North America

The General Master of Family Court granted custody of a child to the defendant because the plaintiff received public assistance. The issue on appeal was whether receiving public assistance was a legitimate criterion for the denial of child custody. In reversing the Family Court’s ruling for the defendant, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reiterated the rule that any custody determinations must be based on the best interests of the child and delineated a non-exclusive test to determine the best interest of the child.

The petitioner claimed that she was terminated from her position because she confronted a male vice president about his repeated lunch invitations to two female employees outside his department. The Texas Supreme court held that no reasonable person could have believed the invitations gave rise to an actionable sexual harassment claim. Accordingly, the Court held the petitioner did not engage in a protected activity under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act when she confronted the vice president about his behavior. The Court reversed the lower court and dismissed the claim.

After several instances of abuse by Defendant, Plaintiff sought an emergency order of protection in November 2014. During the hearing, the trial court found that there was abuse but denied a plenary order of protection and instead issued a civil restraining order, which is a less severe remedy. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois found that Illinois statute states that when a trial court finds abuse against the petitioner, it must issue an order of protection and remanded the case to the trial court to issue this order.

The plaintiff worked as a youth services officer with the Dyer County Juvenile Court, where she alleged that a Chancery Court judge sexually harassed her verbally and physically. When she rejected his advances, the judge demoted her from her supervisory position, denied her salary increases, and altered her job requirements weekly. She sued the judge for quid-pro-quo sexual harassment, in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”).

Donna Feleccia was a records clerk with the county sheriff’s department. A coworker sent her a letter that appeared to be from the Illinois Department of Public Health informing her that she may have been exposed to a sexually transmitted disease. When Feliccia read the letter, she became very upset and started shaking. The letter was sent by Yanor, a coworker of Feliccia’s, as a practical joke. Feliccia’s coworkers heard about the letter and/or that Feliccia had a sexually transmitted disease and Feliccia missed work and sleep over the incident.

Ohio House Bill 68 (2024), the Saving Ohio Adolescents from Experimentation (SAFE) Act, prohibits minors from receiving gender-affirming medical services and requires schools to maintain single-sex sports teams, thereby excluding transgender girls from participating in female sports. The bill was vetoed by Governor DeWine in December of 2023, but the veto was overridden by the House and Senate in early 2024, making it law. The law is currently blocked by a court order and is being challenged in Moe v.

The respondents were upstate New York abortion doctors and clinics and an organization dedicated to maintaining access to abortion services. They sought to prevent vocal anti-abortion protestors from physically blocking the entrances to abortion clinics, The District Court issued an injunction that created a “fixed buffer zone” of 15 feet around abortion clinics where protestors were prohibited from demonstrating. The court additionally created “floating buffer zones,” which banned demonstrations within 15 feet of individuals accessing abortion clinics.

In Schiavo v. Marina District Development Co., LLC, 442 N.J. Super. 346, 123 A.3d 272 (App. Div. 2015), twenty-one former employees of the defendant’s hotel and casino brought claims of sexual discrimination, gender stereotyping, disparate treatment, and disparate impact under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. § 10:5-1 et seq.

Here, the plaintiff was an at-will employee whose contract could be terminated by either party giving thirty days written notice. The plaintiff mainly worked for the defendant, who was the president and controlling shareholder of the company. The plaintiff alleged the defendant made sexual comments and advances towards her a few weeks after she commenced work and also touched her inappropriately. The plaintiff told the defendant his behavior made her uncomfortable but he did not stop.