RAILROADS

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization

Issues

Whether 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1), the federal statute that prohibits states from overtaxing railroads as compared with other commercial and industrial property within the same assessment jurisdiction, permits a railroad to challenge the method by which a  states  assesses the market value of its rail property, when that method is not irrational or intentionally discriminatory.

 

After finding that states consistently overtax railroads when compared with similar commercial and industrial property, Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("the 4-R Act" or "the Act"), 49 U.S.C. § 11501. The 4-R Act permits railroads to challenge a state’s tax assessment as discriminatory in federal court. CSX Transportation, Inc. challenged Georgia’s 2002 tax assessment, claiming it violated the anti-discrimination provision of the Act. The Northern District of Georgia ruled that while the Act permitted CSX Transportation, Inc. to challenge the assessment, it did not permit the railroad to challenge the methods the state used unless it could show that they were irrational or intentionally discriminatory. Agreeing with one other Circuit and affirming the District Court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit is the fourth Court of Appeals to address the issue. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether a railroad may challenge a state’s methods in assessing its property value under the 4-R Act.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether, under the federal statute prohibiting state tax discrimination against railroads, 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1), a federal district court determining the “true market value” of railroad property must accept the valuation method chosen by the State.

    The following facts are generally derived from the Circuit Court decision in this case. CSX Transportation v. State Bd. of Equalization, 472 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2006).

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    Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States

    Issues

    Does the United States have a reversionary interest in a railroad right-of-way created by the General Railroad Right of Way Act of 1875 after the federal government granted the lands underlying the right-of-way to a private party?

    The United States sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to quiet title to an abandoned railroad right-of-way. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to the right-of-way in its favor. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Abandoned Railroad Right-of-Way Act and the National Trails System Improvement Act modified the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 to create a reversionary interest in the United States to abandoned railroad rights-of-way. The Trust argues that, under Supreme Court precedent, rights-of-way created by the 1875 Act should be considered easements, not reversionary interests. The United States claims that Congress preserved a reversionary interest in the United States under the 1875 Act, under which the right-of-way at issue was created. This case addresses a circuit split over whether the United States retains an implied reversionary interest in rights-of-way created under the 1875 Act. The Supreme Court will balance private property interests and the public’s interest in rehabilitating abandoned rail lines. More generally, the Court will address whether a grantor of real property impliedly retains an interest in land after it is sold.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    This case involves the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 ("1875 Act"), under which  thousands of miles of rights-of-way exist across the United States. In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942), this Court held that 1875 Act rights-of-way are easements and not limited fees with an implied reversionary interest. Based upon the 1875 Act and this Court's decisions, the Federal and Seventh Circuits have concluded that the United States did not retain an implied reversionary interest in 1875 Act rights-of-way after the underlying lands were patented into private ownership. In this case, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and acknowledged that its decision would continue a circuit split. The question presented is:

    Did the United States retain an implied reversionary interest in 1875 Act rights-of way after the underlying lands were patented into private ownership?

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    Facts

    In 1908, pursuant to the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 (43 U.S.C. §§ 934-39) (“1875 Act”), the United States granted a right-of-way from Laramie, Wyoming to Colorado to the Hahn’s Peak and Pacific Railroad Company. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App.

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    Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell

    Issues

    Did the Missouri Court of Appeals err by ignoring federal law and finding that the causation standard for employee contributory negligence under FELA is governed by Missouri-specific rules that impose a lower burden of proof on the railroad employee?

     

    Timothy Sorrell, a railroad employee, suffered injuries while working for his employer, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) and sued, seeking damages for his injuries, under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). FELA is the federal statute governing railroad workplace injuries. After determining and apportioning negligence among the parties, the Missouri circuit court found for Sorrell, awarding him $1.5 million for his injuries. At issue in this case is the standard of negligence used to determine liability under FELA between plaintiff employee and defendant railroad. In conflict with the United States Supreme Court and several federal courts of appeals, the Missouri circuit court used a different standard to determine plaintiff and defendant liability. Traditionally, federal courts had used proximate cause to determine the liability of both parties. The Missouri circuit court, however, applied Missouri-specific rules that lower the employee’s burden to prove railroad negligence and that keep the railroad’s burden to prove contributory negligence by the employee the same. Given that FELA is the exclusive remedy for railroad employees injured on the job, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in this case will have a significant impact on all workplace injury cases involving railroads. The Supreme Court’s decision will reflect its view on the balance that courts should strike when considering negligence in FELA cases and will ultimately affect the outcome of all FELA cases by either maintaining the status quo or making it easier for plaintiff employees to emerge victorious.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the court below erred in determining – in conflict with this Court and multiple courts of appeals – that the causation standard for employee contributory negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) differs from the causation standard for railroad negligence.

    Timothy Sorrell, Respondent, was employed as a trackman by Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Brief for Petitioner Norfolk Southern at 5. As a trackman for the railway company, Sorrell was classified as a “general laborer.” Id. at 5.

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