United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority
Issues
1. Does a local ordinance that directs solid waste to a publicly owned facility discriminate against interstate commerce in the same way as an ordinance that directs solid waste to a private facility?
2. If the ordinance does not discriminate, does the ordinance place a burden on interstate commerce that is greater than its benefit to the local community?
Solid waste processing has been a contentious issue since the 1980s when local governments were implicated in environmental lawsuits regarding solid waste disposal. Local governments tried to take control of the issue, but found that they faced commerce clause issues when they tried to protect their local facilities by passing ordinances to ensure enough tipping fees through flow control ordinances. This case represents the latest attempt by local governments to protect local waste processing facilities by requiring that local solid waste be directed to the publicly owned facility. In a key case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994), the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance similar to the one at issue in this case because it was discriminatory to other waste processing facilities and placed a burden on interstate commerce. In this case, the Second Circuit ruled that because the ordinance at issue favored a public facility rather than a private facility as in Carbone, it passed the discrimination test. The Court also held that it passed a balancing test whereby the court balances the local interest and the burden on interstate commerce. At stake in this case are the local governments' interests in sustaining environmentally sound local processing plants that represent significant sunk cost versus interstate waste hauling and out of state processing plants hoping to sustain their businesses.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
This Court held in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994), that “a so-called flow control ordinance, which require[d] all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer station before leaving the municipality,' discriminated against interstate commerce and was invalid under the Commerce Clause because it “depriv[ed] competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access to a local market.” This case presents two questions, the first of which is the subject of an acknowledged circuit conflict:
1. Whether the virtually per se prohibition against “hoard[ing] solid waste” (Id. at 392) recognized in Carbone is inapplicable when the “preferred processing–facility” (ibid.) is owned by a public entity.
2. Whether a flow-control ordinance that requires delivery of all solid waste to a publicly owned local facility and thus prohibits its exportation imposes so “insubstantial” a burden on interstate commerce that the provision satisfies the Commerce Clause if it serves even a “minimal” local benefit.
In 1988, Oneida and Herkimer Counties (“the Counties”), in upstate New York, formed the Oneida and Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority (“The Authority”). Brief for Petitioners at 3.