Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak and Salazar v. Patchak (Consolidated)

Respondent David Patchak, in a bid to challenge the entrustment of the Bradley Property for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of the Pottawatomi Indians (“the Band”), argues that the Secretary of the Interior violated the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) because the Band is ineligible to receive lands in trust under the IRA. In response, the Band and the government (“Petitioners”) assert two primary arguments: that Patchak’s suit is blocked by sovereign immunity and that, alternatively, Patchak lacks prudential standing to receive judicial review of his claim.

The Quiet Title Act and Waivers of Sovereign Immunity

The government first argues that sovereign immunity has not been waived in this case because, although § 702 of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) generally waives immunity in suits contesting agency action, it is rendered null by the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), which “expressly and impliedly” reinserts immunity for suits challenging Indian trust lands. . The Band concurs, pointing to Supreme Court precedent to support the government’s point and contending that the precise reason why Congress included the “expressly or impliedly” language was to ensure no circumvention around the QTA. . The QTA is implicated here, the government argues, because it provides the exclusive means for private claimants to challenge title held by the United States; it follows, the government maintains, that the QTA’s Indian trust exception, retaining immunity in challenges to federal Indian trust lands, expressly forbids Patchak’s suit—an outcome in alignment with legislative intent and Supreme Court precedent. . In addition, the government contends that the court of appeals, in holding that the QTA does not apply, erroneously considered what Patchak does not seek—personal title to the Bradley Property—and missed the claim itself—that the United States may not entrust it. . The government closes in this regard with the pronouncement that any other reading would allow any claimant to circumvent express statutory language and intent with simple artful pleading. . The Band is in agreement, asserting first that, as a “precisely drawn, detailed statute,” the QTA deliberately instates sovereign immunity in quiet-title cases involving Indian trust lands, foreclosing the application of more general waivers of immunity such as § 702. . The Band concludes by arguing that the QTA cannot be circumvented here because allowing the QTA’s immunity provision to fall away simply because Patchak does not assert title for himself would upend the QTA’s whole purpose.

In response, Patchak attacks the Petitioners’ premise that the APA falls away here by asserting that his claim specifically implicates the APA because he is in fact challenging agency action under the IRA. . In establishing this argument, Patchak first notes that the QTA’s waiver exception for Indian trust lands requires a claimant to bring a quiet title action through which the claimant asserts personal ownership, a conclusion buttressed by the QTA’s jurisdiction and venue provisions as well as the United States’ own past actions in which it employed this very same argument to defeat claims brought under the QTA that did not sound in personal title assertion. . Next, Patchak contends that, while the QTA is indeed precisely drawn to preclude claims not brought as traditional quiet-title actions, Patchak’s claim does not even require QTA approval because it challenges unlawful agency action, not United States land title. . Patchak asserts that his claim cannot be encapsulated by the QTA’s sovereign immunity exception for several reasons: First, Patchak argues that although his action implicates United States title, the QTA’s waiver exception, understood through legislative history and indeed the government’s own assertions, can only apply to traditional quiet-title actions. . Second, Patchak maintains that § 702 does not invite the QTA to block Patchak’s suit because though the relief sought would divest the government’s title, the cause of action itself—the essence of the claim—cannot be said to draw in the QTA, a result similar to that reached by other courts in similar contexts. . Patchak then notes that it must follow that the QTA does not “expressly or impliedly” reach his APA claim. . Finally, Patchak asserts that his claim is directed to unlawful actions of a federal agency and not to divestment of government title, and argues that the government, by placing focus on the effects of Patchak’s suit, misses the brunt of his actual claim.

Prudential Standing to Sue

In addition to Article III standing, access to the federal courts is limited by the prudential standing requirement, which looks to whether the plaintiff’s asserted injury falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the statutory provision the plaintiff invokes. See . The government begins by arguing that the IRA does not protect Patchak’s asserted interests here because they fall outside the zone of interests protected by the IRA. . The government contends that Patchak’s interests—maintaining property values, avoiding a “gaming” community, and others—do not comport with the IRA’s protections—namely, ensuring the transfer of Indian trust lands to rightful beneficiaries. . The Band supports this notion, asserting that Patchak’s interest in combating gaming in his community is but a tiny fraction of the grander scheme of land entrustment furthered by the IRA. . Next, the government asserts that the zone-of-interests evaluation should only take into account the particular provision invoked by Patchak, not ancillary portions of the statute. . The government maintains that the courts of appeals erred in reading the IRA in conjunction with other statutes, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), because Patchak has foreclosed this route by not including it in his original complaint and the IGRA’s mere similarity in subject matter does not suffice to sustain linkage. . The Band additionally contends that Patchak cannot pick and choose redress by asserting a claim under the IRA instead of the more appropriate IGRA. . Finally, the government argues that when the court of appeals below found that Patchak has “standing” because he possessed a “cognizable injury,” such a conclusion only goes to establish Article III standing, not prudential standing. .

Patchak argues that prudential standing, and the attendant zone-of-interests test, when viewed through the lens of an APA claim, should be applied leniently to serve a “broad remedial purpose.” . Patchak asserts that the correct statutory scheme is the APA and that the appropriate inquiry is not whether Patchak is a beneficiary of the IRA—the statute implicated under the APA claim—but whether he has an interest in challenging an agency action. . Taking the former point as well-established by Supreme Court precedent, Patchak argues that he is exactly the sort of party that the IRA’s zone of interests covers, especially because state and local governments, who Petitioners concede fall within the zone, cannot be relied on as the sole enforcers of the statute because of their potential self-interest in establishing revenue generating casinos. . Next, Patchak contends that, while Petitioners—in establishing the zone of interests—look only to the acquisition of the land, the appropriate perspective accounts for use of the land as well, which, once taken, would materially touch Patchak’s interests. . Patchak further argues that his interest in enforcing the IRA against unwarranted agency encroachments is not a “generalized grievance” but is best suited to be resolved in the federal courts. . Finally, Patchak contends that the zone-of-interests test should not view the operative statute—the IRA—in isolation but, rather, should integrate related statutes—such as the IGRA. In support, Patchak points out that this approach is consistent with that in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, in which the Supreme Court—in determining whether the plaintiff there satisfied prudential standing—incorporated into its standing analysis of the operative McFadden Act of 1929 the related provisions of the National Banking Act of 1864.