due process

Turner v. United States

Issues

What standard applies to the materiality of evidence withheld from criminal defendants by the government in order to assess whether a due process violation occurred, and should that standard differ based on the strength of the government’s case?  

This case will address whether certain undisclosed evidence falls under the standard for prosecutorial disclosures as described by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The defendants, Russell Overton and Charles Turner, were convicted of a murder that occurred in 1984 and contend that several pieces of evidence were improperly withheld by the prosecution, resulting in a violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The United States asserts that the evidence in question does not fall within the scope of the Brady standard, and therefore no post-conviction relief is required. The outcome of this case will further articulate the standards of materiality, favorability, and suppression under Brady and elucidate what information a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to know before trial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether petitioners' convictions must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Christopher and Charles Turner, Clifton Yarborough, Kevin Smith, Levy Rouse, and Timothy Catlett were convicted for the 1984 murder of Catherine Fuller. Turner v. United States, Nos. 12-CO-1362, 12-CO-1538, 12-CO1539, 12-CO-1540, 12-CO-1541, 12-CO-1542 & 12-CO-1543, at 14 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2015).

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Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive

Issues

  1. Are final arbitration awards determined by the National Railroad Adjustment Board subject to review for violations of due process?
  2. Was the National Railroad Board applying a “retroactive” interpretation of the procedural requirements in its arbitration proceedings by dismissing a complaint because of untimely submission of evidence of prior conferencing between the parties?

 

Five railroad employees filed claims through their union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (“Brotherhood”), contesting disciplinary charges imposed by the Union Pacific Railroad (“Railroad”). The National Railroad Adjustment Board dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the Brotherhood had failed to submit written evidence that the parties had met in conference. The District Court affirmed the Board’s decision. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the Brotherhood. The Seventh Circuit found that the due process rights of the Brotherhood were denied, because it was not clear when and how evidence of conferencing should be presented, and dismissal for reasons that were not clear at the time of filing functioned as a denial of its due process rights. The Railroad subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court arguing that because submission of evidence is solely within the arbitrator’s discretion, the Board’s award should be final and binding. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court’s decision will test the scope of the federal government’s power to review arbitration disputes between private parties. The Court’s decision will also affect future labor disputes and collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§151 et seq., sets forth a comprehensive framework to resolve labor disputes in the railroad industry through binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (“the Board”). The statute provides that the Board's judgment “shall be conclusive . . . except . . . for”: (1) “failure . . . to comply” with the Act, (2) “failure . . . to conform or confine” its order “to matters within . . . the [Board’s] jurisdiction,” and (3) “fraud or corruption” by a Board member. 45 U.S.C. §153 First (q). This case involves the Board’s denial of employee grievance claims for failure to comply with its rules governing proof that the dispute had been submitted to a “conference” between the parties. 45 U.S.C. §152 Second. The Seventh Circuit held that the award must be set aside because the Board violated due process through retroactive recognition of a supposedly “new rule.” The questions presented are: 

  1. Whether the Seventh Circuit erroneously held, in square conflict with decisions of the Third, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, that the RLA includes a fourth, implied exception that authorizes courts to set aside final arbitration awards for alleged violations of due process.
  2. Whether the Seventh Circuit erroneously held that the Board adopted a “new,” retroactive interpretation of the standards governing its proceedings in violation of due process.

For employees in the railroad industry, the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) governs the resolution of labor disputes between rail carriers and unions regarding their collective bargaining agreements. 45 U.S.C.

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·      Wex: Law about Collective Bargaining

·      Wex: Law about Labor Law

·      Workplace Prof Blog, Law Professor Blogs Network: Labor Law

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United States v. Comstock

Issues

May Congress authorize the civil commitment of a “sexually dangerous” person even after that person has completed his or her prison sentence?

 

Petitioner, the United States, argues that 18 U.S.C § 4248, which authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually dangerous” persons, is a constitutional exercise of Congressional power. Respondents, Graydon Earl Comstock Jr., et al. (“Comstock”), counter that civil commitment of an individual after the completion of a federal prison sentence exceeds Congressional power, because it (1) encroaches on states’ authority and (2) is neither necessary nor proper to operating a valid federal regulation. The Fourth Circuit rejected the United States’ argument that § 4248 is necessary and proper to its ability to maintain the federal penal system. The Supreme Court must now decide (1) whether § 4248 is incidental to Congress’ Article I powers and (2) whether civil commitment of individuals labeled “sexually dangerous” and already in federal custody or incompetent to stand trial is an encroachment on state power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact 18 U.S.C. § 4248, which authorizes court-ordered civil commitment by the federal government of (1) "sexually dangerous" persons who are already in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, but who are coming to the end of their federal prison sentences, and (2) "sexually dangerous" persons who are in the custody of the Attorney General because they have been found mentally incompetent to stand trial.

This consolidated action addresses whether the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact 18 U.S.C. § 4248. See U.S. v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 275–76 (4th Cir.

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United States v. Palomar-Santiago

Issues

Whether a defendant charged with illegal reentry into the United States may challenge the validity of his removal order solely by showing that his crime is no longer a removable offense, even if he has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements for challenging the validity of a removal order during the original proceedings?

The case asks the Court to determine whether a defendant can challenge the validity of a removal order for unlawful reentry solely by showing that the order was based on a criminal conviction that is no longer a removable offense without having to meet the procedural requirements of demonstrating administrative exhaustion and no opportunity for judicial review. Respondent Refugio Palomar-Santiago was removed in 1998 for a DUI, and in 2001, DUIs were re-classified as a nonremovable offense. Palomar-Santiago was then found living in the United States in 2017 and was charged with unlawful reentry by Petitioner United States. Palomar-Santiago asserts, as a defense, that the original removal order was unlawful. The United States contends that Palomar-Santiago cannot challenge the validity of the original removal order absent the procedural requirements of administrative exhaustion and judicial review of the original order. Palomar-Santiago counters that procedural rights should not obstruct substantive rights, and that he should be able to challenge the legality of the removal order even absent judicial review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate immigration procedure and the ability of noncitizens to challenge unlawful removal orders.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant, charged with unlawful reentry into the United States following removal, automatically satisfies the prerequisites to asserting the invalidity of the original removal order as an affirmative defense solely by showing that he was removed for a crime that would not be considered a removable offense under current circuit law, even if he cannot independently demonstrate administrative exhaustion or deprivation of the opportunity for judicial review.

Mexican-national Refugio Palomar-Santiago received U.S. lawful permanent resident status in 1990. U.S. v. Palomar-Santiago at 2. The next year, Palomar-Santiago was convicted of a felony DUI.

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United States v. Vaello-Madero

Issues

Is it unconstitutional for Congress to establish a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals in all of the states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands while excluding Puerto Rico?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether withholding a federal benefits program to a United States territory resident violates equal protection. Petitioner, the United States, asserts that, under rational basis review, Congress properly excluded Puerto Rico from the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program because of the territory’s unique tax status and fiscal autonomy. Respondent José Luis Vaello-Madero counters that Petitioner misconstrues the unique relationship between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the United States, especially regarding the Commonwealth’s contribution to the United States Treasury fund. Furthermore, Valleo-Madero emphasizes the discriminatory nature of the Commonwealth’s exclusion from the SSI program. The outcome of this case has important implications for the treatment of territories in relation to that of states, the self-governance of territories, and the distribution of social security benefits for aged and disabled individuals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income — a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind and disabled individuals — in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.

In 1972, Congress established Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a program that provides monthly cash payments to those that are older than sixty-five, blind, or disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1382(c). Unlike Social Security benefits, Congress does not fund SSI through payroll taxes; rather, the treasury funds SSI.

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United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa

Issues

1. Is a bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan void when the plan improperly discharges the debtor’s statutorily non-dischargeable student loans?

2. Does a debtor violate the due process rights of a student loan creditor when, instead of commencing a statutory adversary proceeding by filing a complaint and serving it, the debtor merely states in his Chapter 13 plan that the debt owed to the creditor will be discharged?

 

Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed in his Chapter 13 reorganization plan that he would repay $13,250 in student loans to United Student Aid Funds (“Funds”). Although Funds claimed they were owed an additional $4,582.15, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona confirmed Espinosa's plan as proposed, and Funds did not object to the confirmed plan. Espinosa repaid all debts according to the Chapter 13 plan. Funds subsequently began to intercept Espinosa's income tax refunds, claiming that Espinosa had improperly discharged his student loans, because Espinosa had not initiated a statutorily required adversary proceeding to determine whether repayment of the student loans would constitute an "undue hardship." While the U.S. District Court of Arizona held that Espinosa had violated Funds' due process interests by failing to initiate an adversary proceeding and serve a complaint and summons upon Funds according to the statutory procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and Funds now appeals. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine how student loans and other debts are collected in bankruptcy and will affect the overall relationship between debtors and creditors in America.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Student loans are statutorily non-dischargeable in bankruptcy unless repayment would cause the debtor an "undue hardship." Debtor failed to prove undue hardship in an adversary proceeding as required by the Bankruptcy Rules, and instead, merely declared a discharge in his Chapter 13 plan. Are the orders confirming the plan and discharging debtor void? 

2. Bankruptcy Rules permit discharge of a student loan only through an adversary proceeding, commenced by filing a complaint and serving it and a summons on an appropriate agent of the creditor. Instead, debtor merely included a declaration of discharge in his Chapter 13 plan and mailed it to creditor's post office box. Does such procedure meet the rigorous demands of due process and entitle the resulting orders to respect under principles of res judicata?

In 1988, Respondent Francisco J. Espinosa borrowed $13,250 in student loans through the Federal Family Education Loan Program, which grants federally guaranteed loans. See Brief for Petitioner, United Student Aid Funds, Inc.

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Waddington v. Sarausad

Issues

When reviewing a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is a federal court required to accept a state court determination of the constitutionality of jury instructions?

 

In 1994, respondent Cesar Sarausad was convicted of second degree murder in Washington State Court for his role as a driver in a gang-related shooting. At trial, the prosecution argued in its closing that Sarausad could be found guilty of murder under the Washington accomplice liability statute because, even though he only drove the car, if he was "in for a dime," he was "in for a dollar." After repeated requests for clarification on the accomplice liability rule, which the trial judge answered only by referring the jurors back to the Washington accomplice liability statute, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Sarausad was convicted; he argued unsuccessfully on direct appeal that the instruction relieved the state of its burden to prove each element of the offense charged. Sarausad eventually sought federal habeas corpus relief, which the Ninth Circuit granted. The State of Washington, seeking to reinstate Sarausad's conviction, petitioned for certiorari from the Supreme Court. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court may determine if a federal court is required to defer to state court determination of state law when interpreting the constitutionality of jury instructions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly approved of the pattern accomplice liability jury instructions given in Sarausad’s trial, which mirror the statutory language on accomplice liability under state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found a violation of due process based its independent conclusion that the instructions were ambiguous, and that there was a reasonable likelihood a jury could misapply the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. In reviewing a due process challenge to jury instructions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, must the federal courts accept the state court determination that the instructions fully and correctly set out state law governing accomplice liability?

2. Where the accomplice liability instructions correctly set forth state law, is it an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law to conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving all the elements of the crime?

In 1994, respondent Cesar Sarausad and other 23rd Street Diablos gang members drove to a Seattle high school to confront a rival gang. See Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his assistance in understanding federal habeas corpus.

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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt

Issues

Can a state enforce laws that significantly reduce the availability of abortion services while failing to advance any valid interest, including the state’s interest in promoting health?

 

In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”), which imposed new requirements on abortion clinics. For example, H.B. 2 required a physician performing an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the abortion clinic. Whole Woman’s Health, a private abortion clinic, sued the state of Texas to lift the new restrictions. The Supreme Court will determine whether a state can enforce laws that significantly reduce the availability of abortion services while failing to advance any valid interest, including the state’s interest in promoting health. Whole Woman’s Health argues that H.B. 2 imposes an undue burden on women’s access to abortions. Hellerstedt contends that H.B. 2’s justification of improving patient health is supported by substantial evidence, and H.B. 2 will not impose a burden in the majority of cases. This case implicates H.B. 2’s effect on women’s health and H.B. 2’s imposed costs on women seeking abortions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1a. When applying the Due Process Clause standard associated with the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey decision, does a court err by refusing to consider whether and to what extent laws that restrict abortion for the stated purpose of promoting health actually serve the government’s interest in promoting health?



1b. Did the Fifth Circuit err in concluding that this standard permits Texas to enforce, in nearly all circumstances, laws that would cause a significant reduction in the availability of abortion services while failing to advance the State’s interest in promoting health—or any other valid interest?

2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that res judicata provides a basis for reversing the district court’s judgment in part?

In 2013, Texas passed House Bill Two (“H.B. 2”), which places specific requirements on abortion clinics. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) at 576. The Texas Legislature stated that it enacted H.B.

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Yates v. United States

Issues

Does the term “tangible objects” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 encompass all physical objects, including fish, or only those objects that are meant to preserve information?

In this case the Supreme Court will address whether the term “tangible objects” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 encompasses more than objects that preserve information—specifically whether it includes fish. Section 1519 criminalizes destroying or concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a government investigation. While Yates encourages the Court to look at the statutory language surrounding “tangible objects” and argues that fish are not “tangible objects” within the meaning of the statute, the government contends that “tangible objects” is an unambiguous term that applies to all objects, including fish. The Court’s ruling will implicate the reach of federal law, statutory interpretation, and the notice requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the wake of the criminal charges filed against Enron's corporate officers, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Known as the “anti-shredding provision” of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object’ with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis supplied). John L. Yates, a commercial fisherman, was charged and convicted under this anti-shredding criminal statute for destroying purportedly undersized, harvested fish from the Gulf of Mexico after a federally-deputized officer had issued him a civil citation and instructed him to bring them back to port.

This petition presents the important question of whether the reach of section 1519 extends to the construction of anything meeting the dictionary definition of “tangible objects,” or instead is limited to the destruction of tangible objects related to record-keeping as follows:

Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose?

On August 23, 2007, Petitioner John Yates and his crew were actively engaged in fishing aboard their vessel when Officer John Jones (“Officer Jones”) of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission approached for an inspection. See United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2013).

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Ziglar v. Abbasi

Issues

Did the Second Circuit err in deciding that non-citizens’ Fifth Amendment claims did not require Bivens “new context” analysis, that the relevant government officials were not entitled to qualified immunity, and that those non-citizens’ claims met Ashcroft v. Iqbal pleading requirements?

This case first asks the Supreme Court to determine whether non-citizens’ claims against government officials who arrested them in connection with the September 11, 2001 attacks and subjected them to harsh conditions during their detention arose in a “new context” under Bivens. Second, it asks whether the government officials were erroneously denied qualified immunity, which would preclude the government officials’ liability for their involvement in the non-citizens’ arrest and detention. Third, this case asks whether the pleading requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal are satisfied where the pleading relies on hypothetical scenarios and assumed discriminatory intent. James W. Ziglar, the petitioner, argues that a Bivens remedy is not applicable in this case because Bivens applies to individual government officials’ behavior, not policy concerns such as national security and immigration. Ziglar also argues that the government officials’ actions were reasonable within the context, given the national security concerns, and that the government officials should, therefore, be precluded from liability for their actions. Lastly, Ziglar argues that the respondent Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence to support his claim against the government officials. Meanwhile, Abbasi argues that harsh treatment in federal detention is not a new context under Bivens, that government officials are aware that the Equal Protection Clause categorically prohibits race-based government action, and that Abbasi’s claim satisfied Iqbal’s facial plausibility standard. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the balance between government officials’ qualified immunity and detained non-citizens’ constitutional rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in finding that respondents' Fifth Amendment claims did not arise in a "new context" for purposes of implying a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of The Federal Bureau Of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), err by defining "context" at too high a level of generality where respondents challenge the policy decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, by petitioner James W. Ziglar, then the Commissioner of the United States Immigration And Naturalization Service, the then-Attorney General of the United States, and the then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the conditions of confinement of persons illegally in the United States whom the FBI had lawfully arrested and detained in connection with its investigation of the September 11 attacks, each of whom came from the same part of the world as, and shared ethnic and religious affiliations with, the September 11 attackers (many of whom themselves were illegally in the United States), thereby implicating concerns regarding national security, immigration, and the separation of powers that strongly counsel against judicial creation of such a remedy?
  2. Did the court of appeals, in denying qualified immunity to petitioner Ziglar for his official actions in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, err: (A) by defining "established law" at too high a level of generality, thereby failing to recognize that clearly-established law did not make it apparent to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law that Mr. Ziglar's specific conduct violated the rights of those detainees in the specific context of this case; and (B) by finding that even though the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to the actions of federal officials like petitioner Ziglar was not clearly established at the time in question, respondents nevertheless could maintain a§ 1985(3) claim against Mr. Ziglar so long as his conduct violated some other clearly established law?
  3. Did the court of appeals err in finding that respondents' Fourth Amended Complaint meets the pleading requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), because that complaint relies on allegations of hypothetical possibilities, conclusional assumptions, and unsupported insinuations of discriminatory intent that, at best, are merely consistent with petitioner Ziglar's liability, but which are also consistent with the conclusion that Mr. Ziglar acted with a non-punitive and nondiscriminatory intent to detain in restrictive confinement aliens who were illegally in the United States and who had potential connections to those who had committed terrorist acts, thereby rendering respondents' claims implausible under Iqbal?

This case began over thirteen years ago when eight Arab and Muslim non-citizens brought a claim against high-ranking federal officials who were involved in the government’s investigation into the events of September 11, 2001, when al Qaeda’s attack on American soil caused the death of nearly 3,000 people. See Turkmen, et al. v. Hasty, et al., 789 F.3d 216, at 3 (2nd Cir. 2015).

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