The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) is an administrative agency that is the central support entity for the judicial branch, providing a wide range of administrative, legal, financial, management, program, and information technology services to the federal courts.
Nike, Inc., sued Already, LLC d/b/a Yums, for selling shoes that allegedly infringed on Nike’s trademark covering the Air Force 1 shoe line. Yums counterclaimed to cancel Nike’s trademark. Shortly after Yums’s counterclaim, Nike dropped its claim and promised Yums that Nike would not assert its trademark against any of Yums’s current or previous products. The district court dismissed Yums’s counterclaim and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Yums argues that a controversy remains after Nike’s promise not to sue because Nike’s trademark continues to hinder Yums’s ability to compete in the athletic footwear business. Nike argues that a court cannot hear a trademark claim without a controversy, and that Nike’s promise not to sue eliminated any controversy involving the Air Force 1 trademark. The Supreme Court’s decision here may determine whether intellectual property owners can drop infringement actions without having to defend counterclaims challenging their intellectual property rights. This decision may have a significant impact on intellectual property litigation and on the risks associated with commencing an infringement action.
Does a federal district court lose jurisdiction over a trademark cancellation claim after the trademark holder terminates any infringement actions and promises not to assert its trademark against the party seeking the trademark’s cancellation?
Petitioner, Atlantic, and Respondent, J-Crew, entered into a contract that included a forum-selection clause limiting venue to two courts in Virginia, including a federal court. Contrary to that provision, J-Crew filed suit in the Western District of Texas alleging breach of contract for nonpayment for contracted services. Atlantic asks the Supreme Court to reverse the lower courts and transfer the case to the venue specified by the contract. Atlantic argues that a valid forum-selection clause renders improper any venue not specified in the contract. In opposition, J-Crew contends that proper venue is defined by statute and that a forum-selection clause does not render improper a statutorily permissible forum. This case will resolve the circuit split regarding the enforceability of forum-selection clauses. Specifically, the Supreme Court will determine whether a § 1404(a) transfer is appropriate when a lawsuit is filed in violation of a valid forum-selection clause. This implicates the ability of private parties to contract around federal statutes, raising questions about the limits on the freedom of contract, the ability of plaintiffs to forum-shop, and the capacity for parties to secure a favorable choice-of-law by filing their case first.
Following the Court's decision in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the majority of federal circuit courts hold that a valid forum-selection clause renders venue “improper” in a forum other than the one designated by contract. In those circuits, forum-selection clauses are routinely enforced through motions to dismiss or transfer venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406. The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, however, follow a contrary rule. This Petition presents the following issues for review:
In April 2009, Atlantic Marine Construction Company (“Atlantic”) entered into a construction contract with the Army Corps of Engineers to build a child development center at Fort Hood, Texas. See In re Atl. Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736, 737 (5th Cir.
The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont of Cornell Law School for his insight into the issues in this case.
Can individual voters challenge a state-wide redistricting plan as unconstitutional? Is a re-districting plan constitutional so long as it complies with traditional districting criteria? Was the issue of entrenchment properly litigated?
In what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called the most important case presently before the Supreme Court, the Court will venture into the thicket of redistricting. Wisconsin Republicans redrew Wisconsin’s State Assembly district maps in 2011, allowing them to win the majority of Assembly seats with only 48.6% of state votes and prompting Wisconsin Democrats to sue. A U.S. District Court held for the Wisconsin Democrats, finding the re-districting plan unconstitutional because it was gerrymandered with the intent of disenfranchising Democrats, had such an effect, and lacked a legitimate justification for its effects. Four issues will decide the outcome of this case: are the Democrats entitled to have their claim heard in court; is the test that the district court adopted judicially “discernable” and “manageable” enough for courts to apply; does compliance with traditional districting criteria render a redistricting plan non-discriminatory notwithstanding the district court’s test; and did the parties fully litigate the issue of entrenchment? Will the Court intervene in partisan gerrymandering and expand federal power or will it abstain from this politically charged question to protect federalism?
Wisconsin has long faced difficulty drawing its electoral districts—a process commonly known as redistricting. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, at *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016). In the 1980s, after a Republican governor repeatedly vetoed any redistricting plans proposed by the Democratic Assembly, a federal court had to determine the districts. Id. at 5.
Does Arizona’s requirement of a “significant change in law” before filing a petition for postconviction relief prevent the United States Supreme Court from reviewing the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure, which only allows postconviction relief if there has been a significant change in law to make it an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment, prevents federal review. Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz claims that the rule cannot apply because it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent requiring the application of settled rules of constitutional law on postconviction review. Cruz also asserts that the rule requires consideration of federal law, and thus that the Supreme Court may review determinations made under it for consistency with federal law. Respondent, the state of Arizona, argues that its Rule prevents federal review because it is premised on a matter of state law, rather than federal law. Arizona asserts that its rule only regulates when a claim may be brought, not the rule to be applied when evaluating the claim.
Whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (g) precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.
In 2005, John Montenegro Cruz was convicted of first degree murder for killing a police officer and was sentenced to death in a jury trial. State v. Cruz at 992.
The authors would like to thank Professors John Blume and Keir Weyble for their guidance and insights into this case.
Is a defendant seeking removal from state to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act required to present evidence supporting jurisdiction in the notice of removal?
In 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in Kansas state court, alleging that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline owed royalty payments derived from certain gas wells. Dart and Cherokee sought to remove the case to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), commonly known as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). In their notice of removal, Dart and Cherokee did not include supporting evidence of its allegation that the jurisdictional amount was met. Dart and Cherokee contend that mere allegations of the amount in controversy is sufficient to establish jurisdiction if there is no dispute over that amount. In opposition, Owens argues that the notice of removal has to contain factual evidence supporting federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will decide how much evidence of the jurisdictional requirements—if any—a CAFA defendant seeking removal is required to include in his or her notice of removal. The resolution of this case will have a significant impact on a defendant’s burden in seeking removal and, in turn, large effects on the availability of a federal forum for many state court defendants.
A defendant seeking removal of a case to federal court must file a notice of removal containing "a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal" and attach only the state court filings served on such defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Consistent with that statutory pleading requirement, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits require only that a notice of removal contain allegations of the jurisdictional facts supporting removal; those courts do not require the defendant to attach evidence supporting federal jurisdiction to the notice of removal. District courts in those Circuits may consider evidence supporting removal even if it comes later in response to a motion to remand.
Here, in a clean break from Section 1446(a)'s language and its sister Circuits' decisions, the Tenth Circuit let stand an order remanding a class action to state court based upon the district court's refusal to consider evidence establishing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) because that evidence was not attached to the notice of removal. (That evidence, which was not disputed, came later in response to the motion to remand.)
The question presented is:
Whether a defendant seeking removal to federal court is required to include evidence supporting federal jurisdiction in the notice of removal, or is alleging the required "short and plain statement of the grounds for removal" enough?
In 2012, Respondent Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in Kansas state court against Petitioners Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC and Cherokee Basin Pipeline, LLC (“Dart and Cherokee”).
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar the prosecution of a crime in a federal district court when the defendant was previously convicted for the same incident in a Court of Indian Offenses?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether prosecution of the same conduct, first in a Court of Indian Offenses (“CFR court”), a federally-constituted Article I trial court with jurisdiction over cases arising on Indian reservations, and then in a federal court, is permissible under the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner Merle Denezpi argues that his prosecution in a federal district court following his conviction in the Ute Mountain Ute CFR court violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits successive prosecutions of the same offense, because the CFR court derives some of its judicial power from the federal sovereignty of the United States government. Respondent the United States counters that Denezpi’s crime falls within the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Ute Mountain Ute CFR court is an extension of tribal, not federal, sovereignty and, as Denezpi’s conduct violated both tribal and federal law, he can be prosecuted successively under each law by the two separate sovereigns. The outcome of this case has implications for tribal sovereignty and public safety in tribal communities.
Whether the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute Agency is a federal agency such that Merle Denezpi’s conviction in that court barred his subsequent prosecution in a United States district court for a crime arising out of the same incident.
In the 19th century, in response to the growing federal policy of assimilating Native American tribes into Anglo-American society, Congress created special Article I courts across the country known as Courts of Indian Offenses. United States v. Denezpi, at 782.
The authors would like to thank Professor Michael C. Dorf for his guidance and insights into this case.
Under the Suspension Clause, is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) constitutional as applied to noncitizens who have secretly entered the United States?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under the Suspension Clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is constitutional as applied to noncitizens who have secretly entered the United States. Petitioner Department of Homeland Security argues that noncitizens entering clandestinely, treated properly as seeking initial admission to the United States, are entitled to no due process protections; that such noncitizens are not entitled to habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause; and that even if the Suspension Clause does apply, the statute’s provision of administrative review and limited judicial review are sufficient. Respondent Thuraissigiam counters that notwithstanding the Government’s misreading of applicable law, clandestinely entering noncitizens within the United States are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment; that the Suspension Clause does apply to individuals in immigration proceedings; and that the statute provides an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus. This case has implications for states’ resource spending, revenue collection, and citizen welfare. Additionally, this case’s outcome could impact federal courts’ work load, depending on whether federal courts must open up to a new class of alien-petitioners.
Whether, as applied to the respondent, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is unconstitutional under the suspension clause.
Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lanka native, is of the Tamil ethnic minority and backed a Tamil political candidate. Thuraissigiam v. USDHS at 11–12. In June 2016, Thuraissigiam fled Sri Lanka to Mexico. Id. at 11. In February 2017, he entered the United States through the Mexico-California border and was arrested by U.S.
Can a federal court, after discharging a jury, recall the jurors and direct them to deliberate further in order to correct an invalid verdict?
This case stems from a vehicle collision lawsuit and comes to the Supreme Court on appeal from the Ninth Circuit. Respondent Hillary Bouldin collided with petitioner Rocky Dietz who subsequently sued Bouldin in Montana state court for injuries sustained during the accident. Bouldin removed the case to federal court and the jury found in favor of Dietz but erroneously awarded $0 in damages, which was legally impossible because Bouldin had admitted to causing at least $10,000 in medical expenses. The Supreme Court will clarify under which circumstances, if any, federal courts may recall jurors dismissed after having rendered a final verdict. Dietz contends that the Court should establish a bright-line rule clearly forbidding such re-empaneling of jurors, asserting instead that the appropriate remedy for an invalid verdict is a new trial. Bouldin counters that federal courts should be allowed to exercise discretion to determine when it is appropriate to recall a jury after its dismissal. This case will affect how federal courts interpret rules and procedures for recalling jurors and will also impact the fairness and finality of jury verdicts and judicial efficiency in federal court proceedings.
After a judge has discharged a jury from service in a case and the jurors have left the judge’s presence, may the judge recall the jurors for further service in the same case?
In August 2009, respondent Hillary Bouldin, while driving his car, struck petitioner Rocky Dietz’s car. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.
Jurisdiction can be defined as:
Jurisdiction: An Overview
