Salma Yusuf, a fourteen year old girl, alleged that the appellant police officer, Onesphory Materu, had raped her inside a police cell with a promise to release her (made in writing) after the fact. The trial court found the police officer guilty of rape and convicted him to a sentence of thirty years imprisonment, twenty four strokes of the cane and an order that he pays Shs.700,000 compensation to the complainant. The police officer had appealed for the second time and the court had to consider two grounds: (1) whether the victim was in fact telling the truth; and (2) that the court erred in relying on the “release note” as evidence of the crime. On the first matter, the court noted that inclusion of Section 127 (7) of the Evidence Act as amended by the Sexual Offences Special provisions Act, Number 4 of 1998 means that the only burden imposed on the court is “to give reasons that it is satisfied that a child of tender years or the victim of the offence is telling nothing but the truth”. There is no longer a requirement for the court to warn itself of the dangers of basing a conviction on the uncorroborated evidence of a child where a sexual offence is involved. On the second matter, the court noted that the appellant did not object to the entry into evidence of the note, so there can be no merit in objecting to it now. The conviction and sentencing was upheld.
Women and Justice: Court: Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Tanga
Domestic Case Law
Onesphory Materu v. The Republic Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Tanga (2009)
Seif Mohamed El-Abadan V. The Republic Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Tanga (2009)
The victim was raped by a doctor on 14 November 2006 at Magunga Hospital in Korogwe District. The appeal asserted that the witness in the trail was not credible. The appellate Court concluded that it was unable to “find a ground for denting the credibility of the complainant” and “not having found any contradictions in the evidence of PW1, the victim of the sexual assault by her doctor, the appellant” . The Court recognises sextortion and goes on to say: “We agree with the learned judge that ‘ it is treacherous for one to stray away from a professional calling and turn against one amongst the very lot who bestowed their trust unto the person.’ In this case, it was treacherous for the appellant doctor to rape his patient, PW1.”
Ally Hussein Katua v. The Republic Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Tanga (2010)
The appellant claimed that the charge of sexual exploitation was defective and that the evidence of the complainant Rehema Athumani should not have been believed and acted upon (allegedly because of a “history of mental illness and confusion”). The Court determined that although normally the element of lack of consent ought to be reflected in a charge of rape, but with the inclusion of section 130 (2) (e) of the Penal Code, consent is no longer relevant where the victim is under eighteen years of age and in this case, there was no dispute that the victim was aged 17 at the time of the crime (and therefore covered by the law). The Court noted that “Paragraph (d) above would particularly be important in highlighting the fact that the appellant being a traditional healer took advantage of his position and committed rape on PW1 as we shall demonstrate hereunder.” Furthermore, the Court recognised that an aggrieved party may appeal on a matter of law (not including severity of sentence) but not on a matter of fact, and “strictly speaking, in our reading and appreciation of the evidence on record there is no serious point of law involved in this appeal”, only matters of fact.