect,” it makes little sense to conclude that Congress enacted these amendments in case of a hypothetical day without emergencies. TRW, 534 U. S., at 29. This statutory history therefore provides another reason to adopt a cabined reading of the “during a national emergency” language.

*  *  *

 Taken together, these contextual clues establish that the “during a national emergency” catchall in §101(a)(13)(B) reaches only military operations conducted in response to a national emergency. The differential-pay statute, in covering any reservist who is called to active duty “pursuant to a call or order” under “a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B),” incorporates §101(a)(13)(B)’s limits. 5 U. S. C. §5538(a). Thus, the statutory context of 10 U. S. C. §101(a)(13)(B) also establishes that a reservist qualifies for differential pay under the “catchall” only if he is called to serve in an operation responding to a national emergency. Reservists cannot benefit if they are called to serve merely while other, unrelated emergency responses are ongoing.

 III

 The majority does not persuasively grapple with the foregoing evidence of §101(a)(13)(B)’s meaning. At most, its reasoning suggests that Congress could have spoken more clearly. But, that conclusion cannot justify the Court’s decision today.

 As an initial matter, the majority wrongly puts a thumb on the scale in favor of reading the word “during” in a purely temporal sense. “Normally,” it says, “that word ‘denotes a temporal link’ and means ‘contemporaneous with.’ ” Ante, at 4 (quoting Ressam, 553 U. S., at 274–275). But, as the majority later acknowledges, the meaning of “during” is context dependent. Ante, at 9–10; supra, at 4–6. Often, “ordinary reader[s]” will read “during” to “require both a temporal and substantive connection.” Ante, at 10. Our decision in Ressam is not to the contrary: It stated only that the purely temporal sense was “the most natural reading of the word as used in the statute” at issue. 553 U. S., at 274–275 (emphasis added).

 Even if the majority were right about “during” as a general matter, we still must read statutes in context. See Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U. S. 435, 441 (2019) (narrowly reading a term that, “standing alone, is broad”). Here, the majority too quickly brushes aside the key contextual clues in the scheme before us.

 To start, the majority cannot disregard the ordinary meaning of “contingency operation” on the ground that we are interpreting an “express statutory definition” of that term. Ante, at 11, n. 4. When the meaning of a statutory definition is unclear, “the ordinary meaning of the term . . . is one of ‘the most important’ factors we can consider.” Delligatti v. United States, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 14) (quoting Scalia & Garner 228); see supra, at 6. And, even on the majority’s view, the meaning of §101(a)(13)(B) is at least debatable: The majority acknowledges the “force” of countervailing arguments, and it all but admits that its  reading generates superfluity, at least as to Congress’s retroactive provision of differential pay under the Coast Guard amendment. Ante, at 9, 14, n. 5.

 The majority cannot dodge the larger superfluity problem raised by its overbroad reading either. The majority speculates that there could be a day where no national emergencies are in effect. Ante, at 12–13. But, given the five-plus decades of national emergencies against which Congress legislated, that possibility is far too remote to reflect Congress’s likely intention in enacting §101(a)(13)(B). And, Congress’s postenactment amendments—including the retroactive amendment—only further confirm that it intended all of §101(a)(13)(B) to have present effect.

 The majority downplays the ripple effects its opinion will have for the term “contingency operation” as used in other provisions. Notwithstanding its decision to define “contingency operation” to mean essentially “any military operation,” the majority offers “no views” on the full consequences of its interpretation. Ante, at 15, n. 6. But, Congress made §101(a)(13) the definition for “contingency operation” throughout Chapter 10 and beyond, and so we “must, to the extent possible, ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Ali, 552 U. S., at 222. We cannot leave that obligation for another day.

 The majority’s competing textual arguments are also unavailing. The majority invokes the presumption of consistent usage and the canon of meaningful variation to argue that a comparison with other statutes shows that “during” in §101(a)(13)(B) is merely temporal. Under these principles, “[i]n a given statute, the same term usually has the same meaning and different terms usually have different meanings.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 124, 149 (2024). Thus, the majority argues, it is noteworthy that Congress used only the word “during,” given that other Code provisions use “during” or equivalent language in a purely temporal sense. Ante, at 13. If Congress had wanted  to reach only active-duty service undertaken in the course of a national emergency, the majority posits, it would have borrowed different, clearer language, such as “during and in relation to.” Ante, at 6. These arguments are true as far as they go, but they go only so far.

 Because “drafters more than rarely use the same word to denote different concepts, and often . . . use different words to denote the same concept,” inferences like the majority’s are “particularly defeasible by context.” Scalia & Garner 170–171. And, the presumption of consistent usage and canon of meaningful variation carry especially little weight when applied to words that are “ubiquitous” and “context-dependent,” whose use drafters are not “likely to keep track of and standardize.” Pulsifer, 601 U. S., at 149. That is the case with a preposition such as “during,” which even the majority acknowledges to be context dependent, including in its meaning elsewhere in Title 10. See ante, at 10; supra, at 5. Thus, the majority’s arguments on this front cannot be controlling.³

 Likewise, the interaction of the differential-pay statute with 18 U. S. C. §209 does not move the needle. That statute criminally bars private parties from supplementing a federal employee’s salary, but it creates an exception for parties who give differential pay to reservists serving on “active duty under a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13).” §§209(a), (h). The majority warns that a narrow reading of 10 U. S. C. §101(a)(13) could create liability  for private employers who mistakenly believe an employee to be serving in the course of a national emergency. Ante, at 7–8. But, even setting aside that such employers would likely have a mens rea defense, see ante, at 8, n. 3, this argument for lenity can be relevant only if, “at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed[,] . . . the ordinary canons of statutory construction have revealed no satisfactory construction,” Lockhart v. United States, 577 U. S. 347, 361 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, those ordinary canons supply an answer.

 No more availing is the majority’s invocation of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as evidence of what an “ordinary reader” might think. Ante, at 8–9. The majority highlights that CBO at one point applied the majority’s reading when estimating the cost of “potential legislation featuring [similar] terms.” Ante, at 8. But, as the majority acknowledges, “no one votes for CBO reports,” and courts owe CBO “no rote deference.” Ibid. It is not apparent, then, why CBO’s reports are relevant—particularly given that the reports contain no interpretive analysis.⁴ That one generalist agency, for unknown reasons, once shared the majority’s view is hardly compelling evidence of §101(a)(13)(B)’s meaning, especially given the weight of the interpretive clues and the practice of the military itself. See supra, at 7.

 Finally, the majority cannot fall back on workability concerns. The majority asks how a substantive standard can be discerned from the “during a national emergency” language, pointing to the somewhat different formulations that the Government and I have used compared to the Federal Circuit’s. Ante, at 7, 9. But, “[i]t is not our place to question whether Congress adopted the . . . most workable  policy, only to discern and apply the policy it did adopt.” Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S. 685, 706 (2022).

 In any event, the majority’s concerns are unjustified. However formulated, the inquiry should ordinarily be straightforward. A reservist is eligible for differential pay through the “during a national emergency” catchall if he is called to active-duty service in an operation responding to such an emergency. The nature of an activation can ordinarily be determined from the face of the reservist’s activation orders, which, under Department of Defense and Coast Guard policies, must state whether he is being activated in support of a contingency operation. Brief for Respondent 23–24; see Adams, 3 F. 4th, at 1379. If there is any ambiguity, the reservist or his civilian employer can obtain clarification. Office of Personnel Management, OPM Policy Guidance Regarding Reservist Differential Under 5 U. S. C. 5538, p. 23 (rev. June 23, 2015), https://www.opm.gov/ policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/reservist-differential/policyguidance.pdf. The majority has no basis to deviate from the commands of statutory text.

*  *  *

 My interpretive conclusion does not mean that Feliciano should be denied differential pay. As even the Government admits, Feliciano’s “orders indicate that [he] would have been entitled to differential pay” under a proper reading of §101(a)(13)(B) because they indicate that he was being called to active duty to support the Coast Guard’s response to a national emergency. Brief for Respondent 36; see supra, at 3. The Government argues, however, that petitioner has forfeited any entitlement. Because we are not a court of first view, I would vacate and remand so that the Federal Circuit may assess these issues in the first instance. The majority instead grants Feliciano relief based on a misreading of the statute. I respectfully dissent.