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Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles

Starting in 2008, one of the busiest ports in the United States, the Port of Los Angeles (POLA), entered into “concession agreements” with motor carriers doing business at the port. POLA enforced the agreements through a system of tariffs levied against noncompliant carriers and remedial provisions that empowered it to revoke noncompliant carriers’ access to the port. The American Trucking Association (ATA) sued POLA, arguing that the agreements were barred under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. The Central District of California and Ninth Circuit found that multiple provisions of the concession agreements were exempted from the FAAAA’s preemption clause under the market-participant doctrine and held that Castle did not bar suspension of carriers’ port access because of the FAAAA’s express safety exemption. In resolving the questions presented, the Supreme Court will determine the scope of the market-participant exemption to FAAAA preemption and whether Castle bars POLA from enforcing its concession agreements through revocation or suspension of port access. The case directly affects local and state governments’ power to regulate and contract under the FAAAA and similar Congressional legislation and has broad regulatory implications for motor carriers and other regulated actors in interstate commerce.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Title 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), originally enacted as a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, provides that “a State [or] political subdivision . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.” It contains an exception providing that the express preemption clause “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A). The questions presented are:

  1. Whether an unexpressed “market participant” exception exists in Section 14501(c)(1) and permits a municipal governmental entity to take action that conflicts with the express preemption clause, occurs in a market in which the municipal entity does not participate, and is unconnected with any interest in the efficient procurement of services.
  2. Whether permitting a municipal governmental entity to bar federally licensed motor carriers from access to a port operates as a partial suspension of the motor carriers’ federal registration, in violation of Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).

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Issue

Does federal law prevent enforcement of certain aspects of motor carrier-related contracts used by the Port of Los Angeles?

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Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey

Robert Pelkey's car was towed from his apartment complex for failure to move it during a snowstorm. At the time, Mr. Pelkey was quite ill and eventually was sent to the hospital to have his left foot amputated. When he returned home and was made aware that his car was towed, he had his attorney track down the car at Dan’s City towing and ask for it back. When they disposed of the car, Mr. Pelkey sued for violations of New Hampshire’s consumer protection laws and common law negligence. Dan’s City claimed that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act ("FAAAA") controlled motor carriers and preempted any state law claims. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the lower court and agreed with Mr. Pelkey that his state law remedies were not preempted because they dealt with the disposal of property and debt collection on a lien, rather than the "services" of the towing company. Dan's City contends these actions are incidental to their towing and storage of the vehicle and therefore are properly construed as services of their company. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the scope of preemption under the FAAAA. How the Court rules in this case will have great significance for both vehicle owners and the towing industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether state statutory, common law negligence, and consumer protection act enforcement actions against a tow-motor carrier based on state law regulating the sale and disposal of a towed vehicle are related to a transportation service provided by the carrier and are thus preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

Issue(s)

Are state law claims of negligence and consumer fraud against a towing company for having a car towed and eventually disposed of to pay towing and storage fees preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”)?

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Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association

Issues

1. Does the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA") prevent states from regulating commercial tobacco product transportation?

2. Does the FAAAA prevent states from requiring shippers of tobacco to require their carrier to ensure that the addressee is old enough to purchase tobacco products?

 

Under Maine law, mail-order tobacco product retailers must require their delivery service to verify that the purchaser is not a minor. Delivery services are deemed to know that a package contains tobacco products under certain circumstances. The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, together with other trade associations representing air and motor carriers of property ("Associations"), have challenged these provisions, arguing that they impinge upon exclusive federal authority over carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA"). The Attorney General of Maine, G. Steven Rowe ("Attorney General"), responds that Congress did not intend the FAAAA to limit state public health regulations such as tobacco controls. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the Associations and invalidated Maine's law. The Supreme Court's holding in this case likely will clarify the line between federal authority over carriers and state authority over public health matters. If the Attorney General prevails, Maine will be able to continue its strategy of controlling mail-order sales of tobacco products by regulating tobacco product transportation. On the other hand, a victory for the Associations would protect carriers from the potentially costly threat of inconsistent state laws. The health of the economically crucial package carrier industry and the health of minors exposed to tobacco products lie in the balance.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA"), 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1) and 41713(b)(4)(A), preempts states from exercising their historic public health police powers to regulate carriers that deliver contraband such as tobacco and other dangerous substances to children.

2. Whether the FAAAA preempts states from exercising their historic public health police powers to require shippers of contraband such as tobacco and other dangerous substances to utilize a carrier that provides age verification and signature services to ensure that such substances are not delivered to children.

In 2003, Maine adopted a law regulating the shipping and delivery of mail-order tobacco products. See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2006) (describing "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Tobacco Products and to Prevent the Sale of Cigarettes to Minors," codified as Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.

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