civil rights

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Steven Pyett, Thomas O’Connell, and Michael Phillips (the "employees") claim that their employer, Temco Service Industries, Inc., and the company, 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, that owns the building in which they worked, discriminated against them on the basis of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). The employees are members of Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB"), of which Temco and 14 Penn Plaza are members. The CBA stated that the sole and exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims, including those brought under the ADEA, is the union’s grievance and arbitration procedure. The issue in this case is whether a union has the power to bargain away its members’ rights to litigate employment discrimination claims. The employees argue that the answer should be no, while the employers argue the opposite. The outcome of this case will clarify whether a union has the power to waive its members' statutory right to sue their employers in federal court for certain types of discrimination in favor of a mandatory arbitration procedure.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to balance public accommodation anti-discrimination laws and First Amendment rights. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) limits a public accommodation’s ability to refuse services to a customer based on their identity, such as sexual orientation. 303 Creative LLC and its owner Lorie Smith argue that CADA violates their First Amendment rights to free artistic expression and religious belief. Respondent Aubrey Elenis, Director of the Colorado Civil Rights Division, counters that CADA regulates discriminatory commerce, not speech, and thus does not violate 303 Creative LLC’s First Amendment rights. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for LGBTQ+ rights, freedom of speech and religion, and creative expression.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act who is a member of a majority group must provide “background circumstances” to show that their employer discriminates against majority groups. Ames argues that the background circumstances rule treats plaintiffs differently based on their protected characteristics, contradicting the goals of Title VII. The Ohio Department of Youth Services argues that the background circumstances rule is only a method for deciding individual cases and does not discriminate based on a protected characteristic. This case has important implications for how readily individuals can use the civil rights laws to sue, and how courts determine discrimination without direct evidence.

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Terrence Byrd was pulled over by a Pennsylvania police officer for violating a state driving law. Eventually, the officer and another police officer discovered that Byrd was driving a rental car but was not a named driver on the rental agreement. Moreover, the officers also discovered that Byrd had a criminal record that included drug, weapon, and assault charges. Ultimately, the officers asked Byrd for permission to search the car, which they assert that Byrd granted, and, the officers found both heroin and illegal body armor in the car. Byrd challenged the stop and search arguing that it was unlawful. The District Court held that the stop and search was lawful. On appeal, the Third Circuit further recognized that the driver of a rental car who is not listed on the rental agreement did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court will likely resolve the Circuit conflict regarding whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists for a driver in sole possession of a rental vehicle that is not listed as a driver on the rental agreement.

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The Supreme Court will determine to what extent federal courts can evaluate state court determinations of federal error regarding a federal question. Kevin Chappell, Warden of the State of California, contends that federal courts must grant significant deference to state court determinations denying federal habeas relief for convicted defendants based on a finding that any error that occurred during a trial was a harmless error. Hector Ayala, a prisoner, counters that federal courts should have the opportunity to independently review federal habeas petitions for error and determine how much prejudice the defendant suffered when state courts determined an error was harmless. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the level of deference afforded to state courts in determinations of harmless error and will affect the jury selection process. 

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In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether Jascha Chiaverini’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the City of Napoleon, Ohio may proceed, although some of the charges filed against Chiaverini were based on probable cause. Jascha Chiaverini argues that state common law governs his lawsuit, and that as such the charge-specific rule, in which any baseless charge allows a § 1983 to proceed, applies. The City of Napoleon argues that Petitioner presents a false binary between the “any-crime” rule and the charge-specific rule that leads to a framework that is incompatible with the intent and meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This case has implications for the viability of malicious prosecution suits filed under § 1983 and the reach of Fourth Amendment protections against baseless charges.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether claims under Section 1981 can survive absent a showing that race was the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Here, NAAAOM sued Comcast for racially discriminating against ESN’s network by refusing to enter into a contract with them. Comcast argues that a plaintiff cannot successfully plead race discrimination if race was not the but-for cause—or the actual cause—of the refusal to contract. NAAAOM counters that the correct causation standard is a “motivating factor” or “mixed-motives” approach in which racial discrimination need only be one factor in establishing a claim under Section 1981. This case’s outcome could affect how Section 1981 and Title VII claims are brought by marginalized communities and how employers will allocate resources to handle litigation.

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This case would have asked the Court to determine whether Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination based on disability, provides a cause of action for disparate impact claims. Numerous John Does use CVS Pharmacy’s prescription plan for medication to treat HIV/AIDS, which only allows drugs to be dispensed through mail or CVS pharmacies. These John Does sued, arguing that this plan had a disparate impact on individuals living with HIV/AIDS and meaningfully impacted their health. Petitioners CVS Pharmacy et al. contend that claims under Section 504, which is incorporated in Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, require evidence of discriminatory intent or differential treatment. Respondents John Doe, et al., argue that Section 504 provides for disparate impact claims. Although this case will no longer be argued in front of the Court, due to an agreement for dismissal by the parties, the case could have had implications for the administration of health insurance and pharmacy benefits programs, and the risk of litigation.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect for trespassing under the Fourth Amendment when the owner of a house says that the suspects do not have authority to enter and the officers find circumstantial evidence of trespass, but the suspects claim that they thought that they had authority to be there. Additionally, the Court will decide whether, if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects in this case, the law of probable cause for trespass was unclear enough to entitle the officers to qualified immunity. Petitioners District of Columbia, et al. argue that an officer, in order to be able to make timely probable cause determinations, should not be required to exactly determine the criminal intent of a suspect; at the very least, the District of Columbia argues, officers should not be required to rely on a suspect’s claims of an innocent mental state. The District of Columbia also argues that the law was not “clearly established” in this area and so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Respondents Theodore Wesby, et al. argue that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects for trespassing because the suspects indicated that they thought that they had permission to be in the home and, thus, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. This case will address the scope of the probable cause standard for trespass claims under the Fourth Amendment and will clarify the standard for qualified immunity.  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider extending the implied right of action from Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents to a situation involving a federal officer carrying out immigration enforcement functions. In Bivens, the Court recognized a limited federal cause of action for damages when federal officers, acting under color of federal authority, violate an individual’s constitutional rights. Currently, the Court recognizes Bivens actions for Fourth Amendment violations committed by law enforcement officers, as well as violations of rights secured by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Erik Egbert argues that extending Bivens to encompass First Amendment retaliation claims and Fourth Amendment claims involving immigration enforcement officials is unwarranted. Robert Boule counters that extending Bivens to his two claims ensures that individuals are provided with a constitutional remedy when federal officers violate fundamental rights. This case has significant implications for civil rights, separation of powers, and questions related to judicial overreach in matters involving alleged constitutional violations.

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