Oral argument: Mar. 21, 2011
Appealed from: New York State Court of Appeals (Mar. 30, 2010)
EXCLUSIONARY RULE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, FOURTH AMENDMENT, IDENTITY EVIDENCE
Following an automobile stop in Manhattan, New York police officers ran Petitioner Jose Tolentino’s driver’s license through a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database, discovering that his driver’s license had been suspended and that he had at least ten suspensions for failure to answer a summons or to pay a fine. Tolentino was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, Tolentino argues his DMV records must be suppressed because they were the fruit of an unlawful stop. Respondent State of New York argues that, even if the stop was unlawful, the exclusionary rule should not be extended to apply to information the government already possessed, since such an application would be unreasonable. The Supreme Court will have to balance the cost of suppressing highly probative evidence against the potential benefit of discouraging police from conducting random automobile stops without probable cause.
Whether pre-existing identity-related governmental documents, such as motor vehicle records, obtained as the direct result of police action violative of the Fourth Amendment, are subject to the exclusionary rule?
Whether records obtained from a DMV database as the result of an unlawful search should be considered “identity-related” evidence, thus barring suppression of such records as “fruit of the poisonous tree”?
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence resulting from a violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights was “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and could be suppressed by the defendant at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). However, the Court subsequently held that neither a defendant’s body nor his identity were suppressible fruits, and thus were not subject to the exclusionary rule. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039–40 (1984). Many courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have since interpreted this holding as prohibiting the suppression of evidence that is closely linked with a defendant’s identity, such as a defendant’s immigration records. See People v. Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (N.Y. 2010).
In January 2005, New York City police officers stopped a car driven by Petitioner Jose Tolentino for playing his music too loudly. See Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d at 1213. After learning Tolentino’s name, the officers performed a computer search, running his identity through the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database. See id. The search revealed that Tolentino was driving with a suspended license and, additionally, that his license had been suspended on at least ten other occasions. See id. The officers arrested Tolentino and charged him with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree under Section 511(3)(A)(II) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. See id.
At trial, Tolentino moved to suppress the information obtained by the DMV database search, and requested that the court hold a hearing to determine whether the DMV records fell under the exclusionary rule, thus constituting “suppressible fruit” under Mapp. See Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d at 1214. Specifically, Tolentino alleged that the original stop was unlawful, and that the subsequent discovery of his DMV records was suppressible because the information was the direct product of the unlawful search. See id. The court rejected this argument and denied the hearing request, holding that because Tolentino had no expectation of privacy regarding his DMV records, the information obtained from the records was not suppressible. See id. Tolentino pled guilty and the court sentenced him to five years’ probation. See id. The appellate court similarly rejected Tolentino’s argument, holding that, under Lopez-Mendoza, Tolentino’s DMV records were not “suppressible fruit” because his identity had directly led to their discovery. See id. Alternatively, the court held that the records were not suppressible because they were compiled independently of Tolentino’s arrest. See id.
Reviewing this decision, the New York State Court of Appeals assumed for Tolentino’s purposes that the search was unlawful, but nevertheless affirmed the lower court’s holding, adding that the only link between Tolentino’s identity and the DMV records was the officers’ discovery of Tolentino’s name. See Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d at 1216. A dissenting judge, however, disagreed that DMV records constituted “identity-related” evidence, and opined that such records should be subject to the exclusionary rule. See id. at 1217. Thereafter, Tolentino filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on November 15, 2010. See Tolentino v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 595 (2010).
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether a defendant’s electronically-obtained DMV records are suppressible under the exclusionary rule. The State of New York argues that allowing suppression of this evidence could increase motorists’ incentive to continue violating vehicular laws, and may hamper the efforts of law enforcement to stop such violations. Jose Tolentino argues that if such records are not suppressible, law enforcement officers may have a greater incentive to conduct arbitrary stops of vehicles without suspicion of illegal activity.
Costs of Suppressing DMV Records
New York argues that the suppression of DMV records would lead to an increase in traffic and vehicular violations, and would hamper law enforcement’s ability to control such violations. See Brief for Respondent, State of New York at 43–44. New York emphasizes that, although driving with a suspended license is technically a single-act offense, driving is an everyday activity for most Americans; allowing suppression would enable violators to continue breaking the law, at least until they are stopped again. See id. at 42–43. Furthermore, New York warns, it is possible that allowing suppression would effectively prevent a violator from ever being prosecuted: if the knowledge that an individual is driving with a suspended license is fruit of the poisonous tree, New York notes that it is unclear whether police could make any future use of the connection between the individual and his DMV record. See id. at 44.
In contrast, Tolentino argues that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule to identity-related evidence are minimal, because evidence obtained against a defendant in a search is always subject to the close scrutiny of a court’s Fourth Amendment inquiry. See Brief for Petitioner, Jose Tolentino at 51. Thus, he contends, identity-related evidence still may be admissible if the court deems that the search was not, in fact, unlawful. See id. Tolentino points to a number of circumstances under which identity-related evidence, such as DMV records, could be admissible, even if the exclusionary rule applies – e.g. weigh station or inspection stops and roadblocks – claiming that, in those circumstances, concerns associated with application of the exclusionary rule would be irrelevant, since the Court has deemed those types of stops lawful. See id. at 52–53.
Benefits of Suppressing DMV Records
Tolentino argues that suppression of unlawfully-obtained DMV records would eliminate the incentive for law enforcement officers to perform baseless vehicle stops in hopes of obtaining incriminating evidence against people in the car. See Brief for Petitioner at 18. He maintains that, if the Court applies a categorical bar against suppression of DMV records, police conduct in vehicular stops would go unchecked, and such evidence would be admissible even in cases where violations of a motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights were blatant and deliberate. See id. at 44.
The United States, in contrast, argues that these alleged benefits are not nearly substantial enough to warrant applying the exclusionary rule in this case. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States in Support of Respondent at 23–26. The United States contends that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule with respect to the types of evidence commonly found during vehicle stops – weapons, narcotics, contraband, etc. – already sufficiently prevents law enforcement officers from making baseless automobile stops, and that making identity-related evidence suppressible would not significantly increase the deterrent effect of the rule. See id. at 23. Furthermore, the United States argues, officers have other means to discern the status of a vehicle or its owner that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, such as running a license plate through a patrol car’s mobile computer. See id. at 25–26. Against the background of these other available means, officers are not incentivized to perform baseless stops, whether or not the type of identity-related evidence at issue here is suppressible. See id.
The outcome of this case could affect the conduct of law enforcement officers, as well as defendants faced with charges stemming from illegally obtained identity-related evidence. The State of New York argues that, if the Supreme Court decides DMV records discovered during an unlawful search are suppressible, individuals will be free to continue violating the law, and that it may be difficult to prosecute such individuals in the future. Tolentino argues, however, that if the Court decides unlawfully obtained DMV records are not suppressible, law enforcement officers may perform an increasing number of baseless vehicle stops.
In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amendment should apply to state DMV records when a police traffic stop reveals that a person’s driver’s license has been repeatedly suspended.
Petitioner Jose Tolentino argues that when police officers stop an individual without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and acquire any identity-related evidence, that evidence should be suppressed through application of the exclusionary rule. See Brief for Petitioner, Jose Tolentino at 17. Tolentino insists that to hold otherwise would encourage law enforcement agents to violate individuals’ constitutional rights based on unverifiable guesses. See id. at 19. Furthermore, Tolentino maintains that exclusion is necessarily the most appropriate remedy for illegal police searches because it vindicates citizens' constitutional right to protect “their persons, houses, papers and effects” from governmental scrutiny. See id. at 20-21. Additionally, Tolentino claims that, since the DMV records at issue were obtained directly as a result of an illegality, not by some other distinguishable means, the records are tainted and are directly related to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 28-29.
Respondent the State of New York argues that the Court has never used the exclusionary rule to suppress information the government already lawfully possessed prior to unconstitutional searches by police. See Brief for Respondent, State of New York at 13. This is because, New York insists, the exclusionary rule is supposed to only reach illegally obtained evidence, and the word “obtained” necessarily excludes things already in one’s own possession. See id. at 14. Therefore, New York asserts, evidence the government already possesses prior to any supposed illegal police search cannot logically be deemed to have been acquired as a result of a “later-in-time illegality.” See id. at 14-15. New York points to the Court’s decision in United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), where the Court held that once police officers obtain evidence, any later illegal conduct can’t retroactively taint that evidence or make the exclusionary rule applicable. See id. at 20. Even when police officers obtain evidence as a result of unlawful behavior, the Court has repeatedly stressed that suppression of the evidence is only warranted when a tight causal nexus exists between the illegality and the acquisition — a scenario that New York argues does not exist in this case. See id.
Furthermore, New York argues that the inevitable discovery and independent source doctrines prevent the exclusionary rule from being applied to preexisting DMV records. See id. at 27. The inevitable discovery doctrine allows the use of evidence that was discovered as a result of governmental illegality, as long as the evidence inevitably would have been discovered through lawful means. See id. The independent source doctrine allows evidence to be used, so long as it was discovered by means that were completely independent of any constitutional violations. See id. New York argues that, since the DMV records were already in the hands of the government prior to any alleged misconduct, suppressing these records would be inconsistent with these two doctrines. See id.
Tolentino argues that the independent source doctrine doesn’t apply in this instance because the police officers did not discover that Tolentino’s license was suspended by means that were independent of the unlawful seizure. See Brief for Petitioner at 13. Tolentino maintains that, while the government did possess his DMV files prior to the illegal stop, possession of those files would have lacked evidentiary significance without prior knowledge of his identity as the driver. See id. at 30. This information would have remained unknown but for the illegal stop, and, therefore, the independent source doctrine should not apply in this case, Tolentino argues. See id. Tolentino explains that, since the officers would have had no reason to examine Tolentino’s DMV records, suppressing those records wouldn’t put the police in a worse position than they otherwise would have been in; suppression would only operate to bar the police from using the evidence they ascertained as a direct result of their illegal conduct. See id.
New York points out that the sole piece of evidence being contested is Tolentino’s name – the most basic form of identity – and argues that the Court’s precedent has already established that a person’s identity is not subject to the exclusionary rule. See Brief for Respondent at 28. New York insists that this rationale is a natural extension of the principle that a defendant’s person can’t be deemed suppressible information under the purview of the exclusionary rule. See id. Otherwise, New York posits, the defendant would become immune from prosecution, which is a result the Court expressly rejected in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See id at 35.
Tolentino argues that the Court has actually held that the exclusionary rule cannot be used to defeat jurisdiction over a criminal defendant, not that it cannot be used to suppress identity-related evidence. See Brief for Petitioner at 26. Furthermore, Tolentino insists that suppressing DMV records accessed as a result of an illegal stop would meaningfully deter police from violating a driver’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest. See id. at 39-40. Tolentino posits that probable cause – an objective standard – serves as an important safeguard for drivers against unwarranted violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. See id. Furthermore, this safeguard is much more efficacious than one that would involve evaluating the subjective motives of police officers conducting automotive stops; without the remedy of suppression, police officers would have a strong incentive to engage in suspicionless, arbitrary automobile stops. See id.
New York maintains that the exclusionary rule should not be applied here, since the miniscule deterrence benefit of suppressing DMV records would be far outweighed by social costs. See Brief for Respondent at 42. New York insists that applying the exclusionary rule to the knowledge of individual officers who conduct traffic stops would cause fact-intensive and time-consuming litigation that would focus on the state of mind of police officers. See id at 18. This would be a departure from the Court’s continued insistence that illegal search and seizure issues be resolved using objective, not subjective, criteria. See id. New York suggests that other deterrents, such as internal disciplinary mechanisms, police training initiatives, and the risk of civil liability, are enough to discourage invalid stops. See id. at 10. On the other hand, New York posits that the decision Tolentino seeks would have broad consequences for public safety and would raise concerns over whether law enforcement officials should be allowed to follow up on a host of government records they might be able to examine after an unlawful stop. See id. at 13.
In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply to a driver’s DMV records after they have been accessed as a result of an illegal stop. Tolentino argues that the exclusionary rule should apply because, once a driver is stopped illegally, the information contained in that driver’s DMV records become the fruit of an illegal search. Furthermore, Tolentino argues that if the exclusionary rule is not applied to DMV records, police officers would have an incentive to constantly conduct unlawful, suspicionless automobile stops. The State of New York argues that application of the exclusionary rule to DMV records is unreasonable because it would suppress evidence that was already in possession of the government before any stop was conducted, and would impose large burdens on the state with little benefit to potential defendants. The outcome of this case will likely have an impact on the procedure police officers follow when making automobile stops.
Edited by: Eric Johnson
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