Article I, Section 1:

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Challenges to delegations of legislative power often raise concerns regarding an administrative agency’s discretion to interpret broad directives, ambiguities, or gaps in a statutory provision. An agency’s degree of discretion that may be constitutionally “acceptable” under the nondelegation doctrine appears to be fairly broad. In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) authority to set national air quality standards at a level “‘requisite’ . . . to protect the public health.” 1 The Court held that the “scope of discretion” given to the EPA under the Clean Air Act “fit[s] comfortably” and is “well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents.” 2

. In reviewing previous nondelegation cases, the Court reasoned that even in “sweeping regulatory schemes” that affect the entire economy, the Court has “never demanded . . . that statutes provide a ‘determinate criterion’ for saying ‘how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.’” 3

Another consideration arising from delegations of legislative power is the degree of deference that courts should give interpretations by agencies of statutes that they administer. In June 2024, the Supreme Court, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, held that it is the role of courts to interpret ambiguities in the law, rather than to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of such ambiguities.4

. In reaching this determination, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for six members of the Court, stressed that Article III of the Constitution assigns to the judicial branch “the responsibility and power to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’” which entails the power to interpret the meaning of laws.5

In holding that courts should not defer to administrative agency determinations, the Loper Court overruled its 1984 decision Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,6

, overruled by . Although overruling Chevron, the Court clarified that “[t]he holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.” . under which a court deferred to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguities within the agency’s delegated authority7 rather than “impose [the court’s] own construction of the statute.” 8 In Chevron, the Court had upheld the EPA’s definition of the term “stationary source” in a regulation EPA had promulgated under the Clean Air Act,9 determining that the EPA’s definition was “a permissible construction of the statute.” 10 In Chevron, the Court had reasoned that

If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.11

.

Accordingly, the Chevron doctrine had essentially established a two-step process for courts to apply when considering agency interpretations of statutes.12

Court noted, this two-step process had been refined over the year to carve out various exceptions, including those major questions of “deep economic and political significance.” (internal quotations omitted). If Congress’s intent in the statute was unambiguous, the court’s analysis was at an end as Congress’s intent controlled. However, if Congress’s intent in the statute was ambiguous, the court would defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute if such an interpretation was permissible. In Loper, the Court determined that Chevron contravened the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a federal statute that prescribes standards for judicial review of agency action and directs federal courts to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 13 Such a statutory command in the APA, the Court reasoned, could not be squared with the broad deference accorded to agencies under Chevron.14 Rather than defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, the Court stated, courts “must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority . . . .” 15

Footnotes

1

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001).

2

Id. at 474, 476

.

3

Id. at 457, 474

.

4

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

No. 22-451 (U.S. June 28, 2024)

.

5

Id. at 7

.

6

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)

, overruled by

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

No. 22-451 (U.S. June 28, 2024)

. Although overruling Chevron, the

Loper

Court clarified that “[t]he holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of

Chevron

itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.”

Loper,

slip op. at 34

.

7

United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)

.

8

Chevron,

467 U.S. at 842–43

.

9

Id. at 840

; 42 U.S.C. § 7502.

10

Chevron,

467 U.S. at 866

.

11

Id. at 844

.

12

As the

Loper

Court noted, this two-step process had been refined over the year to carve out various exceptions, including those major questions of “deep economic and political significance.”

Loper,

No. 22-451 slip op. at 27

(internal quotations omitted).

13

Id., slip op. at 13–14

(quoting 5. U.S.C. § 706).

14

Id. at 21

.

15

Id. at 35

.