Dolan v. United States Postal Service

The doctrine of "sovereign immunity" essentially holds that the United States government cannot be sued without its consent. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). However, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in order to delineate specific circumstances in which the government would waive the protections of sovereign immunity and consent to being sued. 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). As such, in passing the FTCA, Congress chose to forgo the powerful protections that the shield of sovereign immunity provides the United States government in order to provide a remedy, in the form of money damages, to individuals harmed by Federal employees. 28 U.S.C. 2674.

Recognizing that the passage of the FTCA exposes the government to vast liability in a variety of circumstances, Congress sought to curb this exposure by delineating thirteen specific exceptions to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. ? 2680(b). These waivers shield the government from liability in areas where the government is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of a lawsuit and areas of uniquely governmental function. One of these waivers is the so-called "postal exception." This exception says that the government, or rather, the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), shall not be liable for "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. ? 2680(b) (emphasis added). This case involves the interpretation of the "postal exception." Specifically, the parties disagree over the correct interpretation of the phrase "negligent transmission" in the statutory language.

Dolan argues that the postal exception to the FTCA barring claims for "negligent transmission" does not bar claims against mail carriers for personal injury resulting from the negligent delivery of mail. Brief for Petitioner at 3. According to Dolan, the negligent transmission bar prevents plaintiffs from bringing claims arising from the damage, delay, or loss of mail in the process of delivering the mail itself, but does not protect carriers from liability for any tort they commit simply because they were in the act of delivering mail when they committed it. Dolan finds support for this argument from the Second Circuit who, based on the reasoning and decision set forth in Raila v. United States, agrees with Dolan's interpretation. 355 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004). In support of her argument, Dolan points out that the FTCA allows claims against postal employees for negligent operation of postal delivery trucks even if the vehicles are carrying mail, and thus, in the process of delivery. See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984); Brief for Petitioner at 4.

Although both the district court and the Court of Appeals below disagreed with Dolan's reading of the statute, she contends that Congress never intended for the postal exception to have the "sweeping breadth attributed to it by the court below." Brief for Petitioner at 5. Rather, she contends that the statute exempts the USPS for liability mostly with regard to the condition of mail, and not to every single activity the USPS does. By way of support, she points to the fact that if Congress had intended otherwise, it could have given the USPS the same latitude it gave other wholly exempt organizations like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Panama Canal Company. 28 U.S.C. 2680 (l) and (m). Since it did not give the USPS this same latitude, Dolan argues Congress did not intend for the USPS to be wholly exempt.

Further, Dolan contends that the phrase "negligent transmission" has a specialized legal meaning derived from the telegraph context, and when a term has a specialized legal meaning, it should be interpreted in accordance with that meaning and not the plain language of the phrase. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7. Finally, she argues that any exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed and given the most narrow meaning plausible within the language of the statute. Support for this proposition comes from the Supreme Court itself in its Kosak opinion. 465 U.S. 848 (1984). In Kosak, the court reiterated that "identifying 'those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception'–no less and no more" is critical to correctly interpreting an FTCA waiver. Id. at 854 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 13 (1953)). In this case, Dolan argues, that the Supreme Court's statement means construing the postal exception to bar claims dealing with the condition of the mail itself, and not restricting liability when a mail carrier has committed an independent tort while in the process of delivering mail.

On the other hand, the USPS, with support from the district court and the Court of Appeals, argues that the incident in question falls directly within the plain meaning of the postal exception language of the FTCA. That is, that the negligent delivery of mail on Dolan's porch falls clearly within the "negligent transmission" part of the postal exception. According to the USPS, Congress designed this exception to limit its liability, thereby allowing it to perform the "vital federal function" of delivering thousands of pieces of mail as efficiently and inexpensively as possible, a function that would not be possible if the USPS were vulnerable to suit in the performance of its regular duties. Brief for the Respondents at 5, 8. The USPS relies heavily on the basic and long-standing definition of "transmission" as "the transfer or delivery of items.from one person to another" Brief for the Respondents at 5. The USPS further argues, that the postal exception is written to protect the function of delivering mail, not to define the type of injury suffered. Id. at 5.

As such, the USPS contends that by leaving mail on Dolan's porch, it was transferring mail from one person and delivering it to another. By characterizing the USPS employee's actions in this case as the "delivery of mail," the behavior would fall clearly within the plain language of the statute, and, the argument goes, where the plain language of the law protects the USPS's immunity, the resulting claim should be barred. Brief for the Respondents at 13. Further, since the FTCA was written broadly to allow claims, the clearly delineated exceptions to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity should be carefully construed. In addressing Dolan's arguments, the USPS points out that this case is wholly unrelated to cases involving postal delivery trucks (where liability is allowed) and cases involving telegraphs, where "at least some types of personal injury claims caused by.delivery" are allowed under the FTCA. Brief for the Respondents at 6.