Hong Kong

The defendant was an employment consultancy company that worked on behalf of various Hong Kong government agencies. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, who worked under a one-year contract. The plaintiff’s contract was renewed, with a start-date immediately following the end-date of the original contract. The plaintiff subsequently informed the defendant that she was pregnant. The defendant rescinded the renewal of the contract, on the grounds that the plaintiff had been dishonest in informing the employer of her pregnancy.

The plaintiff, a gay man, challenged the government’s denial of spousal benefits to his husband. The couple had been married in New Zealand. The court observed that Hong Kong law does not recognize same-sex marriage; the Marriage Ordinance defines marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” The court concluded that the government’s denial of spousal benefits therefore did not violate the Basic Law, Bill of Rights, or common law. The plaintiff plans to appeal to Hong Kong’s highest court, the Court of Final Instance.

The Matrimonial Causes Ordinance governs the jurisdiction of Hong Kong courts over divorce and legal separation proceedings. It also contains provisions providing for how to determine child custody.

The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance covers the kinds of ancillary and other relief that may be granted in matrimonial proceedings. Sections 4-7 of the Ordinance, in particular, cover the allocation of assets between a divorcing couple.

The plaintiff, Ng Hoi Sze and defendant Yuen Sha Sha shared a college dorm room. Yuen Sha Sha discovered a video recorder that plaintiff’s boyfriend, Tse Chi Pan, placed in the room, which recorded Yuen Sha Sha while she was undressing. Ms. Sha Sha had Mr. Pan expelled from the University and the plaintiff was expelled from the dorm room. The plaintiff filed a nuisance claim against Ms. Sha Sha and her boyfriend, Fung Ka Fai, the other defendant, who was a student at another university.

Section 47A of the ordinance regulates abortion. Abortion is legal in only a few situations: (i) continuing the pregnancy would risk the health of the woman; (ii) there is a substantial risk that the child would be born with a physical or mental abnormality, making it severely handicapped; (iii) the woman is younger than 16 years; or (iv) the woman is the victim of unlawful sexual intercourse. Section 45 forbids bigamy and polygamy.

The appellant and respondent were German nationals whose marriage was recognized in Hong Kong and who were initiating a divorce. Prior to their marriage, they had entered into a prenuptial agreement under German law. The court considered whether Hong Kong was the proper forum for the divorce proceedings, and whether a Hong Kong court should stay the divorce action at the request of one of the parties, due to ongoing divorce proceedings in Germany.

The Sex Discrimination Ordinance (“SDO”) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, pregnancy, and marital status. Both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited. Direct discrimination occurs where a party treats a person “less favorably” than another person in similar circumstances, except for the attribute of sex/pregnancy/marital status. Courts use a “but for test,” asking whether the complainant would not have received the less favorable treatment but for his/her sex/pregnancy/marital status.

The plaintiff was a former employee of the defendant. She alleged that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against her because of her gender. Following poor performance reviews, the plaintiff had been fired by the defendant. She pointed to disparate treatment of her versus a male colleague, who despite having had multiple complaints made against him (while there were none against her) had received better performance reviews than the plaintiff. The court denied the plaintiff’s claims, relying in part on nine allegations of substandard performance that had been made against her.

Appellant, So Wai Lun, was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16, in contravention of section 124 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, which made sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 a strict liability offense, punishable by five years’ imprisonment. Appellant first argued that section 124 was unconstitutional because it criminalized only the male’s conduct, depriving him of equality under the law.