Chevron deference

“Chevron deference” refers to the doctrine under which courts historically deferred to a federal agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency administers. The doctrine originated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court established a two-step test:

  • Has Congress directly addressed the precise issue?
    • If yes, then the court and the agency must follow congressional intent.
    • If not, then move to Step 2.
  • Is the agency’s interpretation reasonable?
    • If so, the court must defer, even if it would have interpreted the statute differently.

For roughly 40 years, Chevron deference was a landmark principle in administrative law. However, in June of 2024, the Supreme Court overruledChevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), declaring:

“The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled.”

Under the traditional Chevron framework, deference applied only to interpretations by agencies responsible for administering the statute in question, and not by others. It did not extend to an agency’s self-determination of its own jurisdiction under the statute. Only interpretations issued via formal processes, such as adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, warranted true Chevron deference. Less formal guidance (e.g., opinion letters, policy statements) was evaluated under the more limited Skidmore deference, which accords weight based on persuasiveness.

By overturningChevron, Loper Bright reasserts that under APA Section 706, courts must “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” It rejects Step 2 of Chevron’s premise that ambiguity implies congressional intent to delegate gap-filling authority to agencies. Ambiguity may be unintentional, and courts cannot relinquish their interpretive role. Instead, courts must interpret statutes independently, recognizing constitutional delegations, defining agency authority, and ensuring agency action is reasoned and within statutory bounds. Agency interpretations may still inform judicial understanding, especially where they rest on factual and technical expertise; but they are no longer entitled to automatic deference.

[Last reviewed in June 2025 by the Wex Definitions Team]

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