Women and Justice: Keywords

The Intestate Succession Act governs family inheritance when a property owner dies without a will. The law provides a uniform system of intestate succession applicable regardless of the type of marriage (i.e., secular, customary, or Muslim). The estate is distributed through the various sections according to the number and type of heirs involved in the distribution. Section 5, for example, sets guidelines for how to divide an estate survived by both spouse and child, while section 6 dictates how to divide an estate when survived by a spouse only.

According to Iranian law, the husband is the exclusive holder of the position of “head of the family” (Art. 1105). As such, the husband provides his wife with the cost of maintenance (Art. 1106), “which includes dwelling, clothing, food, furniture, and provision of a servant if the wife is accustomed to have servant or if she needs one because of illness” (Art. 1107) Article 1108 creates a duty on the part of women to satisfy the sexual needs of their husbands at all times. This is the tamkin (submission) requirement of Sharia law. If a wife refuses to fulfill her duties, she may be barred from receiving maintenance payments. The husband determines his wife’s place of residence and thus controls her freedom of movement (Art. 1114). If the dwelling of the wife and husband in the same house involves the risk of bodily or financial injury or that to the dignity of the wife, she can choose a separate dwelling. If the alleged risk is proved, the court will not order her to return to the house of the husband and, so long as she is authorized not to return to the house, her cost of maintenance will be on the charge of her husband (Article 1115). In addition, the husband may prevent his wife from exercising a certain profession if he deems it “incompatible with the family interests or the dignity of himself or his wife” (Art. 1117).

The deceased was married to the second and third applicant under Islamic law. The marriage of the deceased and the third applicant was entered into before the marriage between the deceased and the second applicant. However, the deceased and the second applicant entered into a civil marriage to qualify for a home loan. Following the death of the deceased, The Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town, refused to register the title deed to the family home in the name of the third applicant. The Registrar’s refusal was premised on the meaning of the term “surviving spouse” as contemplated in terms of section 2C(1) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 (the “Wills Act”). According to the Registrar, the only recognised surviving spouse of the deceased is the second applicant as they entered into a civil marriage. The Court declared section 2C(1) of the Wills Act unconstitutional as it does not recognise the rights of spouses married under Islamic law nor multiple female spouses married to a deceased testator in polygynous Muslim marriages.

Die oorledene is volgens die Islamitiese Wet met ‘n tweede en derde applikant getroud. Die huwelik van die oorledene en die derde applikant is aangegaan voor die huwelik tussen die oorledene en die tweede applikant. Die oorledene en die tweede applikant het egter ‘n siviele huwelik aangegaan om te kwalifiseer vir ‘n huislening. Na die afsterwe van die oorledene het die Registrateur van Aktes, Kaapstad, geweier om die titel-akte van die gesinshuis in die naam van die derde aansoeker te registreer. Die weiering van die registrateur is gegrond op die betekenis van die term “oorlewende gade” soos beoog in terme van artikel 2C(1) van die Wet op Testamente 7 van 1953 ( die “Testamente Wet”). Volgens die registsrateur is die enigste erkende oorlewende gade van die oorledene, die tweede aansoeker aangesien hulle ‘n siviele huwelik aangegaan het. DIe hof het artikel 2C(1) van die Wet op testamente ongrondwetlik verklaar aangesien dit nie die regte van gades wat kragtens die Islamitiese wet getroud is, erken nie asook nie veelvuldige vroulike eggenote wat met ‘n oorlede testateur in ‘n poligamiese moslemhuwelik verbind is nie.

After a Methodist Church minister (applicant) announced to her congregation her intention to marry her same-sex partner, the Methodist Church (respondent) suspended and subsequently discontinued her role as an ordained minister in early 2010. In March 2010, the applicant referred the matter to arbitration according to the Laws and Discipline of the Church. The parties could not agree on the applicant’s procedural rights and the arbitration convener proceeded with the process as provided by the Laws and Discipline of the Church. On her behalf, the convener then entered into a final agreement with the Church in May 2011. In 2012, the applicant approached the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town seeking an order to set aside the arbitration agreement in terms of the Arbitration Act. She contended that she was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation. The High Court held that the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. She then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The majority judgment of that Court agreed with the finding of the High Court. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court made four findings. First, the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. Because the issue related to interpretation of religious doctrine, arbitration would be the appropriate forum. Second, since the applicant had unequivocally disavowed her unfair discrimination claim before the High Court, she was not free to raise the claim for the first time on appeal. Third, pursuant to the principle of constitutional subsidiarity, the applicant should have first brought her unfair discrimination claim to the Equality Court. Finally, the applicant failed to file a notice in terms of the Uniform Rules of the High Court, an omission that deprived other interested parties including religious communities of the opportunity to intervene as parties to the dispute or seek admission as amicus curiae in the High Court. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Nadat ’n predikant van die Metodiste Kerk (applikant) aan haar gemeente aangekondig het dat sy van voorneme is om met haar maat van dieselfde geslag te trou, het die Metodiste Kerk (respondent) vroeg in 2010 haar rol as ’n geordende predikant opgeskort en daarna gestaak. In Maart 2010 het die applikant die saak na arbitrasie verwys volgens die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die partye kon nie saamstem oor die prosedurele regte van die applikant nie en die arbitrasie- sameroeper het voortgegaan met die proses soos bepaal deur die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die sameroeper het namens haar in Mei 2011 ’n finale ooreenkoms aangegaan met die Kerk. In 2012 het die applikant die Wes-Kaapse hooggeregshof, Kaapstad, genader om ’n bevel aan te vra om die arbitrasie ooreenkoms ingevolge die Wet op Arbitrasie tersyde te stel. Sy het aangevoer dat daar onbillik teen haar gediskrimineer word op grond van haar seksuele oriëntasie. Die Hooggeregshof het beslis dat die applikant nie goeie rede vir die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms getoon het nie. Sy het toe appél aangeteken by die Hoogste Hof van Appèl. Die meerderheidsuitspraak van daardie Hof het saam gestem met die bevinding van die Hooggeregshof. Die applikant het verlof gevra om tot die Konstitusionele Hof te appelleer. In ’n eenparige uitspraak het die Konstitusionele Hof vier bevindings gemaak. Eerstens het die applikant nie goeie gronde getoon om die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms ter syde te stel nie. Omdat dit die kwessie rakende die interpretasie van godsdienstige leerstellings is, sou arbitrasie die gepaste forum wees. Tweedens, aangesien die applikant haar onbillike diskriminasie-eis voor die hooggeregshof onomwonde verwerp het, was sy nie vry om die eis vir die eerste keer op appèl aanhandig te maak nie. Derdens moes die applikant volgens die beginsel van grondwettige subsidiariteit haar eis op onbillike diskriminasie eers by die gelykheidshof ingedien het. Uiteidelik het die applikant versuim om ’n kennisgewing in te dien ingevolge die eenvormige Reëls van die Hooggeregshof, ’n versuim wat ander belanghebbende partye, waaronder godsdienstige gemeensappe, die geleentheid ontneem het om as partye tot die geskil in te gryp of om toelating as amicus curiae in die Hooggeregshof te verkry. Die hof het die appèl gevolglik van die hand gewys.

Ms. Esseku and Mr. Inkoom had been married for 30 years. The husband claimed to have divorced his wife in 1995 under Muslim tradition and custom. They had one property together, which Mr. Inkoom sold without consulting Ms. Esseku or their five children, all of whom he evicted off the property. The trial court held that the property was a joint property of both parties, and nullified the sale. Examining the evidence, the Superior Court affirmed the holding because Ms. Esseku had made a “substantial contribution” to the property by building an additional two bedrooms to the house. Furthermore, the Court held that even if she had not made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of the property, she still would have been entitled to an equal share of the property because of her valuable considerations made during the marriage, like “the performance of household chores” and the “maintenance of a congenial domestic environment for the respondent to operate and acquire properties.” As such, both parties were entitled to equal shares of the property, and Mr. Inkoom could not sell the house without consulting her first.

The petitioner, a female resident of Yerucham and an Orthodox Jew, was disqualified from the local religious council because of a tradition of not appointing women as members of religious councils. The court found, however, that although the religious council provided services that were religious in character, the qualifications of the council were solely dictated by the general legal system. Thus, the exclusion of the petitioner based upon her gender was discriminatory.

Court held that divorce obtained by husband under Islamic religious and secular Pakistani law would not be recognized and afforded comity in Maryland. Petitioner argued that because he performed “talaq,” (which under Islamic law, allows a husband to divorce his wife by stating “I divorce thee” three times) the Circuit Court for Montgomery County lacked jurisdiction “to litigate the division of the parties’ marital property.” “The trial court found that the marriage contract entered into on the day of the parties’ marriage in Pakistan specifically did not provide for the division of marital property and thus, for that reason alone, the agreement did not prohibit the Circuit Court for Montgomery County from dividing the parties’ marital property under Maryland law.” The Court of Special Appeals agreed and stated, “[t]hus, the Pakistani marriage contract in the instant matter is not to be equated with a premarital or post-marital agreement that validly relinquished, under Maryland law, rights in marital property.” It explained that the default under Pakistan law is that the wife does not have rights to marital property, while under Maryland law she does. Applying Pakistani law, according to the court, would violate Maryland public policy. The court also noted that a “procedure that permits a man (and him only unless he agrees otherwise) to evade a divorce action begun in this State by rushing to the embassy of a country recognizing talaq and, without prior notice to the wife . . . summarily terminate the marriage and deprive his wife of marital property, confers insufficient due process to his wife. Accordingly, for this additional reason the courts of Maryland shall not recognize the talaq divorce performed here.”