Fourth Amendment

Arizona v. Gant

Issues

May a law enforcement officer conduct an automobile search as an incident to all lawful arrests, or must the officer reasonably fear for his own safety or for the integrity of the evidence before searching the automobile?

Court below

 

Police arrested Rodney Gant for driving with a suspended license. During a warrantless search of Gant’s car incident to his arrest, officers found a weapon and cocaine. Gant moved to suppress this evidence; the court denied his motion, and he was convicted of possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Gant claims the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because he was arrested for an unrelated charge and because neither officer safety nor the integrity of the evidence was imperiled. The State of Arizona argues that the Court should adopt a clear, bright-line rule that automatically permits officers to conduct a vehicle search contemporaneous to an arrest. The outcome of this case will affect law enforcement officers’ conduct during motor vehicle stops and accompanying arrests and vehicle searches.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Fourth Amendment require law enforcement officers to demonstrate a threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle’s recent occupants have been arrested and secured?

On August 25, 1999, two uniformed police officers responded to a report of narcotics activity at a house in Tucson, Arizona. See State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 641 (Ariz. 2007). Respondent Rodney Gant told the officers that the owner was not home but would return later. See id.

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Arizona v. Johnson

Issues

In the course of a minor traffic stop, is the police officer’s reasonable belief that the vehicle’s passenger may be armed and dangerous a sufficient reason to conduct a search of the passenger for a concealed weapon, even where there is no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?

 

Lemon Johnson was a passenger in the back seat of a vehicle stopped for a mandatory insurance suspension. A police officer initiated a conversation with Johnson that was unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop. After asking him to exit the car, the officer conducted a pat-down search of Johnson because she was concerned for her safety upon noticing signs that Johnson may have been affiliated with a gang. During the pat-down search, the officer found a gun, which was used as evidence to convict Johnson at trial. Johnson argues that this evidence should have been suppressed because the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights: the officer had no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring, and therefore the pat-down search did not meet the standard articulated by Terry v. Ohio. In this case, the State of Arizona argues that police officers should have the right to conduct a pat-down search if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual is armed and dangerous. Numerous organizations and all lower courts that have considered the issue have adopted this standard to increase officer safety. Johnson, however, maintains that expanding Terry in the way that Arizona proposes is unnecessary and would encourage discretionary pat-down searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the context of a vehicular stop for a minor traffic infraction, may an officer conduct a pat-down search of a passenger when the officer has an articulable basis to believe the passenger might be armed and presently dangerous, but has no reasonable grounds to believe that the passenger is committing, or has committed, a criminal offense?

On the night of April 19, 2002, Maria Trevizo, a police officer assigned to the state gang task force, was on patrol with two other officers in a neighborhood known for gang-related activity near Tucson, Arizona. See Arizona v.

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Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd

Issues

1. Does the former Attorney General have either absolute or qualified immunity when making the determination of whether to apply for a material witness arrant?

2. Does the person seeking a material witness warrant have to actually intend to obtain further testimony from the subject of the warrant?

 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Respondent Abdullah al-Kidd as a material witness in a terrorism case. Al-Kidd sued the former United States Attorney General, Petitioner John Ashcroft, alleging that he used the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, as a pretext to hold and investigate al-Kidd as a terrorism suspect in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Ashcroft asserted absolute immunity, claiming that the use of a material arrest warrant constituted a prosecutorial function. He also claimed qualified immunity, on the grounds that there was no established constitutional violation for using a material arrest warrant at the time of the arrest. Al-Kidd contends that Ashcroft is not entitled to either form of immunity because the arrest had an investigative function and no reasonable official could believe that a material witness warrant would authorize the arrest of a suspect without any intent to use the suspect as a witness. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ashcroft was entitled to neither absolute nor qualified immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the protection available to government officials by resolving the issue of when the government can use material witness warrants in making arrests.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner absolute immunity from the pretext claim.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner qualified immunity from the pretext claim based on the conclusions that (a) the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from executing a valid material witness warrant with the subjective intent of conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject; and (b) this Fourth Amendment rule was clearly established at the time of respondent's arrest.

Abdullah Al-Kidd is a United States citizen. See Brief for Respondent, Abdullah Al-Kidd at 1. After September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) began investigating various terrorist activities. See Brief for Petitioner, John Ashcroft at 3.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

 The Washington Post, Robert Barnes: Supreme Court to Decide whether Ashcroft can be Sued by Detained Citizen (Oct. 18, 2010)

· The New York Times, Adam Liptak: Justices to Hear Appeal over Liability for Detention (Oct. 18, 2010)

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Bailey v. United States

Issues

May police officers, prior to executing a search warrant, follow and detain a person seen leaving the premises after that person leaves the immediate area?

 

Chunon L. Bailey was detained approximately a mile from his residence after two police officers observed him leave his home prior to the execution of a search warrant. The officers brought Bailey back to his home and arrested him after the search turned up drugs and a gun. Bailey seeks to vacate his conviction, arguing that the detention violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In this case, the Court must resolve a circuit split surrounding the application of Michigan v. Summers, which held that police may detain an occupant outside of the premises to be searched so long as the detention is reasonable. Bailey argues that Summers should not be extended to situations where the occupant has left the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, as this expansion would further none of the justifications described by the Court in that case. In response, the United States argues that the reasoning underlying Summers justifies this detention and that any potential Fourth Amendment issues can be resolved by a reasonableness test. If the Supreme Court sides with the United States and affirms the decision below, the scope of police power to detain occupants prior to the execution of a search warrant will be significantly expanded. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, pursuant to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), police officers may detain an individual incident to the execution of a search warrant when the individual has left the immediate vicinity of the premises before the warrant is executed.

On July 28, 2005, two officers of the Suffolk County Police Department executed a search warrant for a basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive in Wyandanch, New York. United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.

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Barnes v. Felix

Issues

When analyzing whether a law enforcement officer used excessive force, should courts consider context outside of the narrow time when the officer’s safety was threatened?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether courts should consider context outside of the narrow time when the officer’s safety was threatened when analyzing whether a law enforcement officer used excessive force. The Fifth Circuit applies the “moment of the threat” doctrine when analyzing the reasonableness of the use of deadly force by a police officer. Under the “moment of the threat” doctrine, the court can only consider the instance at which an officer deployed the deadly force in its reasonableness analysis. Barnes argues that the “moment of the threat” doctrine should be rejected because it contravenes precedents established by the Supreme Court and because it raises impossible line-drawing problems. Felix counters that the “moment of the threat” doctrine is consistent with precedent and is a straightforward analysis that does not raise line-drawing issues. The outcome of this case has strong implications for law enforcement and community relations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether courts should apply the "moment of the threat" doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix, Jr. shot and killed Ashtian Barnes after a traffic stop. Barnes v. Felix at 2. Before the killing, the Harris County Toll Road Authority provided Felix with a plate number that had outstanding violations.

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Birchfield v. North Dakota

Issues

Does a State violate the Fourth Amendment by criminalizing a driver's refusal to take a chemical test to detect blood-alcohol levels without a warrant?

 

The Fourth Amendment  of  the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government, or state governments, from carrying out “unreasonable searches and seizures” without a warrant. The Supreme Court has previously held that a chemical test for blood-alcohol content is a search. Several states have statutes that require drivers to consent to chemical tests as a condition of holding a  drivers   license,  or impose criminal and civil penalties—including revoking drivers’ licenses—if drivers refuse chemical tests during traffic stops. Petitioners Danny Birchfield, William Robert Bernard, Jr., and Steve Michael Beylund argue that these statutes violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches and that no exception to this constitutional protection applies. Respondents North Dakota and Minnesota contend that, by driving on state roads, drivers provide implied consent to chemical tests where police suspect that a driver is  intoxicated,  and that the governmental interest in preventing drunk driving outweighs any Fourth Amendment concerns. This case could shape how the courts consider the role of driving in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and could either narrow or expand states' police powers in cases of suspected drunk driving. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the absence of a warrant, may a State make it a crime for a driver to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the driver’s blood?

On July 6 and July 7, 2012, drivers driving under the influence of alcohol in North Dakota lost control of their vehicles and caused several tragic deaths. Brief for Respondent, North Dakota at 4–5.  In response, North Dakota passed Brielle’s Law, named after one of the victims. 

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Brendlin v. California

Issues

When does a passenger in an automobile become “detained” during a traffic stop and thereby gain the ability to challenge the stop under the Fourth Amendment?

 

Bruce Brendlin was a passenger in a car driven by Karen Simeroth when she was the subject of a traffic stop by a County Deputy Sherriff. During the stop, the Deputy discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Brendlin. Brendlin was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the original traffic stop was unreasonable, and therefore in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied his motion, and the California Supreme Court upheld the denial on the basis that Brendlin had not been “seized” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus could not challenge the stop. Brendlin appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was effectively seized by the initial stop, and therefore should be able to challenge it. California argues that Brendlin was not seized, because he should have felt free to leave the scene of the traffic stop, and did not actually submit to the application of force or to a show of police authority.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a passenger in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop is thereby “detained” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, thus allowing the passenger to contest the illegality of the traffic stop.

Early in the morning of November 21, 2001, a vehicle driven by Karen Simeroth was stopped by Deputy Sheriff Robert Brokenbrough in Yuba City, California under suspicion of an expired inspection. See People v. Brendlin, 38 Cal. 4th 1107, 1111 (Cal. 2006).

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Brigham City v. Stuart

Issues

Whether officers who entered a private home because they believed a fight was occurring inside violated the Fourth Amendment, or are the officers protected under either the emergency aid exception or the exigency exception.

Court below

 

The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion by prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures without a warrant. Two related exceptions to this rule are relevant in this case: the emergency aid exception and the exigent circumstance exception. This case will help define the type of conduct that must occur in order for an officer to validly invoke either the exigent circumstance or the emergency aid exception. The Court’s decision will help sharpen the line between permissible and impermissible police involvement and define the level of protection individuals continue to have under the Fourth Amendment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does the "emergency aid exception" to the warrant requirement recognized in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), turn on an officer's subjective motivation for entering the home?

2. Was the gravity of the "emergency" or "exigency" sufficient to justify, under the Fourth Amendment, the officers' entry into the home to stop the fight?

On July 23, 2001, at approximately 3:00 a.m., four Brigham City, Utah police officers were dispatched to respond to a complaint about a loud party. Brief for Petitioner at 2.

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Byrd v. United States

Issues

Does a driver in sole possession of a rental car and with the renter’s permission to operate the car, but not included as a driver on the rental agreement, have a reasonable expectation of privacy that is entitled to constitutional protection?

Terrence Byrd was pulled over by a Pennsylvania police officer for violating a state driving law. Eventually, the officer and another police officer discovered that Byrd was driving a rental car but was not a named driver on the rental agreement. Moreover, the officers also discovered that Byrd had a criminal record that included drug, weapon, and assault charges. Ultimately, the officers asked Byrd for permission to search the car, which they assert that Byrd granted, and, the officers found both heroin and illegal body armor in the car. Byrd challenged the stop and search arguing that it was unlawful. The District Court held that the stop and search was lawful. On appeal, the Third Circuit further recognized that the driver of a rental car who is not listed on the rental agreement did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court will likely resolve the Circuit conflict regarding whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists for a driver in sole possession of a rental vehicle that is not listed as a driver on the rental agreement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Fourth Amendment protects people from suspicionless searches of places and effects in which they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Does a driver in sole possession of a rental vehicle reasonably expect privacy in the vehicle where he has the renter’s permission to drive the vehicle but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement?

In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a state police officer pulled petitioner Terrence Byrd over for violating a state driving law. United States v. Byrd at 2. The police officer, eventually accompanied by another officer, found that Byrd was driving a rental car but that Byrd’s name was not on the rental agreement. Id. at 3.

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Camreta v. Greene; Alford v. Greene

Issues

1. Prior to questioning a child regarding possible sexual abuse, must law enforcement agents first obtain a warrant, or are they permitted to proceed without a warrant, provided that the public interest in conducting the investigation outweighs any impact that the questioning has on the liberties of the individual?

2. Is the Supreme Court authorized to review the legal basis of a lower court opinion that objected to the petitioners’ actions, even though the court ultimately decided in favor of the petitioners on qualified immunity grounds?

 

When the Oregon Department of Human Services received a report of alleged abuse against a nine-year old child, a caseworker and police officer decided to interview the child at school, without parental consent or a warrant. After the charges against the child's father, Mr. Greene, were dropped, the child’s mother, Mrs. Greene, sued the caseworker and officer for violating her daughter's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search or seizure, arguing that probable cause is a necessary prerequisite to interviewing children about their alleged sexual abuse because such interviews may cause irreparable harm to the children when the allegations are unfounded. The caseworker and officer argue that reasonableness is the proper standard because it would be difficult to obtain probable cause when the child is often the only witness to the abuse. The Court's decision will likely clarify whether probable cause or reasonableness is the proper standard for interviewing a child who is the alleged victim of abuse without parental consent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Camreta

1. The state received a report that a nine-year-old child was being abused by her father at home. A child protection caseworker and law enforcement officer went to the child's school to interview her. To assess the constitutionality of that interview, the Ninth Circuit applied the traditional warrant/warrant-exception requirements that apply to seizures of suspected criminals. Should the Ninth Circuit, as other circuits have done, instead have applied the balancing standard that this Court has identified as the appropriate standard when a witness is temporarily detained?

2. The Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the interview in order to provide "guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting child welfare within the confines of the Fourth Amendment[,]" and it thus articulated a rule that will apply to all future child-abuse investigations. Is the Ninth Circuit's constitutional ruling reviewable, notwithstanding that it ruled in petitioner's favor on qualified immunity grounds?

Alford

Does the Fourth Amendment require a warrant, a court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances before law enforcement and child welfare officials may conduct a temporary seizure and interview at a public school of a child whom they reasonably suspect was being sexually abused by her father?

In 2003, Nimrod Greene was arrested after F.S., a seven-year old child, informed his parents and investigators that Mr. Greene had inappropriately touched him twice. See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). In connection with the ensuing investigation, F.S.'s mother told investigators that Mr. Greene's wife, Sarah Greene, said that she did not like her daughters, S.G.

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