The plaintiff, a gay man, participated in a gay recreational softball league. Subsequently, he received criticism at his job as a welfare services coordinator for Clayton Country, Georgia, for his sexual orientation and participating in the league. Previously he had received positive professional evaluations. In 2013, Clayton County conducted an internal audit of the funds the plaintiff managed and then dismissed him for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” The plaintiff filed a case with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His case was dismissed by the district court and such dismissal was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court had to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompassed discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court held that it was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fire an employee for being gay or transgender. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” was that firing an employee based on sex was a violation of the Act. This, in turn, applied to one’s homosexuality or transgender status as discrimination on the basis of this required employers to discriminate against employees based on their sex.
Women and Justice: Court: United States Supreme Court
Domestic Case Law
Bostock v. Clayton County United States Supreme Court (2020)
Roe v. Wade United States Supreme Court (1973)
The plaintiff discovered she was pregnant and sought an abortion. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion due to a Texas law that criminalized all abortions except those necessary to protect the life of the mother. The plaintiff alleged that the Texas law violated her constitutional right to privacy. The Court invalidated the law, finding that the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment Due Process Clause protects women’s right to privacy and thus their right to choose to have an abortion before the end of the first trimester. The Court further held that after the first trimester but before fetal viability, the State may only impose regulations related to the protection of the mother’s health. However, the Court found that following the viability of the fetus, the State may prohibit abortions except those necessary to protect the mother’s life. This decision was affirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey United States Supreme Court (1992)
In light of the ruling in Roe v. Wade, which established a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability the plaintiffs challenged various abortion-limiting restrictions in Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act. The act restricted public funding to abortion clinics. It also required women to obtain informed consent, notify their husbands if married, wait 24 hours before proceeding with the surgery, and obtain parental consent if underage. In response, the Supreme Court created a new test that asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden,” which the Court defined as a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Though the Court reaffirmed Roe pursuant to this test, the Court upheld nearly all of the restrictions in Pennsylvania’s state abortion law, including parental notification/consent requirements for minors and limitations on public funding of abortions. However, the Court did find that the statute’s husband notification requirement was unlawful.
Bradwell v. The State United States Supreme Court (1872)
Myra Bradwell petitioned to be admitted to the bar and to be allowed to practice law, but was denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The United States Supreme Court upheld this decision, noting that a woman’s freedom to pursue the occupation of a lawyer was not a “privilege and immunity” of Untied States citizenship that was protected from state restriction by the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the court found that excluding women from the bar did not violate the U.S. Constitution.
In re Lockwood United States Supreme Court (1894)
The Supreme Court stated that a woman could not be admitted to the bar because she was under a common law disability: she did not have the right to enter into contracts with third persons without the permission of her husband.
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education United States Supreme Court (2005)
Mr. Jackson, a teacher and basketball coach, brought suit against the Birmingham Board of Education (“Board”), alleging that the Board retaliated against him because he had complained about sex discrimination in the high school’s athletic program. Specifically, Mr. Jackson complained to his supervisors that the girls’ basketball team was not receiving equal funding and equal access to athletic equipment and facilities. After the Board terminated Mr. Jackson’s coaching duties, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. He alleged that the Board violated Title IX by retaliating against him for protesting the discrimination of the girls’ basketball team. The district court dismissed Mr. Jackson’s complaint on the ground Title IX did not cover claims retaliation, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Unites States Supreme Court reversed, holding: “We conclude that when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.” The Court reached this conclusion, in part, because “[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report went unpunished.” In response to the Board’s claim that it had no notice that Title IX prohibited retaliation, the Supreme Court held that Title IX itself supplied sufficient notice to the Board, as did previous Courts of Appeals decisions that had considered the issue.