Thornell v. Jones

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Thornell v. Jones

Issues

When considering a state court’s analysis of prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington (1984), when must a federal habeas court defer to factual and credibility findings of the district court and consider non-statutory aggravating evidence––including attacks on the mitigation case put on by the prisoner––in determining whether counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced the prisoner?

Oral argument:
April 17, 2024
Court below:
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

This case asks whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit improperly overruled a district court when granting a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim on habeas review. The IAC claim arose in an Arizona capital murder case in which Respondent Danny Lee Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure psychology and neurology professionals in support of mitigating evidence relating to Jones’s mental health. Petitioner Ryan Thornell, the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to accord proper deference to the district court’s fact-finding as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Arizona’s state sentencing laws as well as improperly weighed aggravating factors in Jones’s case. Jones rejects these claims, arguing that the Ninth Circuit properly adjudicated his claim with respect to both law and fact. This case has significant implications with respect to the proper standard of deference between appellate courts and district courts and raises concerns about finality and state sovereignty in enforcement of criminal statutes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit violated this court’s precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing prejudice under Strickland v. Washington when it disregarded the district court’s factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the state’s rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief.

Facts

On March 26, 1992, in Bullhead City, Arizona, Danny Lee Jones and his friend Robert Weaver spent the day in Weaver’s garage consuming alcohol and using crystal methamphetamine. At some point, Jones and Weaver fought, which concluded when Jones struck Weaver multiple times in the head with a bat, killing Weaver. Jones proceeded to enter Weaver’s house, strike Weaver’s grandmother in the head with the bat, and kill Weaver’s seven-year-old daughter. . Following his arrest, Jones was indicted in Arizona state court for two counts of murder in the first degree, and one count of attempted murder. The prosecutor sought the death penalty.

After a trial, a jury convicted Jones on all counts. At sentencing, Jones’s public defender called Jones’s second stepfather, Randy Jones, as a witness. Randy testified to Jones’s upbringing, including details such as complications with Jones’s birth, abuse by Jones’s first stepfather, drug and alcohol abuse, behavioral changes, and head trauma. In conjunction with Randy’s testimony, the trial court appointed the Chief of Forensic Psychiatry for the Correctional Health Services in Maricopa County, Dr. Jack Potts, to examine Jones and to provide a report. Dr. Potts testified to evidence that Jones suffered from severe brain trauma which could potentially impact his behavior. Additionally, Dr. Potts found that Jones’s family history predisposed him to substance abuse or a possible affective disorder. After Dr. Potts’s testimony, counsel moved for a continuance for Jones to receive additional psychological testing. The judge rejected the motion on the grounds that counsel had prior opportunities at trial to introduce psychological testimony.

The judge proceeded to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in accordance with Arizona law, which required judges to impose death sentences if they found “one or more of the [statutory] aggravating circumstances…[and] no mitigating circumstances significantly substantial to call for leniency.” While the judge found several mitigating factors in Jones’s favor, he also found four statutory aggravating circumstances, including that the murders were committed for monetary gain, were especially heinous, and that Jones committed multiple homicides; he also found the murder of Weaver’s daughter, who was less than fifteen years old, an additional aggravating factor. As a result, the judge sentenced Jones to two death sentences for the murders. Jones subsequently petitioned the state for post-conviction review (PCR). Jones asserted that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by (1) failing to secure a defense mental health expert and (2) failing to seek neurological or neuropsychological testing prior to sentencing. PCR counsel argued that had this evidence been presented during Jones’ trial, there was a reasonable probability he would not have been sentenced to death. The state PCR court denied Jones’ claims, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for review.

Jones subsequently filed a federal petition for habeas relief. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied his claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Jones’s trial counsel ineffective on the basis of his failure to obtain a mental health expert or neurological and neuropsychological testing and failure to present additional mitigation evidence. The United States Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court again rejected Jones’s claim, and again, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari on December 13, 2023.

Analysis

MITIGATION EVIDENCE AND THE STRICKLAND PREJUDICE STANDARD

Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the prejudice standard of the Strickland v. Washington test, which states that convicted individuals who contend their lawyers provided inadequate representation must demonstrate there was a reasonable probability that “the result of the proceeding would have been different” except for the deficient representation by the individual’s lawyer. Thornell contends that the Ninth Circuit wrongly reversed the district court’s assessments that the potentially mitigating evidence would not have made a difference at Jones’ trial. Thornell observes that under Arizona state law abuse and poor mental health without a “causal nexus” to the alleged crime has only minimal weight as mitigating evidence during sentencing. He argues that the district court therefore appropriately disregarded evidence regarding alleged sexual and physical abuse because such abuse occurred during Jones’s childhood, long before the murders. Thornell also contends that the district court appropriately “assigned minimal significance” to evidence that Jones had been diagnosed with ADHD and a mood disorder because neither were connected to the murders Jones committed. Thornell additionally cites Supreme Court precedent asserting that courts may weigh mitigating evidence unrelated to a killing less than evidence connected to a killing.

Thornell also criticizes the Ninth Circuit for only relying on Supreme Court and federal Ninth Circuit precedents in its decision rather than state law decisions, which Thornell argues led the Ninth Circuit to inappropriately weigh and evaluate the entirety of the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating evidence. Thornell highlights that of the four aggravating circumstances the Arizona Supreme Court identified when sentencing Jones, three were entitled to receive either “great” or “extraordinary” weight under Arizona state law when weighed against mitigating evidence. Thornell argues that Jones’s mitigation evidence does not outweigh the aggravating circumstances identified by the Arizona Supreme Court and concludes that the Ninth Circuit could not have reasonably found that a sentencing court might have sentenced Jones differently had it considered the aggravating circumstances against Jones’s mitigation evidence.

Jones counters that the Ninth Circuit appropriately interpreted the Strickland prejudice standard in reversing the district court’s assessments of potentially mitigating evidence. Jones highlights the Court’s statements that to be considered mitigating under Strickland ’s prejudice standard, evidence must only “prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value” and contends that the district court improperly disregarded substantive evidence of cognitive impairment resulting from long-term physical, emotional, and sexual abuse that a sentencing court may have considered mitigating. Jones also contends that the Ninth Circuit properly challenged the district court’s finding regarding Jones’s ADHD and mood disorder diagnoses. Jones emphasizes that the Court has previously found “the tragic details of a defendant’s life story,” including previous abuse and mental disorders, to be mitigating even when such details were unrelated to the crime for which the defendant was convicted and argues that the district court therefore erred in requiring that Jones’s abuse and cognitive impairment be causally related to his crimes.

Jones also asserts that relying on Arizona case law as a guide for whether evidence should be considered mitigating is unhelpful, given the unique fact pattern underlying each capital sentencing case. Jones argues that the Ninth Circuit properly considered the aggravating evidence against Jones, which Jones contends is similar to evidence presented in other capital sentencing appeals where the defendant’s available-yet-omitted mitigation evidence was enough to overturn the defendant’s death sentence. Jones additionally posits that the district court improperly assigned weight to the available-yet-omitted mitigation evidence, thus evaluating whether the available-yet-omitted mitigation evidence would have been enough to help Jones avoid being convicted rather than adhering to the Strickland prejudice standard and only determining if Jones’ trial was fair without his lawyer presenting the available-yet-omitted evidence. Jones concludes that the Ninth Circuit, instead of repeating the district court’s mistake of reweighing newly introduced mitigating evidence against existing aggravating circumstances, appropriately considered whether the available-yet-omitted mitigation evidence “might… have influenced the [sentencing court’s] appraisal of [the defendant’s] moral culpability” even considering the aggravating circumstances.

REVIEW STANDARD FOR LOWER COURT DECISIONS

Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit improperly exceeded the standard for reviewing lower court decisions by overturning the district court’s findings regarding the evidence presented and witnesses who testified at Jones’s PCR hearing. Citing Supreme Court precedent, Thornell asserts that the standard for reviewing lower court decisions is deferential, contending that a court of appeals may only reverse a district court’s assessment of evidence when the district court’s assessment was “ clearly erroneous .” Thornell also argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (“FRCP Rule 52(a)”) requires courts of appeal to review all factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and emphasizes the Court’s declaration that no exceptions to FRCP Rule 52(a) exist. Thornell stresses that a court of appeals may not reverse a district court’s assessment of evidence as long as the district court’s assessment is “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” even if the court of appeals would have interpreted the evidence differently.

Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit improperly rejected the district court’s assessment of expert witness testimony, highlighting Ninth Circuit precedent asserting that courts of appeal must review credibility determinations under the clearly erroneous standard. Thornell also cites Supreme Court precedent stating that a district court’s evaluation of witness credibility must receive “even greater deference” than other findings. He notes that courts of appeal must still evaluate district courts’ witness credibility evaluations deferentially even when the district court relied on documents, physical evidence, and inferences to determine a witness’s credibility, rather than evaluating how the witness acts on the stand. Thornell contends that the district court, as a fact-finder, was responsible for assessing the credibility and opinions of each expert who testified and argues that the district court’s reasoning for accepting or rejecting each expert’s testimony was plausible enough to not be clearly erroneous.

Jones counters that the Ninth Circuit appropriately overturned the district court’s findings. Jones argues that the Ninth Circuit was not bound by a deferential standard in reviewing the district court’s assessment of the evidence and argues that, in the context of Strickland prejudice, the clearly erroneous standard of review only applies to a district court’s properly made assessments of evidence. Referencing FRCP Rule 52(a), Jones further argues that courts of appeal are not bound by the clearly erroneous standard in correcting errors of law that might affect either mixed findings of law and fact or findings of fact predicated on a misunderstanding of the law.

Jones also counters that the Ninth Circuit properly rejected the district court’s assessment of expert testimony because the district court exceeded its scope of review by assessing the credibility of the experts, as the credibility of the experts under the Strickland prejudice standard constituted a legal question instead of a factual question. Jones contends instead that the state courts which sentenced defendants are responsible for determining the credibility of the experts during trial. Jones argues that the district court’s factfinding responsibilities extended only to identifying if available-yet-omitted mitigation evidence existed, rather than assessing the evidence. Jones asserts that the question of whether to weigh evidence as mitigating instead constituted a matter of law outside of the district court’s purview, which is not given clear-error deference. Jones contends that the district court’s decision to evaluate witness credibility constitutes an error of law that the Ninth Circuit was justified in reversing under FRCP 52(a).

Discussion

MENTAL HEALTH EVIDENCE IN DEATH PENALTY TRIALS

The State of South Dakota et al. (“State amici ”), in support of Thornell, argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision overemphasizes the value of mental health evidence in capital cases. State amici argue that such evidence, when introduced at the post-conviction stage, is often dependent on poor scientific reasoning and is not a legitimate strategy but a frivolous attempt to delay execution. Indeed, amici contend, the addition of more mental health mitigation can often be prejudicial to the defendant––for example, counsel’s decision to introduce this evidence could create an opportunity for damaging cross examination. State amici contend that the Ninth Circuit’s “more-is-better" approach misunderstands the fundamental ends of mitigation, which is often not about “humanizing” defendants but about demonstrating that defendants accept responsibility for their acts. State amici claim that attorneys’ failures to make every attempt to reduce culpability through introduction of additional mental-health evidence does not automatically make their strategy ineffective, since introduction could result in damaging counter-mitigation as to claimed mental disorders.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union (“NACDL/ACLU”), in support of Jones, contends that mental health evidence is vital to culpability analysis in mitigation proceedings and deserves the solicitude the Ninth Circuit accords it. The NACDL/ACLU cites four examples of cases where the Supreme Court concluded counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence undermined confidence in the sentence, all of which involved evidence pertaining to an intellectual disability, mental disorder, or psychological trauma. The NACDL/ACLU state that introduction of such evidence at trial influences how juries view defendants’ “moral culpability;” and, when it is not introduced at trial, it undermines confidence in the trial’s fairness. Even facing significant aggravating evidence, the NACDL/ACLU argue, post-conviction mitigation evidence relating to mental health can be determinative in whether a death sentence is ultimately imposed; thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision properly respects the factfinder’s responsibility to make a “unique moral judgement” based on all the evidence.

COUNTER-MITIGATION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The State of South Dakota et al. (“State amici ”), in support of Thornell, contend that the state’s strong interests in the enforcement of its criminal laws supports overturning the Ninth Circuit’s non-deferential Strickland methodology. South Dakota notes that the Ninth Circuit compared Jones’ habeas mitigation efforts (which included three testifying experts) only to the trial mitigation (featuring one expert) and statutory aggravators proven by the prosecution. State amici argue that this methodology minimizes the prosecution’s evidence undermining Jones’s habeas mitigation theory. This “one-sided” Strickland analysis, State amici claim, ignores the impact of the prosecution’s attack on Jones’s mitigation case, which challenged the methodology of expert medical diagnoses and the historical narrative presented by Jones’s counsel. State amici assert that applying this methodology to ineffective assistance of counsel cases would permit challenges to state convictions whenever defense attorneys secure less expert testimony than postconviction counsel. State amici contend that such nondeferential review disrupts sentences that are not “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems” and not eligible for habeas relief. Intrusive relitigation of these convictions, they argue, wastes state resources and undermines state sovereignty.

The Arizona Capital Representation Project (ACRP), in support of Jones, argues that the Ninth Circuit’s reconsideration of the district court’s conclusions was consistent with respect for state sovereignty and enforcement of state laws. The ACRP argues that the current Arizona state practice favors searching inquiry to ensure the constitutional rights of litigants, a concern for which the state judicial system has evinced special concern. The ACRP notes that since Arizona revised its sentencing policies in 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court has engaged in thorough independent reviews of death sentences which “tilt[ ] firmly in favor of life.” In conducting such review, amici argue, the Arizona Supreme Court has found highly probative cases where counsel failed to appropriately investigate the deficiencies alleged by Jones. Additionally, Jones argues that overturning the Ninth Circuit’s decision would actually undermine state sovereignty, because it is the role of state factfinders, not federal ones, to conclusively weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Conclusion

Written by:

Garry A. Blum

Griffin Perault

Nicholas Sola

Edited by:

Michelle E. Briney

Additional Resources