United States

One of the parties’ children accused petitioner of sexual assault, including improper touching of her breasts and vaginal area on multiple occasions. During an interview with Child Protective Services (CPS), the child denied any improper touching, but subsequently stated that petitioner had cautioned her against disclosing any information about the improper touching. Additionally, in a written declaration, petitioner had admitted to rubbing aloe vera on the naked body of the child.

Plaintiff sued the Buckeye Valley Fire Dept. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. However the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment citing that the Plaintiff needed only to provide evidence of a nexus between the alleged discrimination and her lack of promotion.

Plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and that when she complained, her employer fired her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Plaintiff argued that her executive director subjected her to sexual ridicule, advances, and intimidation. He also intensified his harassment in response to her complaints, deprived her of work responsibilities, undermined her ability to do her job, and ultimately fired her. The lower court dismissed her case. On appeal, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed that decision.

A. Griffin was employed as a billing clerk in the City of Opa-Locka’s water department in 1993. Shortly after hiring Griffin, the city hired Earnie Neal as its City Manager. After taking office, Neal immediately began sexually harassing Griffin. He called her derogatory names, aggressively pursued her, and made inappropriate advances. He performed some of these acts in front of the Mayor and City Commissioner. Griffin continually resisted his advances and attempted to go on with her daily routines in fear of being fired.

The plaintiffs challenged an 1879 Connecticut law, which banned the use of all drugs, medical devices, or other instruments necessary for contraception, by opening a birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut. The Supreme Court found that the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments established a right of marital privacy against state contraception regulations. As a result, the Court held that the Connecticut law violated this constitutionally established right to privacy, so the law was struck down.

In Grundberg v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, 276 P.3d 443 (Alaska 2012), the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a dismissal of a discrimination claim brought by a 58‑year‑old Asian American woman who alleged she was passed over for promotion due to her sex and race.

Here, the plaintiff worked as a staff pharmacist for the defendant for ten years.   At a subsequent point, she became temporary pharmacy manager.  Until the plaintiff was terminated thirteen months later, she was paid at a lower rate as a pharmacy manager than her male counterparts.  She was told by the defendant that she would receive the difference in pay but never did.  She complained numerous times and finally received a check for the pharmacy manager bonus that others received, but never received the thirteen months’ worth of additional pay.  Prior to her

In Hall v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1982), the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of gender-specific language in Alabama’s probate statutes.

In the case Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Alaska 2014), the United States District Court for the District of Alaska struck down Alaska’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, holding that the prohibition violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Petitioners, husband, and wife filed cross-petitions for legal separation rather than an absolute divorce where the matrimonial bonds are completely broken. The Family Court dismissed both petitions because the husband’s stated reason for seeking legal separation was “irreconcilable differences.” The text of the statute ordaining legal separation seemed to require that it be an interim measure pending the reconciliation of the parties. Legal separation because of irreconcilable differences therefore, on its face, seemed to be an inconsistent proposition.