Eleventh Amendment

Alabama v. North Carolina

Issues

Whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission, jointly with four compacting States, from asserting claims in a Supreme Court original action, that North Carolina has violated the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact and is subject to the Commission’s sanctions order.

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

 

Original Jurisdiction: On Motion of North Carolina to Dismiss Claims of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission

This case involves a lawsuit brought by several states and the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission against the State of North Carolina for its alleged breach of contract under the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact to license a waste disposal facility. In June 2002, the member states of the Compact and the Commission filed a Bill of Complaint, which the Supreme Court granted. The Special Master then filed his Preliminary and Second Reports with this Court on April 2, 2009. The Supreme Court subsequently received these Reports and ordered them filed. This case is now before the Supreme Court as both an original and exclusive jurisdiction case; it also addresses issues of contract law. The Supreme Court’s decision in Alabama v. North Carolina may have significant effects on constitutional law, most notably on the extent of the Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction over a judicial case or controversy between States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Plaintiffs except to the following conclusions of the Special Master:

1.     Article 79F) of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (the “Compact”), which states that the Commission may “sanction[]” “[a]ny party state which fails to comply with the provisions . . . or . . . fulfill the obligations” of “this compact,” does not give the Commission the authority to level monetary sanctions against a party State when it fails to comply with the Compact. Preliminary Report 15–25.

2.     Even if North Carolina violated the Compact, it was not subject to the sanctions authority of the Commission because it withdrew from the Compact before sanctions were imposed. Preliminary Report 25–29.

3.     North Carolina did not waive its right to contest the legality of the sanctions proceedings even though it attended and refused to participate in the hearing. Preliminary Report 29–30.

4.     Even though the Compact expressly provides that the Commission is “the judge of the [party States’] compliance with the conditions and requirements of this compact,” Art. 7(C), the Commission’s determination that North Carolina breached the Compact is neither conclusive nor entitled to any deference from the Court. Second Report 1920.

5.     While it is undisputed that North Carolina ceased taking any steps to license a facility in December 1997, more than 18 months before it withdrew from the Compact, North Carolina, as a matter of law, did not breach its duty under the Compact to “take appropriate steps to ensure that an application for a license to construct and operate a facility . . . is filed.” Art. 5 (C). Second Report 10?24.

6.     The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to interstate compacts and North Carolina did not withdraw from the Compact in bad faith. Second Report 29–35.

7.     North Carolina did not repudiate the Compact when it informed the Commission that it would take no further steps to license a facility. Second Report 24–28.

The State of North Carolina takes exception to the following conclusions of the Special Master:

1.     The recommended denial of North Carolina’s motion to dismiss all claims brought by plaintiff Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission. Under both the Eleventh Amendment and common-law sovereign immunity principles, only the United States or a sister State may sue a non-consenting State in federal court, absent a valid congressional abrogation of the State’s sovereign immunity. Because North Carolina has not waived, and Congress has not abrogated, North Carolina’s sovereign immunity from suit by the Commission, the Commission’s claims cannot proceed in this Court. In this case, this Court has jurisdiction to the Special Master’s recommendation, North Carolina’s motion to dismiss the Commission’s claims should be granted.

2.     The failure to recommend granting North Carolina’s motion for summary judgment on the quasi-contract claims asserted in Counts III, IV, and V of the Bill of Complaint. It is a settled common-law rule that where the parties’ relationship concerning a given subject matter is governed by the terms of an express contract, no equitable claim will lie in addition to a claim for breach of contract. The Special Master declined to address North Carolina’s motion at this stage in the proceedings, but the motion is legally and factually ripe for adjudication, and should be granted.

This is an original jurisdiction case brought by the States of Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia, joined by the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission (the "Commission") (collectively "petitioners") seeking remedy for the State of North Carolina's alleged breach of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (the "Compact").

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Central Virginia Community College v. Katz

Issues

In accordance with the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause, must states and state government units surrender the sovereign immunity granted to them under the Eleventh Amendment for the purpose of establishing and maintaining uniform Bankruptcy laws?

 

After filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy, Wallace's Bookstores, Inc., formerly a national, private supplier of college books, filed complaints against four public higher education institutions in Virginia. As Wallace's court appointed  a liquidator , Mr. Katz sought to recover money owed by the Virginia Institutions. The Virginia Institutions argue that as a private party, Mr. Katz cannot sue the state or "arms of the state" without abrogating the states' sovereign immunity guaranteed under  the Eleventh Amendment. They maintain that without consent, states cannot be sued by private parties. Mr. Katz denies being classified as a private party and argues that Article I's provisions and purpose of uniform bankruptcy laws across states are an exception. This case raises numerous public policy issues relating to funding of public, higher education institutions and debtor/creditor relationships.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May Congress use the Article I Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 4, to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity?

The petitioners, Central Virginia Community College, Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), New River Community College, and Blue Ridge Community College ("the Virginia Institutions") are public, higher education institutions partially funded by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Brief of Respondent at 1.

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Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals

Issues

Does the FMLA’s self-care provision abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from suits for damages?

 

After respondent Maryland Court of Appeals denied petitioner Daniel Coleman’s request for medical leave and terminated his employment, Coleman filed this suit against the State of Maryland under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position,” 29 U. S. C. §2612(a)(1) (D). Coleman argues that the Act’s medical leave provisions should be considered as a unified effort against gender discrimination that permits state employees to sue state employers under the self-care provision, and that the purpose of preventing gender discrimination abrogates state immunity. The state responds that the FMLA’s provisions address discrete forms of discrimination that should be examined individually and that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity bars lawsuits against a state employer under the self-care provision. By deciding whether a state employee has legal recourse for a violation of the self-care provision, this case will clarify the scope of state exposure to employment lawsuits seeking money damages under the FMLA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In passing the FMLA, as the Court recognized in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 701, Congress intended to eliminate gender discrimination in the granting of sick leave. The legislative record supports its purpose and findings. The question presented for review is:

Whether Congress constitutionally abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the FMLA’s self-care leave provision.

From March 2001 through August 2007, Coleman worked at the Maryland Court of Appeals. See Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

Constitutional Law Prof Blog, Ruthann Robson: On Floors, Ceilings, Federalism and Constitutional Law Exams: West Virginia Weekend (Apr. 9, 2011)

National Organization for Women: The Provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (Feb. 5, 2007)

Stanford Law Review, Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, (Apr. 2006)

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Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.

Issues

Does the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act abrogate the sovereign immunity of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico by granting general jurisdiction to federal courts over claims against the Board?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), which created the petitioner, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“the Board”), abrogates the Board’s sovereign immunity by granting general jurisdiction to federal courts over claims against the Board. The Board argues that PROMESA does not abrogate its sovereign immunity, since the statutory language of PROMESA does not explicitly revoke its sovereign immunity. In contrast, the Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (“CPI”) contends that PROMESA abrogates the Board’s sovereign immunity because the statutory language, read in conjunction with prior case law regarding the abrogation doctrine as well as the legislative history of PROMESA, implicitly revokes the Board’s sovereign immunity. The outcome of this case will profoundly impact the Board’s operations and public oversight of the Board’s financial decisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act’s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims.

In 2016, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”) to facilitate Puerto Rico’s economic recovery and debt restructuring. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd.

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Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt

Issues

Should Nevada v. Hall, which held that a sovereign state can be sued in another state’s courts without its consent, be overruled?

Court below

The Supreme Court will determine whether or not to overrule Nevada v. Hall, which held that states do not enjoy immunity from suit in the courts of their sister states. Petitioner Franchise Tax Board of California (“Franchise Tax Board” or “the Board”) contends that historical evidence and Hall’s inconsistency with the Court’s other precedent regarding sovereign immunity require that the Court overrule Hall. Franchise Tax Board further argues that preserving Hall’s holding, thereby allowing states to be sued in the courts of other states, infringes on state sovereignty and unfairly burdens state tax collection practices. Respondent Gilbert Hyatt (“Hyatt”) counters that the Constitution does not grant states sovereign immunity in each other’s courts and that Hall is consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence on sovereign immunity. Hyatt also asserts that states have a vested interest in protecting their citizens and providing them with a forum to vindicate their rights—if Hall were overruled, individuals similarly situated to Hyatt would have no means of litigating this type of dispute. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will determine whether states can be sued in the courts of other states without their consent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Nevada v. Hall, which permits a sovereign state to be hailed into another state’s courts without its consent, should be overruled.

Respondent Gilbert P. Hyatt filed suit against Petitioner Franchise Tax Board of California (“Franchise Tax Board”) in 1998, alleging that it had committed certain intentional torts, causing him damages, and claiming that its tax auditors acted in bad faith while auditing Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns.

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Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Hyatt

Issues

May a private citizen sue a state agency in a foreign state’s court? If so, must that state’s court treat the foreign state agency at least as favorably as it would a similar agency from its own state?

Court below

 

The Supreme Court must determine the boundaries of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and comity as applied to a state that has been unwillingly brought into another state’s courts. See Brief for Petitioner, Franchise Tax Board of the State of California at 1. The Franchise Tax Board of the State of California (“FTB”) looks to reverse Nevada v. Hall by expanding sovereign immunity to suits brought by private citizens in other states or, alternatively, to find that Nevada violated principles of full faith and credit, comity, and equality, by treating the FTB differently than it would a similar Nevada agency. See id. at 25. Conversely, Hyatt argues that Nevada v. Hall must be upheld as a matter of stare decisis and that the privilege of comity does not require the forum state, in all circumstances, to treat another state’s agency the same as the forum state’s equivalent agency. See Brief for Respondent, Gilbert P. Hyatt at 17. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine where states may be haled into court by a private citizen and to what degree states can be civilly liable for violating the law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Commission in Support of Petitioner at 4, 6.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. May Nevada refuse to extend to sister States haled into Nevada courts the same immunities Nevada enjoys in those courts?
  2. Should Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), which permits a sovereign State to be haled into the courts of another State without its consent, be overruled?

In 1991, Gilbert P. Hyatt (“Hyatt”) began to receive large amounts of income from licensing fees for a computer chip patent. See Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 131 (Nev.

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Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County, Ga.

Issues

Whether a county is entitled to sovereign immunity from admiralty lawsuits.

 

Northern Insurance Company has sued Chatham County, Georgia, to recover for payments made on a boat that suffered damages when one of the county's drawbridges malfunctioned. Chatham claims that it is immune from liability due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The issue before the Supreme Court is therefore whether counties and other municipalities are entitled to sovereign immunity from admiralty lawsuits. If the Court grants sovereign immunity, the quality of county-operated bridges may decline, insurance companies may raise their premiums, and the federal government may have to step in to impose extensive new regulations. If the Court holds that counties are not entitled to immunity, counties may have to dip into state funds to satisfy judgments rendered against it. This would lead to a depletion in resources, which may cause government-run programs like education and public welfare to suffer.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an entity that does not qualify as an "arm of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes can nonetheless assert sovereign immunity as a defense to an admiralty suit.

In October 2002, James Ludwig sailed his boat on the Wilmington River. See Brief for Petitioner at 3.

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PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC v. State of New Jersey, et al.

Issues

Without violating the Eleventh Amendment, can a private party exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power to seize land that belongs to a State, and can a federal court properly hear the case?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a private company can exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power and also considers the scope of a federal court’s jurisdiction. Once the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity, the Natural Gas Act authorizes private parties to exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power to secure rights-of-way and compensation to the landowner. Petitioner PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC argues that the Natural Gas Act’s delegation is necessary and ministerial, and there is no insult to state sovereignty in suits such as this. By contrast, Respondent New Jersey et al. contends that this delegation violates the Eleventh Amendment’s guarantee of sovereign immunity to the States. Both PennEast and New Jersey argue that the Third Circuit properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case. The outcome of this case has implications for siting new natural gas pipelines, eminent domain, and states’ rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Natural Gas Act delegates to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate-holders the authority to exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power to condemn land in which a state claims an interest; and

(2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction over this case.

PennEast Pipeline Co. (“PennEast”) plans to construct a pipeline that will pass through Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

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