Hall v. Hall

LII note: The U.S. Supreme Court has now decided Hall v. Hall.


In a consolidated case, does the entry of a final judgment in only one case trigger the “appeal-clock” for that entire case?

Oral argument: 
January 16, 2018

The Court will decide when a party may take an immediate appeal in a single district consolidated case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the statute addressing appellate jurisdiction of all final decisions made by the district courts of the United States. Elsa Hall argues that § 1291 allows an appeal from a final judgment in a consolidated case even if the judgment does not resolve all claims. On the other hand, Samuel Hall argues that only a judgment resolving all consolidated claims may be appealed under § 1291. This issue arises in every consolidated case in which a district court enters judgment that leaves some claims in the consolidated case unresolved. Accordingly, the case will impact how plaintiffs bring claims and the appeals process in federal courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties 

Whether the clarity Gelboim v. Bank of America gave to multidistrict cases should be extended to single district consolidated cases, so that the entry of a final judgment in only one case triggers the appeal-clock for that case.


Ethlyn Hall and her son, Samuel, had a falling out due to a disagreement over his free legal work for her. As a result, Ethlyn stopped speaking to her son. Her health began to deteriorate, and she moved to Florida with her daughter, Elsa. While in Florida, Ethlyn modified her trust, designating her grandchildren as the sole beneficiaries and appointing Elsa as the sole successor. Ethlyn, as an individual and as trustee of her inter vivos trust, then filed an action against Samuel, alleging several causes of action arising from his legal work.

Before the district court resolved Samuel’s motion to dismiss the suit, Ethlyn died, rendering Elsa the personal representative of the estate and the trust’s sole trustee. Samuel then filed a separate lawsuit against Elsa as an individual, and the district court consolidated Samuel’s suit with the pending suit. The district court dismissed several of the Estate’s claims before trial, and the jury rejected all of its remaining claims. The district court also dismissed all of Samuel’s claims before trial except for his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On this count, the jury found Elsa liable and awarded Samuel damages. The district court entered a separate judgment for the two sets of claims, and the Estate appealed regarding its claims against Samuel. With respect to Samuel’s claims, however, Elsa filed a motion for a directed verdict or a new trial. The district court ultimately granted the new trial.

On appeal, Samuel filed a motion to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction, arguing that because a motion was pending in the lower court regarding his claims against Elsa, the appeals court lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals agreed with Samuel and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Elsa appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in September 2017.


Elsa Hall argues that § 1291 permits an immediate appeal from a final judgment that resolves only one of the cases in a consolidated case.

In opposition, Samuel Hall argues that § 1291 permits an appeal only from a judgment that resolves all the claims in a consolidated case.


Elsa maintains that the dismissal of her claim constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 1291, and because § 1291 is non-discretionary, the appellate court has jurisdiction. Elsa argues that because § 1291 is unambiguous on its face, the Court should not read in an exception to the final judgment rule in consolidated cases. Elsa contends that the dismissal of her case is a final decision because consolidation does not merge the two cases into a single unit under §1291. In support of this assertion, Elsa argues that the Supreme Court has long held that consolidated cases are not merged, noting that the Court considered consolidated cases to be separately appealable before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that there is no language in the Advisory Committee’s report signaling a departure from the Court’s earlier precedent. Additionally, Elsa maintains that Rule 42 does not merge consolidated cases into one action, arguing that if the rule had that effect, it would significantly affect other procedural aspects of the case. Consequently, Elsa contends that the Court should adopt the final judgment rule, which she claims provides a bright line rule that allows consolidated cases to be separately appealable.

Samuel counters that a case that is consolidated for all purposes should be treated as a single unit for purposes of § 1291, and accordingly, only a judgment that resolves all claims in a consolidated proceeding is a final judgment and eligible for appeal under § 1291. Samuel asserts that the concern of piecemeal appeals undergirding the final judgment rule supports recognizing a single appeal right in consolidated proceedings. Samuel claims that consolidated cases for all purposes are indistinguishable from multi-claim actions that afford parties only one appeal as of right because consolidated cases exhibit both procedural unity and substantive unity. According to Samuel, consolidated cases have substantive unity because in order for the district court to consolidate, the cases must present a common question of fact or law in accordance with Rule 42(a). Additionally, Samuel argues that within the context of the liberal joinder rules, Rule 42(a) suggests that consolidated proceedings formally become a single action.


Elsa argues that the Court should apply the same rule it adopted in Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp. for multidistrict litigation: “Entry of final judgment in a case renders it appealable notwithstanding that the case is consolidated with another case that is not final.” Elsa contends that waiting until all claims in a consolidated case are final is contrary to the plain language of § 1291. Although appeals from judgments in some consolidated cases may result in piecemeal review by the court of appeals, Elsa maintains that the court of appeals can effectively manage appeals to avoid this outcome. Elsa argues that the court of appeals should have the authority to determine when justice is best served by deferring the appeal until the rest of the consolidated proceeding is complete. Elsa asserts that the court of appeals is in a better position to determine when to issue a stay because the posture of the cases is likely different from when the district court first consolidated them. Consequently, Elsa argues, the court of appeals would be free to consider whether the cases should remain consolidated on appeal.

Samuel, however, opposes extending the Gelboim rule to single-district consolidated cases because single-district cases that are consolidated for all purposes do not possess the characteristics that indicated separateness in multidistrict litigation, such as temporary consolidation for part of the proceeding. Moreover, Samuel contends that the wrong tribunal would decide whether an immediate appeal is desirable if the Court adopts Elsa’s application of the Gelboim rule. Samuel maintains that the district court is the appropriate tribunal to determine whether an appeal should be allowed separate from the rest of the consolidated proceeding because it is most familiar with the case. Additionally, Samuel argues that the federal rules, including Rule 54(b), specifically authorize district courts to act as dispatchers and determine within their discretion when to let part of a case go to appeal. Samuel contends that allowing the court of appeals to decide whether an appeal should be deferred until all claims are resolved in the consolidated proceeding undermines the district court’s determination that the cases should be consolidated in the first place. Samuel also claims that Elsa’s rule would allow parties to circumvent the “carefully calibrated” rules, such as Rule 54(b), which allow appeals in the interest of justice, by filing separate claims and taking an immediate appeal once consolidated. Lastly, Samuel asserts that Elsa’s rule contains no legal standard to guide the court of appeals in determining whether or not to stay an appeal.


Elsa disputes that there are alternative ways to take an appeal from the dismissal of one of her cases. Specifically, Elsa argues that certification by the district court for an appeal under Rule 54(b) does not apply to her dismissal because Rule 54(b) applies only to judgments that effect fewer than all claims, whereas the judgment she wishes to appeal dismissed all of the claims in the case. Accordingly, Elsa asserts that because consolidated cases are not treated as a single unit, the dismissal of one of her cases is not eligible for certification by the district court for appeal under Rule 54(b).

Samuel disagrees that there are no legal mechanisms available to Elsa and argues that parties such as Elsa may seek discretionary appeal under Rule 54(b), § 1292(b), and mandamus. Samuel asserts that Rule 54(b) is available because a consolidated proceeding constitutes a single unit under § 1291, and thus a judgment that does not resolve all claims in a consolidated proceeding may be appealable by district court certification in the interest of justice and efficiency. Samuel claims that § 1292(b) provides an additional mechanism for immediate appeal by district court certification so long as the judgment is not otherwise appealable, involves an important question of law, and the court of appeals permits the appeal. Finally, Samuel argues that mandamus review is available to allow courts of appeals to immediately review district court error, and is therefore an additional mechanism available for taking immediate appeals in consolidated cases.



Elsa asserts that a uniform rule must exist that provides litigants with certainty as to when to appeal. Elsa claims that the case-by-case method that several other circuits apply and the Second Circuit’s unusual circumstances test do not allow litigants to adequately predict when to appeal. According to Elsa, under the other circuits’ tests, litigants would have to file a protective appeal or risk having an appellate court dismiss the appeal as being untimely. Elsa argues that the Gelboim rule, instead, would provide clear uniformity and give parties adequate notice of when the appeals clocks is triggered.

Conversely, Samuel contends that a uniform rule already exists because a consolidated case should be treated no differently from cases involving multiple claims. Samuel asserts, among other reasons, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) explicitly consolidates cases into one, and that it would be difficult to understand how a consolidated case differs from a case with joined claims.

Moreover, a brief from retired United States District Judges (“District Judges”), in support of Samuel, highlights that Elsa’s proposed rule would lead to inconsistency. The District Judges emphasize that if a district court and a court of appeals exercised jurisdiction simultaneously over a consolidated case, then both courts could yield conflicting judgments. Last, the District Judges claim Elsa’s rule creates uncertainty in that it becomes unclear as to when the particular district court fully resolved all of the issues of that sub-case.


Elsa argues that extending the Gelboim rule to single district consolidated cases is efficient, permitting appellate courts to manage appeals from consolidated cases. Elsa contends that appellate courts can efficiently manage any piecemeal litigation that would result from such appeals. Elsa also argues that a rule prohibiting appeal until all cases are decided and final is inefficient because situations may arise where cases were consolidated for discovery purposes, but one case has received a final judgment. Elsa claims that in such a situation, the litigant would be inefficiently prevented from appealing until the entire consolidated case was decided.

Samuel, on the other hand, argues that the final judgment rule promotes efficiency in the litigation process because it provides litigants only one opportunity to appeal at the end of the district court’s adjudication. According to Samuel, in unusual cases where it would be more efficient to hear the claims before a final judgment is entered, mechanisms, such as an interlocutory appeal or Rule 54(b), already exist to facilitate the appeals process. Additionally, Samuel and the District Judges argue that implementing Elsa’s proposed rule would create piecemeal and even duplicative adjudication, where certain claims are decided, despite being substantially similar to other claims. The District Judges highlight that a district court judge is already tasked with the decision to consolidate cases, suggesting that the district court should retain authority over the appellate process of a consolidated case.

Edited by 


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