Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services
Issues
Do plaintiffs suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act who are members of “majority groups” have to show “background circumstances” showing their employer discriminates against the majority?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act who is a member of a majority group must provide “background circumstances” to show that their employer discriminates against majority groups. Ames argues that the background circumstances rule treats plaintiffs differently based on their protected characteristics, contradicting the goals of Title VII. The Ohio Department of Youth Services argues that the background circumstances rule is only a method for deciding individual cases and does not discriminate based on a protected characteristic. This case has important implications for how readily individuals can use the civil rights laws to sue, and how courts determine discrimination without direct evidence.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a majority-group plaintiff must show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
Facts
In 2014, the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“Department”) appointed Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to be the Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA Administrator”); this was an at-will employment position which meant that she could be fired without cause. Then in 2017, Ginine Trim, a gay woman, was assigned to be Ames’s new supervisor. In December of 2018, Trim issued a performance evaluation for Ames, stating that Ames “met expectations in ten competencies and exceeded them in one.”
In April of 2019, Ames applied to be the Department’s Bureau Chief of Quality and she was interviewed for the position. Nonetheless, Ames was not hired for the position and was also terminated from her position as the PREA Administrator. However, Ames was given the opportunity to return to her previous position, which she took. The Department eventually picked Alexander Stojsavljevic, a gay man, to be the new PREA Administrator and Yolanda Frierson, a gay woman, to be the new Bureau Chief of Quality.
Following these events, Ames filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Opportunity Commission and brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus . At the district court level, Ames made multiple discrimination claims, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. Ames then appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit , which reviewed the district court’s decision. On appeal, Ames’s first argument was that she was discriminated against based on her sexual orientation. In order to establish a prima facie case for this type of discrimination, Ames needed to show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Here, the Sixth Circuit found that Ames did not meet this requirement because she did not show that someone within the relevant minority group made the employment decision or that there was evidence of a pattern of discrimination by the employer against the majority group.
Ames’s second argument on appeal was that “a jury could find that she was demoted from her position as PREA Administrator because of her sex.” In evaluating this argument, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Department has provided a nondiscriminatory reason for Ames’s demotion - the fact that there was a new Director of Department who wanted to improve the Department’s performance pertaining to “sexual victimization” which would benefit from having people who exceeded expectations, rather than just meet them. The Sixth Circuit then evaluated whether this reason for demotion was pretextual. Here, the Sixth Circuit found that the demotion was not pretextual on these grounds because Trim’s performance evaluation provided support for the Department’s reasons for demotion. Despite this, Ames argued that the reason for her demotion was in fact pretextual because the Department offered different justifications for her demotion at different points in time. However, the Sixth Circuit was unpersuaded by this argument because they believed that it did not create a genuine issue of fact . Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Ames petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to hear the case on March 18, 2024 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 4, 2024.
Analysis
THE COURT’S TITLE VII PRECEDENTS
Ames argues that the “background circumstances” rule directly contradicts Title VII’s text. , Ames contends that Title VII only requires that plaintiffs show that they have been discriminated against in the workplace because of their sex or other protected characteristics, and that courts cannot impose additional requirements like the background circumstances rule. Ames points to prior Title VII cases where the Supreme Court rejected other additional requirements, like that the plaintiff’s harm be “significant” or that the employer must have “actual knowledge” of an employee’s need for accommodations. Ames claims that the background circumstances rule is even more contrary to Title VII’s text than past requirements because it applies a heightened standard only to the subset of plaintiffs that are part of a majority group. Ames maintains that the rule contradicts the purposes of Title VII because it explicitly requires courts to treat some plaintiffs less favorably because of protected characteristics like race, sex, and national origin— perpetuating discrimination instead of preventing it.
Ames argues that the first circuit case to impose the background circumstances rule, Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad , misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s Title VII precedents. Ames contends that Parker used part of the Supreme Court’s discussion in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green , where the Court said that the plaintiff’s racial minority status was a necessary part of his claim, incorrectly to justify the background circumstances rule. Ames asserts that the Court meant only that the plaintiff’s minority status was important to his particular claim, not that being a member of a minority group was required to show discrimination. Ames maintains that other Supreme Court cases have held that the same Title VII standards apply to members of majority groups. Ames argues that the background circumstances rule is also inconsistent with other civil rights laws and doctrines, as none impose different standards on majority and minority group plaintiffs.
The Ohio Department of Youth Services (“the Department”) argues that the background circumstances rule does not impose a higher burden on certain groups of plaintiffs. The Department contends that every Title VII plaintiff must show a causal relationship between their protected characteristics and the adverse employment decisions, and that the background circumstances rule is best understood as one way for courts to determine whether that causal relationship exists. The Department asserts that the background circumstances in McDonnell —the long history of discrimination against African Americans in the United States—were specific to that case and were not an exhaustive list. The Department maintains that McDonnell ’s background circumstances discussion only stands for the idea that “individual plaintiffs must make out a unique prima facie case that the employer took an adverse action ‘because of’ a protected characteristic of that plaintiff.” The Department notes that some of the background assumptions in McDonnell ’s case may not apply if the plaintiff is a member of a majority group. The Department argues that Parker , the first case to discuss the background circumstances rule, used it only as a general rule that a minority member being promoted over a majority member did not, on its own, lead to an inference of discrimination, and the plaintiff needed to show other circumstances to establish a prima facie case. The Department claims that because every person is a member of a Title VII protected class, and every Title VII plaintiff has necessarily alleged discrimination based on a protected characteristic, allowing a mere allegation of discrimination to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden would turn that burden into a formality. The Department claims this would force employers to defend against meritless claims and force courts to hear them. The Department argues that a prima facie case must be able to support a judgment for the plaintiff, because unless the defendant employer rebuts it with their own evidence, courts must find for the plaintiff. The Department contends that such a low burden would allow essentially anyone who is rejected for a job to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
THE “BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES” RULE’S IMPACT ON TITLE VII
Ames argues that the background circumstances rule is vague and difficult for courts to apply. Ames contends that, for example, it is often difficult to determine who is a “majority” or a “minority” group, as the same group could be a minority nationally but a majority in a particular region (or vice-versa). Ames notes that some courts have held that the proper test is whether a group is “socially disfavored”, but Ames asserts that applying this test is vague and could lead to stereotyping. Ames also maintains that there may be constitutional issues with the rule. Ames argues that if the rule had been written into the statute directly, it would likely be subjected to strict scrutiny as, at least in part, a racial classification. Ames claims that the background circumstances rule fails to account for how forms of discrimination can overlap and intersect, and that it is difficult for courts to decide what evidence of background circumstances they should consider. Ames asserts that the prima facie case of discrimination was not intended to be an onerous burden, so imposing the background circumstances rule at that stage is particularly inappropriate. Ames argues that eliminating the background circumstances rule does not mean that juries and judges must forget what they know about real-world discrimination— but that it is unfair to impose a heightened requirement and certain types of plaintiffs at the pleading stage of the litigation process.
The Department asserts that the Sixth Circuit has made clear that the background circumstances requirement is not difficult for plaintiffs to meet. The Department notes that the Sixth Circuit claimed that qualifying circumstances included whether a member of the relevant minority group made the employment decision or statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination. The Department contends that Ames did not need to show those specific circumstances to succeed on her prima facie case, but that she did need to show some evidence of discrimination. The Department argues that a plaintiff does not have a higher burden because the type of evidence relevant to their claim is different from the type of evidence a different plaintiff would bring for a different claim. Contrary to what Ames claims, the Department asserts that it is unnecessary to determine what a socially disfavored group is to apply the background circumstances rule. The Department maintains that the Title VII cases Ames cited imposed an additional element plaintiffs must prove, while the background circumstances rule is simply a method of analyzing what all plaintiffs must prove– an inference of discrimination. The Department contends that these cases focus on the plaintiff’s ultimate burden—which they must carry to win the case—not their burden at the outset, so the background circumstances rule does not impose an additional burden on plaintiffs early in litigation.
Discussion
THE IMPACT ON LITIGANTS AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
In support of Ames, the Pacific Legal Foundation (“Pacific”) highlights that the background circumstances rule leads to two problems for litigants in the judicial system. First, Pacific contends that the background circumstances rule imposes a negative stereotype on certain groups of people by supporting the idea that individuals who belong to a “majority group” are very rarely discriminated against. Second, Pacific believes that the rule also uses race as a negative factor since it imposes higher burdens on plaintiffs who belong to a majority group. Josh Young (“Young”) additionally contends that the Sixth Circuit’s view, which is similar to that of other appellate courts, has become widespread, leading some courts to adopt pleading standards that vary based on the race of the litigant in question. Indeed, Young supports this assertion by noting that the Seventh , Eighth , and Tenth Circuit have all required a heightened pleading standard for Caucasians and men because they are statistically less likely to be discriminated against. Nonetheless, the America First Legal Foundation (“America First”) also believes that the background circumstances rule is harmful because it has only been applied to disadvantage those who belong to specific groups.
In support of the Department, the Local Government Legal Center (“Legal Center”) contends that the use of the background circumstances rule has led to a well understood and fairly predictable judicial process. The Legal Center highlights that this rule has provided many benefits which include: facilitating early case resolutions, organizing and streamlining the judicial process while also providing clarity to parties, and reducing the burden on courts. Contrary to the plaintiff’s claims, the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund (“NAACP”) also asserts that courts have not applied Title VII in a way that disadvantages plaintiffs who belong to a majority group. In fact, the NAACP notes that studies indicate plaintiffs who belong to a majority group are more likely to prevail than those who are not. The NAACP further explains that employment discrimination claims are simply difficult to win in general, regardless of whether or not someone belongs to a majority or minority group.
THE IMPACT ON TITLE VII AND OTHER ENTITIES
In support of Ames, Pacific argues that the background circumstances rule would make Title VII unconstitutional because it would cause the statute to fail a strict scrutiny analysis. In support of this, Pacific notes that the background circumstances rule imposes a higher evidentiary bar only for people who belong to certain racial groups; this causes courts to discriminate against people on the basis of their race. Pacific additionally argues that the background circumstances rule causes the government to impose a harmful stereotype on plaintiffs belonging to a majority group because it assumes that people within these groups are rarely discriminated against. Nonetheless, America First also claims that the background circumstances rule causes arbitrary decision making since there is no clear-cut way to determine when it should apply.
In support of the Department, the Legal Center outlines that the background circumstances rule protects against multiple adverse consequences. First, the Legal Center notes that the rule prevents people from bringing tenuous discrimination claims because it resolves meritless cases at earlier stages of litigation. Second, the Legal Center points out that the rule helps local governments who have limited resources and flexibility; they note that increased litigation, especially those in smaller jurisdictions, may result in fewer resources being available for essential services that local governments provide to their communities. Finally, the Legal Center also believes that the rule prevents employers from facing meritless lawsuits that they might have been incentivized to settle in order to avoid the extensive costs of litigation.
Conclusion
Authors
Written by: Brian Kam and Michael Spivey
Edited by: Eric Yang
Additional Resources
- Colleen Aracri, Examining Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: Majority Group Discrimination and Title VII , Maryland State Bar Association (November 8, 2024)
- Michelle Travis, The Supreme Court Case That Will Fuel the Corporate DEI Debate in 2025 , Forbes (December 22, 2024).