BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 24–568

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MICHAEL J. BOST, et al., PETITIONERS v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

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 Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins, dissenting.

 Under our standing precedents, this is an easy case. Article III requires plaintiffs to assert and establish an “injury in fact”—i.e., the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congressman Bost has failed to allege that the election-related law he seeks to challenge has caused him to suffer any injury that satisfies those requirements.

 A majority of the Court nevertheless concludes that Bost has standing to sue based solely on his status as a candidate for office. The Court thereby subtly shifts from our longstanding actual-injury rule to a presumption that certain kinds of plaintiffs are sufficiently aggrieved to satisfy Article III standing, regardless of whether they will experience any particularized harm. In my view, this dubious departure from settled law disregards both the equal treatment of litigants and judicial restraint.

 Justice Barrett rightly rejects today’s bespoke candidate-standing rule. See ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in judgment). Yet her pocketbook theory would allow political candidates to spend their way past Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement, despite our clear admonition that  plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 402 (2013).

 In the end, I would not allow Bost’s suit to move forward on grounds that we have deemed insufficient to establish Article III standing for other plaintiffs. Because I believe that political candidates can and should be held to the same actual-injury requirements as other litigants, I respectfully dissent.

I

 Any litigant who invokes the judicial power of the federal courts under Article III “must establish that he has a ‘personal stake’ in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819 (1997). Today, however, the Court essentially pronounces that this foundational principle no longer applies to candidates for elected office. It declares that all candidates have standing to challenge election regulations in light of their interest in a “fair process.” Ante, at 4. No matter that, in a democratic society like ours, the interest in a fair electoral process is common to all members of the voting public. The Court thus ignores a core constitutional requirement while unnecessarily thrusting the Judiciary into the political arena.

A

 The majority’s primary failing is its refusal to recognize that the alleged injury it identifies—the suffering that results from an unfair electoral process—is not particular to candidate-plaintiffs. The importance of the particularity requirement cannot be overstated, for it is this requirement that “prevents the judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Such a result is incompatible with our constitutional design, which recognizes that “ ‘abstract questions of wide public significance’ ” are “most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)). In other words, the particularity requirement ensures that the Judiciary stays in its proper lane, leaving to the people’s representatives the prerogative to decide questions of broad importance in the absence of a litigant with a “direct stake in the outcome.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972). As such, litigants without a direct stake—i.e., those who assert no more than “generalized grievances about the conduct of government”—cannot satisfy the “case or controversy aspect of standing.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Today’s decision all but ignores the particularity requirement and the democracy-preserving function that it serves. This case, the Court says, involves “[a]n unlawful election rule,” which necessarily injures candidates’ “interest in a fair process.” Ante, at 4. But, even assuming that Illinois’s rule is unlawful (as we must for standing purposes), the Court makes no real attempt to explain how that injury is particular to candidates; to the contrary, it acknowledges that voters, too, have a stake in a fair electoral process. See ante, at 5. Yet the Court insists that a candidate’s interest is “undeniably different” from that of a voter’s, because it is the candidate—and not the voter—who “compete[s]” in an election. Ibid.

 That assessment gets the significance of the relative interests exactly backward. A public office is a public trust, and an election for that office is the ultimate expression of the will of the people, not a mere competition to be won or lost. In the Court’s telling, though, elections are a glorified  national pastime—the competitors’ success is the main objective, and voters are mere bystanders who simply “lend their support.” Ibid. This depiction drastically devalues the role elections play in a democratic society.¹

 The Court similarly misrepresents the harm that occurs when unlawful election rules “erod[e] public confidence [in] the election results.” Ibid. To be sure, a tainted election can hurt a candidate if it undermines the public’s perception of that officeholder’s legitimacy and harms his reputation in the process (assuming he makes that allegation).² But voters suffer too—and arguably even more so—when their fellow citizens lose confidence in the results of an election. Indeed, the same loss of faith the majority counts as injurious to candidates could be a fatal blow to the public’s interest in democratic governance.³

 Batting away these foundational truths, the Court finds “no occasion to theorize” about the relative significance of voters’ and candidates’ shared interest in free and fair elections. Ibid. But it is the Court’s own analysis—i.e., its  purported distinction between the interests of candidates and voters in fair election outcomes—that raises the comparative question, not mine.

 In any event, I agree that we need not “theorize” about the significance of these interests, for one thing is indisputably clear: Our democracy was founded on the “self-evident” truth that a government is legitimate only insofar as it derives its “just powers from the consent of the governed.” Declaration of Independence ¶2. Candidates come and go, but the voters’ collective interest in the “right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion” is enduring and indispensable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964). Against this backdrop, the Court’s effort to isolate and elevate a candidate’s “distinct” interest in electoral integrity, ante, at 5, falls flat.

 For today’s standing purposes, the key realization is that, in a democracy, the (existential) interest in fair and accurate elections is common to all members of the voting public. I acknowledge that “[t]hose who spend untold time and resources seeking to claim the right to voice the will of the people,” ibid.—candidates—have a particularized interest in getting the job. That is precisely why candidates do have Article III standing if an unlawful election rule creates a substantial risk of harm to that interest (the risk of an election loss). But when what is at stake is the overall fairness of the electoral process, it is the people’s shared interest in democracy itself (and not just the candidate’s job prospects) that hangs in the balance.

B

 The Court’s standing analysis elides all this by employing the commonsense intuition that, “[w]in or lose, candidates suffer when the process departs from the law.” Ante, at 4. But how is that a particularized injury? Anyone and everyone who is governed by law is similarly harmed by any departure from the law’s requirements. Moreover, this Court  has repeatedly instructed that litigants “may not sue based only on an ‘asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law.’ ” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 381 (2024) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 754 (1984)); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (rejecting theory that taxpayers have standing to challenge an allegedly unlawful government action requiring the use of public funds because “[t]he party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury. . . , and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally”).

 Here, the generalized nature of the “fair process” harm is indisputable: If Illinois’s vote-count rule is unlawful, all participants in the electoral process—not only candidates for office but also every voter who has cast a ballot in the election—would be deprived “of a fair process and an accurate result.” Ante, at 4. But, as this Court has time and again explained, such an assertion of injury “amount[s] to little more than [an] attemp[t ] ‘to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 483 (omission in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 106 (1968)).

 Indeed, our standing precedents make crystal clear that, absent a showing of particularized harm, these sorts of fair-process grievances must be resolved through the political branches. For it is in those branches “where democratic debate can occur and a wide variety of interests and views can be weighed.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380. By contrast, the exercise of judicial power, “which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends,” is a “tool of last resort,” to be invoked only “when the question is raised by a party whose  interests entitle him to raise it.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 473–474 (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Finding no support for a nonparticularized “fair process” harm in either our precedents or the practices of the lower courts, the Court pivots to an analogy. It suggests that, as a candidate running for office who has been told that votes will continue to be counted after election day, Bost is no different from a competitor in a 100-meter dash whose race is “unexpectedly extended to 105 meters.” Ante, at 6. According to the majority, each runner in the newly announced 105-meter race would obviously suffer, regardless of whether he “expects to finish strong.” Ibid. But whether any given runner is harmed by this rule change depends on a number of factors particular to each competitor, none of which the majority deigns to identify. And, indeed, it is far from obvious that a runner with a track record like Bost’s—who expects to win both races based on sound statistical analyses of his current and past performance—would have the injury that begets Article III standing to involve the Judiciary in this rule-change dispute.

 Despite the imprecision of its analysis, the Court is clear about one thing today: Pinpointing the actual harm to candidates for elected office is no longer necessary for standing purposes. Its remarkable holding jettisons the injury-in-fact requirement entirely. Forget injury; political candidates need only have “a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns.” Ante, at 9 (emphasis added). As Justice Barrett explains, see ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in judgment), this harm-free Article III standing rule finds no support in our precedents.⁴

 C

 Perhaps sensing the weakness of its novel, harm-free standing analysis, the Court resorts to policy arguments to bolster it. It worries that requiring candidates to establish that they might lose the election will “channel” lawsuits “to shortly before election day—or worse, after.” Ante, at 7. “Only then,” the Court says, will a candidate really know whether an election regulation has impacted his race. Ibid. And, worse still, a candidate trying to make such a showing could find himself in the “awkward” position of having to “plead and prove that voters who take advantage of the challenged rule will favor his rivals.” Ante, at 8–9.

 The relevance of these practical concerns is unclear. We have traditionally viewed Article III standing as an “irreducible” constitutional minimum, “not merely a troublesome hurdle to be overcome.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472, 476. As such, Article III’s “essential and unchanging” constitutional mandates do not ordinarily yield to our policy judgment about when it would be most convenient for courts to hear particular kinds of suits. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted).

  In any event, under our usual standing rules, a candidate (and our democracy) need not be put in the awkward position of waiting until the eve of an election or predicting an electoral loss with 100% accuracy. Our cases recognize that a litigant who bases standing on “[a]n allegation of future injury” need only assert a “substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). The substantial-risk standard is not especially exacting; it demands more than mere conjecture, but it does not require plaintiffs to prove that the alleged future harm is “literally certain” to occur. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5.

 Accordingly, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a candidate need only plausibly allege that the challenged regulation creates a substantial risk of an election loss—he need not predict with certainty that the rule will cause him to lose. See, e.g., Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F. 3d 582, 587 (CA5 2006) (concluding that a candidate who alleged that governmental action “threaten[ed] his election prospects” had established standing). Alternatively, a candidate whose win is more secure could allege a substantial risk of some other concrete and particularized harm stemming from the challenged rule’s application, such as an existing or imminent financial or reputational injury. Cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 296 (2022) (recognizing a winning candidate’s $10,000 expenditure as a “pocketbook harm” that “constitute[d] an injury in fact”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 473–474 (1987) (finding standing where a candidate had “alleged and demonstrated” that a challenged disclosure rule would, among other harms, “adversely affect his reputation in the community”).

 Though it may be more difficult for candidates to satisfy the “substantial risk” standard at later stages of litigation, it is nowhere near impossible. It does not require a  candidate to prove that the challenged rule guarantees his loss; it simply requires him to marshal enough evidence from which a court could conclude that the challenged rule presents a significant threat to his victory, his pocketbook, or his reputation.

 As we have recognized in other contexts, that sort of evidence may include an evaluation of the facts on the ground and statistical analyses. See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 767–768 (2019) (concluding that States had standing to challenge the inclusion of a citizenship question on the census, in light of statistical evidence “establish[ing] that noncitizen households have historically responded to the census at lower rates” and “that if noncitizen households [were] undercounted by as little as 2%” those States would “lose out on federal funds”). In the electoral arena, preelection polling will often provide a relevant data set. Candidates could also rely on historical data about how a particular rule has affected those who have run similar campaigns in the past. And the relative advantages or disadvantages of various electoral processes can be scrutinized by the kinds of experts who are routinely hired to make these sorts of assessments. See, e.g., Meese, 481 U. S., at 473–474 (finding standing where a candidate submitted “detailed affidavits, including one describing the results of an opinion poll and another containing the views of an experienced political analyst” to show that a challenged disclosure requirement “would substantially harm his chances for reelection” (footnote omitted)).

 The Court’s suggestion that it is beyond a judge’s competency to evaluate whether an election rule causes a substantial risk of electoral loss, ante, at 7–9, is therefore both puzzling and unfounded. A “substantial risk” of future harm has been the Article III imminent-injury standard for decades. See Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414–415, n. 5 (collecting cases applying this standard). And federal courts, including this one, have routinely applied that standard in a  variety of circumstances—essentially whenever a plaintiff maintains that state action is likely to harm him in the future. See, e.g., Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U. S. 43, 57–58 (2024) (First Amendment challenge related to social media content moderation); Department of Commerce, 588 U. S., at 766–767 (Administrative Procedure Act challenge to changes to the census); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. 139, 153–155 (2010) (environmental challenge to regulations of genetically modified crops).

 In short, our precedents establish that certainty of future harm is not the benchmark, as the majority suggests. Ante, at 7. Rather, all that is required is a plausible allegation (eventually followed by proof ) of a substantial risk of future injury.

 Bost fails to clear even that low bar. At most, he alleges that he “risk[s] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause [him] to lose [his] election” or “reduc[e ]” his “margin of victory” in a way that harms his reputation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–69a (emphasis added). But his complaint and supplemental declaration include no—zero—allegations to support an inference that such risk exists, or is at all substantial, in his own case; for example, he never alleges that untimely ballots are more likely to break against him and in favor of his opponent. Indeed, Bost appears to have disclaimed the need to include any such allegations before the Court of Appeals, where he argued that his “stated injury is not based on a risk of losing the election” and that “[n]either a change to his electoral fortunes nor any other effect is necessary to afford him standing.” Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 23–2644 (CA7), p. 19. The Court today accepts that unprecedented contention, which flies in the face of both the particularity requirement and the substantial-risk standard.

 Alarmingly, today’s ruling also has far-reaching implications beyond Bost’s election, since dispensing with our usual standing requirements opens the floodgates to  exactly the type of troubling election-related litigation the Court purportedly wants to avoid. For example, under the Court’s new harm-free candidate-standing rule, an electoral candidate who loses in a landslide can apparently still file a disruptive legal action in federal court after the election is over. All he must do is assert that an election rule somehow deprived him of a fair process—even if that rule played no role in the election’s outcome or otherwise caused him harm. That possibility is especially concerning given the host of election-related regulations that States must promulgate when exercising their constitutional duty to set the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections.” Art. I, §4, cl. 1. States regulate everything from a ballot’s chain of custody to its format—all of which the majority would permit candidates to challenge in court without offering any theory of how such rules harm them personally. See Brief for District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 16–22 (describing the myriad state regulations at risk under Bost’s broad theory of standing).⁵

 It is impossible to square this outcome with the practical concerns the Court identifies. See, e.g., ante, at 7 (emphasizing that “ ‘federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election’ ” (quoting Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam))). Ironically, then, it is the Court’s new and generous candidate-standing rule that invites late-breaking judicial intervention into the  political process in a manner that is “as practically untenable as it is undemocratic.” Ante, at 7.

II

 While more tethered to our standing precedents, Justice Barrett’s pocketbook-injury theory is also insufficient to support Bost’s standing. This is because it is well settled—in light of our decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398—that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Id., at 402. Bost’s allegations establish only a hypothetical future harm, even when crediting them as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.

 In Clapper, we held that a group of attorneys and human-rights organizations lacked standing to challenge a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) “authorizing the surveillance of individuals who are not ‘United States persons’ and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” Id., at 401 (footnote omitted) (quoting 50 U. S. C. §1881a). The attorneys and organizations premised their standing argument on the possibility that their clients would be surveilled under FISA. 568 U. S., at 406. That possibility, they said, required them to take “costly and burdensome measures” to protect their privacy, including avoiding “certain e-mail and phone conversations” and traveling to their clients “so that they [could] have in-person conversations.” Id., at 415. Yet the attorneys and organizations “ha[d] no actual knowledge” of the Government’s surveillance practices under FISA. Id., at 411. They “merely speculate[d] and ma[de] assumptions about whether their communications” would be targeted. Ibid. As a result, the measures they took to avoid surveillance could not satisfy Article III’s requirements. Id., at 416. Or, put differently, they could not “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on  themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that [was] not certainly impending.” Ibid.

 Bost’s alleged pocketbook injury is no different. He fears that Illinois’s ballot-receipt deadline will allow the State to count illegal votes, which in turn might injure him by costing him an election or at least resulting in a diminished margin of victory that somehow damages his reputation. Brief for Petitioners 18. He has therefore hired poll watchers to monitor the State’s vote counting for an additional two weeks. But, in the absence of any allegation establishing that he actually faces a substantial risk of losing the election or having his margin of victory diminished in a meaningful way, Bost has taken those precautions based on the mere (and by all accounts remote) possibility that such harms will otherwise materialize. At bottom, then, Bost fears a “hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” 568 U. S., at 416. So any additional expenses Bost incurs to ward off that harm is not a proper basis for standing. Ibid.

 Bost nevertheless insists that his case is distinct from Clapper because he knows that the State will apply its 14-day ballot-receipt deadline in his next election. That fact, he says, sets him apart from the attorneys and human-rights organizations in Clapper, who could not prove that the Federal Government would invoke FISA against them or their clients. Stated differently, Bost is certain that the State will apply the ballot-receipt deadline, whereas the Clapper plaintiffs could only speculate as to FISA’s future application.

 This contention misunderstands Clapper’s standing rule and how it applied in that case. In Clapper, the harm the plaintiffs feared (unlawful surveillance) would occur at the precise moment that FISA was invoked against them or their clients. And because the asserted injury stemmed directly from the application of the challenged regulation, the risk of future harm was tied directly to the risk of FISA’s  future application to the plaintiffs. It mattered, then, that the possibility of FISA’s application was only speculative.

 Bost’s feared injury—the one he seeks to spend his way out of—is different in this respect, but it is no less speculative. The harm Bost fears does not stem from the mere (certain) application of the State’s 14-day ballot-receipt deadline. Rather, what triggers Bost’s spending is fear of a lost election or the diminution of his reputation—i.e., the possible downstream effects of the challenged election rule. Thus, even though the rule’s application is certain, the feared harm is not; Bost has only speculated as to the possibility that this future, downstream harm will occur.

 This means that Bost’s pocketbook injury is similar in all relevant respects to that presented by the plaintiffs in Clapper: He is spending money to ward off speculative future injury. His case differs from Clapper only insofar as the source of the harm he is seeking to alleviate is not the (uncertain) application of the regulation itself, but the (uncertain) effects of that regulation. In other words, both Bost and the plaintiffs in Clapper spent money to mitigate a risk of injury that was only theoretical, not substantial. And neither can leverage unnecessary expenditures into Article III standing.

 Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. 139, is not to the contrary. There, we held that farmers who “established a reasonable probability” that genetically modified alfalfa seeds would cross-contaminate their organic alfalfa had standing based on the costly measures they had taken to protect their crops. Id., at 153–155 (internal quotation marks omitted).

 The key phrase from our Monsanto opinion is “reasonable probability.” The farmers did not simply point to a hypothetical possibility of cross-contamination. Instead, their allegations established that their fear of future harm was reasonable. In particular, the farmers explained that modified alfalfa seeds were actually “ ‘being planted in all the  major alfalfa seed production areas with little regard to contamination to non-GMO seed production fields.’ ” Id., at 154, n. 3. The farmers also emphasized “ ‘the compact geographic area of the prime alfalfa seed producing areas and the fact that pollen is distributed by bees that have large natural range of activity.’ ” Ibid. Accordingly, they reasonably predicted that “ ‘the genetic contamination of the [modified] seed [would] rapidly spread through the seed growing regions.’ ” Ibid.

 Bost’s allegations, by comparison, fall well short of demonstrating a reasonable probability of future harm absent costly mitigation efforts. He alleges only that he “risk[s] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause [him] to lose” or diminish his “margin of victory,” leading “to the public perception that [his] constituents have concerns about [his] job performance.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–69a. Examined closely, Bost’s averment is that, if the vote counting continues, he could receive fewer votes, which could cause him to lose the election or could damage his reputation among voters and donors. No other allegations make this harmful outcome likely or otherwise substantiate the risk that any of these potential problems might actually occur.

 Justice Barrett nevertheless suggests that the forgiving standard for motions to dismiss is enough to get Bost over the line. See ante, at 3, n. (opinion concurring in judgment). But that standard cannot benefit a plaintiff like Bost, who is “armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009).⁶ Bost’s  complaint identifies only a “speculative chain of possibilities,” and, as such, his allegations are insufficient to establish a reasonable probability of future harm. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414.⁷

 In an ironic twist, the majority correctly rejects Justice Barrett’s pocketbook-injury theory analysis due to its speculative nature. It rightly acknowledges that a plaintiff who relies on costs to establish standing “must incur those costs to ‘mitigate or avoid’ a ‘substantial risk’ of some independent harm.” Ante, at 9 (quoting Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5). And it recognizes that the independent harm Bost asserts—“discrepancies in late-arriving ballots”—amounts to “conjecture,” with “little support in the pleadings.” Ante, at 9. But rather than follow that observation where it leads, the majority crafts a new candidate-only standing rule, ignoring the patently speculative nature of Bost’s harm based on Bost’s more generalized “interest in a fair process.” Ante, at 4.

 With respect to the majority’s harm-free, fair-process standing theory, Justice Barrett has the better of that argument. She correctly observes that the majority’s  conclusion relieves Bost “of having to show any real harm” and fails to hold him to the same standards that we apply to all other litigants. Ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in judgment). But, given the weaknesses of Bost’s allegations, Justice Barrett’s standing theory would also unjustly benefit Bost, by permitting him to voluntarily spend his way into a federal forum absent any reasonable assertion that the challenged rule (as opposed to his own unsubstantiated fears and spending proclivities) has caused him to suffer an injury in fact.

III

 Forty-some years ago, in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983), this Court considered whether a plaintiff had standing to challenge the Los Angeles Police Department’s repeated use of life-threatening chokeholds on civilians who posed no threat of violence. Id., at 105. The plaintiff in that case, Adolph Lyons, suffered such a chokehold at the hands of police, “rendering him unconscious and causing damage to his larynx.” Id., at 97–98. Fearing that he would again be subjected to a life-threatening chokehold, Lyons filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction that would bar the future use of that technique against civilians who posed no risk to officer safety. Id., at 98.

 We rejected Lyons’s legal action on standing grounds, holding that he had failed to establish a “real and immediate threat” of future harm. Id., at 105. None of Lyons’s appeals to fairness or common sense sufficed to persuade a majority of this Court that he had Article III standing. It did not matter, for instance, that Lyons had almost died from an illegal chokehold only five months prior to filing his complaint. See ibid. Nor did it matter that “no less than 16 persons ha[d] died following the use of a chokehold by an LAPD police officer” in the preceding decade. Id., at 115–116 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because those “odds” did not suggest a substantial risk of harm to Lyons in the future,  we said, he was not entitled to sue for injunctive relief. Id., at 108 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, despite the grievous wrong and physical harm that Lyons (and others like him) had suffered, we “decline[d] the invitation to slight the preconditions” of Article III. Id., at 112.⁸

 If only the Lyons Court had seen fit to create the sort of harm-free, status-based standing rule that the majority adopts today. The majority’s reasoning—leading to today’s holding that “[c]andidates have a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns,” ante, at 9—would have been useful to Lyons. Lyons was a Los Angeles resident who had been unfairly targeted by police violence in the past and who wished to move freely about in the community. Armed with today’s decision, Lyons might have successfully relied upon that status to claim a “concrete and particularized interest” in the rules that governed police officers’ encounters with certain community residents, regardless of whether such police practices would have harmed him in the future.

  But the Lyons standing rule focused on actual injury: We emphasized that a plaintiff must assert (and, ultimately, prove) that the allegedly unlawful practice risks injuring him in a concrete and particularized manner in the future. The bare assertion of an interest in general fairness, absent the showing of any real and immediate harm, is apparently cognizable only if asserted by candidates for office.

*  *  *

 I am all for simplifying our standing law. See ante, at 10. But I am against doing so selectively; either Article III standing requires an actual or imminent injury in fact that is particularized to the plaintiff, or it does not. Bost has plainly failed to allege facts that support an inference of standing under our established precedents. By carving out a bespoke rule for candidate-plaintiffs—granting them standing “to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes,” simply and solely because they are “candidate[s]” for office, ibid.—the Court now complicates and destabilizes both our standing law and America’s electoral processes.