Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn; Garriott v. Winn
Issues
1. Do Arizona taxpayers have a sufficiently personal injury to file a lawsuit against Section 1098, which authorizes a tax credit for voluntary donations to student tuition organizations?
2. Although Section 1089 is neutral on its face, is it nonetheless unconstitutional as applied if taxpayers have used it as a means of providing funding primarily to religious schools?
Arizona taxpayers brought claims alleging that Arizona’s Tuition Tax Credit violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Tax Credit gives taxpayers a reduction in their tax liabilities for their donations to school tuition organizations. These organizations may give scholarships to students of particular faiths to attend certain religious schools. The taxpayers contend that they have the right to sue the government and these organizations for two reasons: the state loses over $50 million in tax revenue each year because the money that the organizations receive would otherwise be state tax revenue and the Tuition Tax Credit promotes religion. The petitioners claim that the taxpayers do not assert a sufficiently personal injury to initiate a lawsuit, and they claim that program does not violate the Establishment Clause because individual taxpayers, not the government, choose where to donate their money. The Supreme Court will decide whether the taxpayers have the right to sue and if so, whether Arizona’s Tax Credit violates the Establishment Clause.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Questions Presented in Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn
1. Do Respondents lack taxpayer standing because they do not allege, nor can they, that the Arizona Tuition Tax Credit involves the expenditure or appropriation of state funds?
2. Is the Respondents' alleged injury-which is solely based on the theory that Arizona's tax credit reduces the state's revenue-too speculative to confer taxpayer standing, especially when considering that the credit reduces the state's financial burden for providing public education and is likely the catalyst for new sources of state income?
3. Given that the Arizona Supreme Court has authoritatively determined, under state law, that the money donated to tuition granting organizations under Arizona's tax credit is private, not state, money, can the Respondents establish taxpayer standing to challenge the decisions of private taxpayers as to where they donate their private money?
Question Presented in Garriott, Director, Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Winn
Under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Section 43-1089, individuals who contribute money to school tuition organizations (STOs) that provide scholarships to students wishing to attend private schools are entitled to an income tax credit. Respondents alleged that Section 1089's neutral language and the Legislature's stated secular purpose for enacting it were a pretense and that the tuition tax credit program had the primary effect of advancing religion because a majority of taxpayers who contributed to STOs chose to contribute to STOs that awarded scholarships to students attending religious schools.
The question presented is the following:
Did the court of appeals err in holding that if most taxpayers who contribute to STOs contribute to STOs that award scholarships to students attending religious schools, Section 1089 has the purpose and effect of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause even though Section 1089 is a neutral program of private choice on its face and the State does nothing to influence the taxpayers or the STOs' choice?
In 1997, the Arizona Legislature approved the Arizona Tuition Tax Credit, Section 1089 of which permits individuals to claim income tax credit in return for contributions to school tuition organizations ("STOs"). See Brief for Petitioner Gale Garriott at 3–4. Tax cr
Edited by
Additional Resources
· Wex: Establishment Clause
· Annotated U.S. Constitution: First Amendment