Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.

Issues 

Does the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act abrogate the sovereign immunity of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico by granting general jurisdiction to federal courts over claims against the Board?

Oral argument: 
January 11, 2023

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), which created the petitioner, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“the Board”), abrogates the Board’s sovereign immunity by granting general jurisdiction to federal courts over claims against the Board. The Board argues that PROMESA does not abrogate its sovereign immunity, since the statutory language of PROMESA does not explicitly revoke its sovereign immunity. In contrast, the Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (“CPI”) contends that PROMESA abrogates the Board’s sovereign immunity because the statutory language, read in conjunction with prior case law regarding the abrogation doctrine as well as the legislative history of PROMESA, implicitly revokes the Board’s sovereign immunity. The outcome of this case will profoundly impact the Board’s operations and public oversight of the Board’s financial decisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties 

Whether the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act’s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims.

Facts 

In 2016, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”) to facilitate Puerto Rico’s economic recovery and debt restructuring. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., at 5. PROMESA established the Financial Oversight and Management Board (“the Board”) and empowered it to “develop, approve, and certify Fiscal Plans and Territory Budgets, . . . negotiate with [Puerto Rico’s] creditors, . . . and . . . commence a bankruptcy-type proceeding on behalf of [Puerto Rico].” Id.

Following the Board’s establishment, the Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (“CPI”), a Puerto Rico-based non-profit media organization, filed a complaint against the Board in June 2017 (the “2017 Complaint”) under PROMESA § 106 (codified as 48 U.S.C. § 2126(a)), which states that “any action against the . . . Board . . . shall be brought in a United States district court.” Id.; 48 U.S.C. § 2126(a). The CPI asked the court to order the Board to produce documents regarding “Puerto Rico's fiscal situation, communications among [the] Board’s members . . . and financial disclosure forms for the Board’s members,” which the Board had refused to fully release to the CPI in an alleged violation of the Constitution of Puerto Rico. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. at 6. The CPI claimed that the Board, by ignoring the CPI’s requests, abridged the freedom of the press and violated Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution of Puerto Rico. Id. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Id. The Board argued that the Eleventh Amendment blocked the CPI’s disclosure requests, and that PROMESA preempts the disclosure obligations established by the Constitution of Puerto Rico. Id. at 6–7. Assuming the Board was otherwise entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district judge denied the Board’s motion, concluding that Congress abrogated its sovereign immunity in PROMESA, and that PROMESA did not preempt Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution of Puerto Rico. Id. at 7.

The district judge referred the case to a magistrate judge. Id. While the magistrate judge oversaw the case, the Board produced some of the requested documents and withheld others. Id. at 7. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) suggesting that the court order the Board to produce a privilege log specifying the categories of privilege for the documents the Board withheld. Id. at 8. The district judge adopted the R&R and imposed a deadline to produce the privilege log. Id.

Before the district judge adopted the R&R, the CPI filed a second complaint against the Board seeking access to communications between the Board and federal and Puerto Rican governments (the “2019 Complaint”). Id. The Board moved to dismiss the 2019 Complaint, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and PROMESA § 105 immunity (codified as 48 U.S.C. § 2125), under which the Board shall be exempted from liability for claims. Id.; 48 U.S.C. § 2125. The district court consolidated the two cases and denied the Board’s motion to dismiss. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. at 8. The Board appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Id. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that PROMESA’s statutory language, prior case law regarding the abrogation doctrine, and PROMESA’s legislative history abrogated the Board’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 14–20.

The United States Supreme Court granted the Board’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 3, 2022. Brief for Petitioner, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico at 4.

Analysis 

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF PUERTO RICO AND THE BOARD

The Board argues that the court should assume that the government of Puerto Rico, and by extension the Board itself, enjoys sovereign immunity as a U.S. territory. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico at 2.The Board asserts that the Supreme Court need not decide whether Puerto Rico possesses sovereign immunity before addressing whether it has abrogated sovereign immunity. Id. Instead, the Board maintains, the Court can assume arguendo that Puerto Rico enjoys sovereign immunity and proceed to the question of whether it has abrogated sovereign immunity. Id. In particular, the Board contends that the Supreme Court should assume that Puerto Rico has sovereign immunity in the present case because the federal judiciary has repeatedly recognized that Puerto Court Rico has sovereign immunity in prior cases. Id. at 3. The Board points to Supreme Court precedent that has held that Puerto Rico “enjoys sovereignty akin to that of the States.” Id. The Board argues that it is an “arm of Puerto Rico” because it acts on Puerto Rico’s behalf, issuing debt, representing Puerto Rico in restructuring matters, and undertaking investigations pursuant to Puerto Rican law. Id. at 5. Additionally, the Board notes, Puerto Rico pays for the Board’s liabilities. Id. Accordingly, the Board argues that it, “as an entity through which the [government of Puerto Rico] acts,” also enjoys sovereign immunity as an “arm of Puerto Rico” pursuant to PROMESA § 101(c) (codified as 48 U.S.C. § 2121(c)). Id. at 5; 48 U.S.C. § 2121(c).

The CPI disputes Puerto Rico’s sovereign immunity by insisting that the Supreme Court has never extended the Eleventh Amendment immunity, which is granted to the states, to territories such as Puerto Rico. Brief for Respondent, Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. at 17–18. Moreover, the CPI contends that Puerto Rico lacks state sovereign immunity since it is a territory and not a state. Id. at 20. An entity does not attain state sovereign immunity, the CPI asserts, simply because the entity practices self-governance. Id. at 18. According to the CPI, the Territory Clause of the Constitution, which vests Congress with plenary power over territories “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations,” precludes territories such as Puerto Rico from having the residual sovereignty that states possess. Id. at 20; U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The CPI posits that territorial governments are created by Congress and are thus subject to Congress’s supervision and control. Id. at 21. The CPI observes that Congress, for example, can control territorial courts and veto provisions of territorial constitutions. Id. at 22. Consequently, the CPI maintains that territories are “not sovereigns distinct from the United States.” Id. In the alternative, the CPI argues that even if Puerto Rico has sovereign immunity, its sovereign immunity does not extend to the Board, since the Board has not provided the requisite evidence to demonstrate that it is an arm of the state. Brief of Respondent in Opposition of Certiorari, Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. at 14.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Assuming that the Board has sovereign immunity, the Board contends that the Supreme Court should use the clear-statement rule to determine whether Congress intended to abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity. Brief for Petitioner at 18–23. The Board argues that the clear-statement rule must be applied to determine congressional intent whenever the legislation in question potentially abrogates another entity’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 18. According to the clear-statement rule, the Board explains, a court may not find an abrogation of sovereign immunity unless Congress expresses an “unmistakably clear” intent to abrogate. Id. The Board elaborates that, to intentionally abrogate sovereign immunity, Congress must “specifically consider[]” and “intentionally legislate[]” on the matter. Id. In other words, the Board asserts, the clear-statement rule requires there to be specific language within the statutory text to confirm that Congress intended to abrogate an entity’s sovereign immunity. Id. The Board notes that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are two ways for Congress to “express a clear and unmistakable intent to abrogate”: 1) by expressly mentioning sovereign immunity or abrogation, or 2) by explicitly naming a government entity as a potential defendant of a statutorily created claim. Id. at 22–23.

Applying the clear-statement rule, the Board asserts that Congress did not intend to abrogate the Board’s sovereignty when it passed PROMESA. Id. at 18. The Board maintains that Congress did not include language within PROMESA that evinced an intent to abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity. Id. Specifically, the Board argues that Congress did not employ either of the two ways it can express a clear and unmistakable intent to abrogate. Id. at 22–23. In addition, the Board argues that PROMESA does not abrogate its sovereign immunity, since the statutory language of PROMESA does not explicitly waive its sovereign immunity. Id. at 18. Instead, the Board contends that the disputed statutory language of PROMESA—“any action against the . . . Board . . . shall be brought [in federal court]”—only establishes “exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims against the Board.” Id. at 23. The Board claims that granting this jurisdiction does not imply abrogation, pointing to previous cases in which Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction without abrogating sovereign immunity. Id. at 23–24.

Assuming that the Board has sovereign immunity, the CPI counters that the clear-statement rule does not apply to PROMESA, since PROMESA was passed under the Territory Clause. Brief for Respondent at 25. According to the CPI, the Supreme Court has never imposed the clear-statement rule on legislation passed under the Territory Clause. Id. at 25–26. As such, the CPI asserts that the Supreme Court should follow prior precedent and not apply the clear-statement rule in this matter. Id.

In the alternative, the CPI argues that even if PROMESA was subject to the clear-statement rule, PROMESA still expresses Congress’s intent to abrogate. Id. at 33. Disagreeing with the Board, the CPI contends that Congress can express its intentions under the clear-statement rule in more than two ways. Id. at 34. While the CPI agrees with the Board that Congress can express its intentions by “expressly mention[ing] sovereign immunity, abrogation, or related concepts,” the CPI asserts that Congress can also express its intentions through “inferences from the statutory text . . . [that] generate[] . . . ‘unmistakably clear’ expression[s] of Congress’[s] intent.” Id. The CPI argues that statutory language provides an “unmistakably clear” expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate when it 1) specifies which courts have jurisdiction over causes of action involving an entity, 2) sets forth the remedies that parties can seek in relation to those causes of action, and 3) lays out the procedures for cases involving the entity. Id. at 34–36.

Accordingly, the CPI asserts that Congress intended to abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity through PROMESA, since inferences from PROMESA’s statutory language “generate[] an ‘unmistakably clear’ expression of Congress’[s] intent to abrogate.” Id. In particular, the CPI notes that PROMESA’s statutory language satisfies the clear-statement rule, since the section in dispute, 48 U.S.C. § 2126(a), specifies which courts have jurisdiction over causes of action involving the Board, 48 U.S.C. § 2126(c) sets forth the remedies that parties can seek in relation to those causes of action, and 48 U.S.C. § 2128(b) lays out procedures for cases involving the Board by identifying “which lawyers the Board could retain” in defense of such causes of action. Id. at 36.

Discussion 

CONCERNS OVER AN ENHANCED LITIGATION BURDEN

The Board argues that ruling for the CPI will overwhelm the Board’s limited resources and undermine its ability to carry out its mission. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico at 24. The Board claims that ruling for the CPI would subject the Board to waves of lawsuits that would distract the Board from its efforts to facilitate Puerto Rico’s economic recovery and debt restructuring. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico at 13; id. The Board further points out that it merely consists of a group of seven members with a limited number of staff. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12. Therefore, the Board argues that it lacks the resources to address this enhanced litigation burden, including the disclosure obligations. Id.; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24. Moreover, the Board claims that the additional litigation would undermine the Board’s mission to help restore Puerto Rico’s financial responsibility by “divert[ing] the Board’s . . . resources.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24–25.

The CPI argues that ruling for the CPI would not overwhelm the Board because the Board has already demonstrated its ample ability to cope with disclosure requirements during this case. Brief of Respondent in Opposition, Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. at 24. In support of this claim, the CPI notes that the Board has already disclosed over 18,000 documents in compliance with the district court’s ruling regarding the CPI’s documents requests for the 2017 Complaint “without signs of disaster.” Id. The CPI contends that, if the obligations to review and disclose its documents really threatened the Board’s mission, the Board would have appealed the district court’s ruling immediately; nevertheless, it did not choose to do so. Id. Furthermore, the CPI claims that Puerto Rican law offers support for the Board to comply with disclosure requirements by establishing reasonable carve-outs to the right of access to information, and the Board thus does not need to worry about being overwhelmed by disclosure requests. Id. at 25.

DISCLOSURE OF BOARD AND GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS

The Board contends that ruling for the CPI would chill written conversations between government officials and the Board. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3. The Board claims that, in order to fulfill its mission to facilitate Puerto Rico’s economic recovery, it is necessary for the Board to communicate with the government of Puerto Rico and the federal government regarding sensitive information. Id. The Board contends that losing its immunity with respect to disclosure requirements would subject these written communications to public inspection. Id. The Board argues that Puerto Rican governmental officials will consequently be reluctant to engage in written communications if their sensitive information could become available to the public. Id. The Board asserts that chilled communications would be detrimental to the Board’s efforts to facilitate Puerto Rico’s recovery. Id.

The CPI responds by analogizing the Board’s position to those of federal agencies that are subject to disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) as well as state governments that are subject to state disclosure laws. Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 25. The CPI notes that agencies subject to FOIA continue to utilize written communications even though the public could access the contents of these communications. Id. Similarly, the CPI points out that many state governments continue to operate effectively despite being subject to disclosure laws. Id. Further, the CPI contends that the government of Puerto Rico is already subject to the same disclosure requirements that the Board opposes. Id. In addition, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and twenty other media organizations (“RCFP”), in support of the CPI, argues that ruling for the Board would undermine government transparency and accountability by impeding people’s access to information. Brief of Amici Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 20 Media Organizations, in Support of Respondent at 6. Specifically, the RCFP asserts that the people of Puerto Rico have compelling interests in understanding the Board’s financial decisions, since oversight of financial decisions helps prevent fiscal emergencies. Id. at 7.

Conclusion 

Written by:

Wentao Yang

Yue (Wendy) Wu

Edited by:

Sam Zarkower

Acknowledgments 

Additional Resources