aiding and abetting

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez

Issues

Does a conviction as an accomplice to a theft, rather than as the principal, constitute a “theft offense” that satisfies the “aggravated felony” standard of the Immigration and Nationality Act?

 

In 2002, Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian national, was found guilty of a violation of California Vehicle Code § 10851(a), which makes it illegal to take a vehicle without the owner’s consent or to aid or abet in such a taking. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought Duenas-Alvarez’s deportation based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows the government to deport aliens convicted of an “aggravated felony.” “Theft offenses” are one type of crime included in the category of aggravated felonies. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the deportation order, reasoning that because the California statute allows for convictions based solely on aiding and abetting, conviction under the statute did not necessarily mean that Duenas-Alvarez had committed a “theft offense.” The DHS contends that simply because accomplice liability involves a lower level of involvement in an offense, that does not remove it from the category of “theft offenses.” The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the immigration status of over 8,000 resident aliens who currently face deportation.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a “theft offense,” which is an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)((G), includes aiding and abetting.

    In 2002, Luis Alexander Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen and lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1998, pled guilty in the Superior Court of California to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 5.

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    Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe

    Issues

    Under the Alien Tort Statute, can domestic corporations be held liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses—specifically, child slavery—in a foreign country, when the aiding and abetting allegedly occurred on U.S. soil?

    This case asks the Court to determine whether domestic corporations may be held liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations committed in foreign countries. Petitioners Nestlé and Cargill contracted for exclusive buyer-seller contracts with cocoa plantations on the Ivory Coast; Respondents John Doe et. al. were child slaves on those farms. John Doe alleges that Nestlé and Cargill aided and abetted the farmers from headquarters in the United States by providing monetary support while aware of the widespread use of child slavery on those farms, thus making them liable under the Alien Tort Statute. Nestlé and Cargill counter that the harm inflicted upon John Doe occurred exclusively on foreign soil, making the case impermissibly extraterritorial; furthermore, they argue recent Court cases determined that corporations were immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute. The Court’s decision in this case will implicate political questions of foreign policy and foreign affairs, corporate incentives to invest in developing countries, and the United States’ support for human rights.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    (1) Whether an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute may overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that activity; and (2) whether the judiciary has the authority under the Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations.

    In the Ivory Coast, cocoa plantations utilize child slaves to produce cheap cocoa. Doe I v.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professor Muna Ndulo for his guidance and insights into this case. The authors would like to thank Professor Muna Ndulo for his guidance and insights into this case.

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    Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta

    Issues

    Can a party be held liable for fraud where it made no misleading public statements (or omissions), and had no duty to disclose, but engaged in transactions with a public corporation designed to artificially inflate the public corporation's financial statements?

     

    Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, brought a securities fraud class action against Charter Communications' vendors Scientific Atlanta and Motorola, alleging a scheme in which Charter contracted with the vendors to purchase set-top cable boxes at higher-than-normal prices and sell advertising at higher-than-normal rates. These transactions served to artificially inflate Charter's stock price. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that Stoneridge's claim was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), in which the Court determined that mere "aiders and abettors" of fraud cannot be held liable.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court is whether a party may be held liable for fraud where it made no misleading public statements (or omissions), and had no duty to do make disclosures, but engaged in transactions with a public corporation designed to artificially enhance the public corporation's financial statements.  How the Supreme Court decides this case may set a new standard for determining whether third-parties can be held liable for investor-related fraud.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), foreclose claims for deceptive conduct under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, where Respondents engaged in transactions with a public corporation with no legitimate business or economic purpose except to inflate artificially the public corporation's financial statements, but where Respondents themselves made no public statements concerning those transactions?

    Charter Communications is a publicly traded cable company that provides digital services to millions of personal and business customers throughout the country. Brief for Petitioner at 4. In order to provide these services, Charter contracts with vendors, such as Respondents Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, who provide set-top boxes and other equip

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