кримінальне право і процес

The appellant was convicted by the court of first instance for the murder and rape of one woman and the murder and attempted of rape of a second woman. Taking into account the fact that the man had previously been convicted of similar crimes, the first instance court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellate court left the judgment unchanged. The appellant’s attorney filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he asked the Court to revoke the sentence and close the criminal proceedings due to insufficient evidence.

The two defendants were charged with raping the complainant. The court of first instance sentenced the first defendant to four years of imprisonment, but discharged him from punishment on probation. The court acquitted the second defendant due to lack of evidence. The prosecutor appealed, arguing that the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the acquitted defendant.  The prosecutor argued that discharging the first man from punishment on probation did not correspond to the gravity of the crime.

The defendant, a boy under the age of 18 (juvenile: 16-18 years), committed lewd acts against a girl under the age of 14 (minor). The first-instance court imposed a punishment of five years imprisonment (Part 2 of Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - Criminal Code). However, the court of first instance released the defendant from serving a sentence and instead imposed a probationary period of two years (Articles 75, 104 of the Criminal Code). The Court of Appeal left the decision unchanged.

The appellant attacked the victim in the park in an attempt to rape her, but he was noticed by other people and fled the scene of the crime before committing rape. The court of first instance sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for three years. However, the court discharged the appellant from imprisonment and instead put him on probation, with the imposition of certain duties. The appellate court overturned this decision and reinstituted the prison sentence of three years, cancelling the discharge from punishment on probation.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes).

While intoxicated, the defendant committed lewd acts against a minor (under 14 years old) by forcing her to expose herself and photographing her naked. He also took the photographs, which were recognized as a pornographic product. According to the courts of the first and second instance, the illegal actions qualified as corruption of a minor (Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and the production of child pornography for which he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment.

While intoxicated, the defendant attempted to rape the victim and intentionally inflicted moderately severe physical injuries on her. The court of the first instance imposed a sentence of three years and six months of imprisonment for attempted rape (Part 3 of Article 15, Part 1 of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and inflicting moderate bodily harm (Part 1 of Article 122 of the Criminal Code). However, the appellate court reversed the conviction for attempted rape and imposed punishment only for inflicting moderate bodily harm (two years of imprisonment).

The appellant was convicted of debauchery for committing lewd acts against the victim, a girl under 14 years old. The first-instance court sentenced the defendant to five years of imprisonment and banned him for three years from continuing to volunteer at a children’s home. The appellate court left this decision unchanged. However, the Supreme Court changed the additional punishment, stating that courts may only impose such additional punishment if the commission of the crime was related to the perpetrator’s position or to engagement in certain activities.

The appellant was convicted of committing systematic physical and psychological violence against his ex-wife. The eyewitnesses to their fights were minor children. Despite the seriousness of the alleged crime, the first-instance court sentenced the appellant to a three-year restriction of liberty, which means holding a person in an open penal institution (“correctional center”) without isolation from society but under supervision and with compulsory engagement in socially useful paid work under a fixed-term labour contract for a term of one to five years.

On five occasions from 2007 to 2013, the applicant's ex-husband inflicted injuries on the applicant, which the domestic authorities classified as minor bodily injuries. The police and the prosecutor's office repeatedly refused to open criminal proceedings due to the lack of evidence. In 2012, the offender was convicted of committing a crime under Article 125 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (intentional minor bodily injury) because criminal liability for domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) was not legislated until 2017 in Ukraine.