Riley v. Bondi

Issues

Is 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1) a jurisdictional statute that requires filing for appeal within 30 days; and, does it allow a person to appeal a Board of Immigration Appeals decision by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision?

Oral argument:
March 24, 2025
Court below:
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

The case asks the Court to determine if 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1), which creates a 30-day deadline to appeal a final order for removal, is a jurisdictional barrier that must be met for an appeal to be heard, or if it is simply one of many factors the Court can consider. Additionally, the case asks the Court to determine if § 1252(b)(1) is satisfied if the petitioner appeals the case after a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals within 30 days of its decision. Petitioner argues that § 1252(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional rule and even if it was, § 1252(b)(1) was satisfied. Respondent argues that § 1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional rule which was not satisfied. The case decision will affect both the noncitizen’s ability to access immigration proceedings and the courts’ administrative burden in handling them.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited; and (2) whether a person can obtain review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision.

Facts

Under 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1), to review an order of removal, the “petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”

In 1995, Petitioner Pierre Yassue Nashun Riley, a native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States on a tourist visa. In 2006, a federal grand jury indicted Riley with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 1000 kilograms of marijuana and for possession of a firearm for the purpose of drug-trafficking. A jury found Riley guilty of both offenses and Riley was sentenced to 25 years in prison. In January 2021, Riley was granted compassionate release from prison.

After Riley was released from prison, federal immigration authorities took custody of him. On January 26, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Final Administrative Removal Order (“FARO”), on the grounds that Riley was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C § 1228(b) because he was convicted of an aggravated felony. After Riley expressed fear of murder upon returning to his home nation of Jamaica, an immigration officer conducted a reasonable fear interview and determined that Riley had not established a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Jamaica. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) disagreed. Riley was referred to the immigration court for withholding-only proceedings.

At the hearing, Riley conceded that he was subject to removal under § 1228(b) and also applied for asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and both withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Riley later conceded that he was only eligible for deferral of removal under CAT because of his prior convictions.

After the hearing, the IJ granted Riley deferral of removal under the CAT. The DHS appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board"). On May 21, 2022, the Board sustained the appeal and ordered Riley to be removed to Jamaica. On June 3, 2022, Riley appealed the Board’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit .

Riley made three arguments as to why the Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear his appeal even though he had not appealed within 30 days of his Final Administrative Removal Order issued on January 26, 2021.

First, Riley argued that a recently decided Fourth Circuit case, Martinez v. Garland , did not apply because Martinez involved a reinstated removal order, whereas this case involves a FARO under § 1228(b). The Fourth Circuit disagreed on the grounds that there is no persuasive justification for drawing a distinction between those two cases when the underlying principle is the same.

Second, Riley argued that the FARO was not actually final because he later applied for asylum. The Fourth Circuit disagreed because Riley was statutorily barred from asylum; and, Riley also had essentially withdrawn his asylum application during the hearing.

Third, Riley argued that 8 U.S.C § 1252(a)(4) granted the Fourth Circuit jurisdiction because § 1252(a)(4) states that “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under [CAT].” The Fourth Circuit disagreed because § 1252(a)(4) states only that the Fourth Circuit may review an order denying CAT relief as a part of their final review of removal. That final review, however, is not authorized by that statute without a timely appeal.

Rejecting all of Riley’s arguments, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case for a lack of jurisdiction.

Riley subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari on May 31, 2024. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 4, 2024.

Analysis

DOES § 1252(B)(1) STATE A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE

Riley first argues that § 1252(b)(1) does not state a jurisdictional prerequisite. Riley explains that Courts should treat rules as jurisdictional only if Congress clearly states them to be so. Here, Riley posits, there is no clear evidence that would allow the Courts to treat § 1252(b)(1) as jurisdictional. Riley notes that the Court in a previous case, Santos-Zacaria , found that a nearby statute § 1252(d)(1) was non-jurisdictional. According to Riley, the Court in Santos-Zacaria explained that to find the rule to be jurisdictional, there would need to be “unmistakable evidence on par with express language addressing the court’s jurisdiction.” Applying that reasoning here, Riley concludes, § 1252(b)(1) is non-jurisdictional as well.

Although a ‘long line’ of Supreme Court cases holding a statutory provision as jurisdictional may establish its jurisdictional nature, Riley argues that no such cases exist here. To support, Riley first argues that Stone v. INS does not address the question of whether § 1252(b)(1) is jurisdictional. Riley asserts that because Stone came from a line of cases prior to the reenactment of § 1252(b)(1), there is no “long line” of Court precedent. Furthermore, Riley emphasizes that there is no reason to carry over the Stone lineage because the jurisdictional issue in Stone is nothing more than a “passing remark.”

In response, the Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below Stephen J. Hammer (“Hammer”), first argues that § 1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional rule because the Supreme Court has already ruled it to be a jurisdictional rule in previous cases such as Stone v. INS. While a “clear statement” from Congress is sometimes required to deprive a court of jurisdiction, Hammer argues that the jurisdiction can be barred as long as traditional tools of interpretation plainly shows such an intent by Congress. Hammer further asserts that, when there is a clear line of precedent that holds a rule is jurisdictional, those precedents should be respected. Hammer posits that in Stone , the Supreme Court held that “the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because the alien’s petition was untimely.” Hammer notes that while Congress later reenacted the statute that Stone was based on (8 U.S.C § 1005a(a)(1)) into the current statute (§ 1252(b)(1)), this act by Congress did not abrogate the precedential value of Stone because Congress did not express the intent to do so in any way. Instead, Hammer alleges that Congress only strengthened precedential Stone by decreasing the appeal’s timeline from 90 days to 30 days.

Hammer also counters Riley’s interpretation of Stone as a “passing remark” on the jurisdictional question, alleging that Stone resulted in a jurisdictional consequence, the unavailability of equitable tolling. Moreover, Hammer alleges that Santo-Zacaria ’s holding did not address the question of jurisdiction because it only held that the exhaustion provision in § 1252(d)(1) was not jurisdictional. Finally, Hammer concludes that because there is no other legal justification to overturn Stone , this Court should uphold its precedent on stare decisis grounds.

WHETHER RILEY SATISFIED § 1252(B)(1)

Riley first argues that even if § 1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional rule, Riley satisfied the rule’s requirement because he filed in court within the 30-day time period of the BIA’s decision. Riley first notes that under an ordinary reading of the word “final,” a removal order is not “final” until all relevant agency proceedings are concluded. In support, Riley points to Black’s Law Dictionary which defines “final order” as one that “leaves nothing to be done.” Riley asserts that the Court has applied this ordinary meaning of “final” in previous cases. Therefore, Riley concludes that there was no “final order of removal” for Riley until the BIA made their decision. Riley also notes that the history and structure of § 1252 support the idea that “final order” refers to the ordinary meaning. For example, Riley points out that § 1252(d) only allows a final order of removal if the person has “exhausted all administrative remedies.” Riley asserts that it would be unreasonable to interpret the FARO as a “final order” because a noncitizen still has not exhausted all administrative remedies at that point; he can still request the adjudication of his fear of torture. Riley also argues that the Court’s decision in Nasrallah does not reject the ordinary meaning of “final” because Nasrallah ’s holding is narrow. According to Riley, the Court in Nasrallah only held that a CAT order is logically different than an “order for removal.” Riley further argues that the two orders being separate logically does not mean that a CAT order cannot also include a “final order of removal.” Riley posits that this dichotomy is false and is rejected in Nasrallah . Here, Riley argues that like in Nasrallah , the BIA’s order consisted of both a final order of removal and a withholding. Finally, Riley argues that Guzman Chavez has no bearing on the interpretation of § 1252 because the Court in Guzman Chavez clarified that it “expressed no view” about the correct interpretation of the “final order of removal” in § 1252.

In response, Hammer argues that Riley failed to satisfy § 1252(b)(1) because Riley failed to file for review within 30 days of the Final Administrative Removal Order. Hammer first notes that in expedited removal proceedings, as is the case here, the only order of removal is the Final Administrative Removal Order. Hammer first notes that § 1228(b) expressly states that a removal order is a “final order of removal.” Because it is a rule of statutory interpretation that same words used in different parts of the same statute are presumed to have the same meaning, Hammer alleges that the definition in § 1228(b) carries over to § 1252(b)(1). Hammer also argues that the Court in Nasrallah held that a CAT order is not an “order of removal” because a CAT order does not consider whether someone is deportable or not. Hammer also rejects Riley’s argument that a CAT order should be considered a “final order of removal” because under Nasrallah , only the rulings that affect the validity of the removal order are considered a part of the removal order. Hammer points out that the CAT order for Riley was not whether Riley will be removed, it is only a decision on where he will be removed. Respondent also argues that Guzman Chavez controls in this case, because, even if the Court did not explicitly adopt Respondent’s position in that case, the reasoning they applied to § 1231 logically carries over to § 1252.

Discussion

MANAGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN ON FEDERAL COURTS

In support of Riley, Immigration Legal Service Providers argue that a ruling against Riley would needlessly burden federal courts by prompting a flood of unnecessary immigration filings in federal courts. They argue that, because the 30-day deadline to file a petition for review typically passes before any withholding or CAT claims are ripe, upholding the judgment below would lead to claims being filed that courts are unable to adjudicate at the time of filing. Immigration legal service providers argue that these inefficiencies could frequently be compounded by the fact that noncitizen petitioners are frequently transferred to different detention facilities, increasing the administrative burden on the courts.

In support of the judgment below, the Immigration Reform Law Institute argues that a ruling for Riley would place severe administrative burdens on federal courts by allowing aliens to delay removal indefinitely. It argues that ruling for Riley would allow aliens to claim a “reasonable fear” of torture with the purpose of delaying removal proceedings. Additionally, Hammer argues that the fears of inefficiency articulated by Riley are overblown, pointing to the current practice of the Second and Fourth Circuits. Hammer argues that ruling in favor of the Respondent will not cause chaos, citing the Second Circuit as an example. Hammer contends that the Second Circuit successfully formalized a procedure enabling non-citizens to obtain judicial review of their immigration proceedings after a similar case.

BALANCING ACCESS TO THE COURTS WITH THE NEED FOR EFFICIENT IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS

In support of Riley, Civil Procedure and Federal Courts Professors argue that a ruling for Respondent would limit court review of potentially meritorious claims because the deadline for filing them would lapse prematurely. Similarly, the Pacific Legal Foundation asserts that a ruling upholding the court of appeal’s decision would deny meaningful judicial review to aliens asserting CAT claims. They argue that this could lead to significant irreparable harm to noncitizens in the form of torture or death. Immigration Legal Service Providers argue that the judgment below would have the practical effect of limiting court review by imposing significant financial costs on aliens facing removal proceedings, many of whom would struggle to meet these costs.

In support of the judgment below, the Immigration Reform Law Institute argues that, instead of promoting access to the courts, a ruling for Riley would instead create procedural loopholes by delaying finality in immigration proceedings. It argues that the Supreme Court has warned about excessive burdens on the immigration system for years, and that Congress has demonstrated a clear intent favoring judicial efficiency in immigration proceedings and the closing of administrative loopholes. Accordingly, it argues that a ruling for Riley would exacerbate existing burdens on the courts and subvert Congress’s intent in enacting immigration statutes. Hammer echoes these concerns, further arguing that “the expedited removal of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies” has been recognized by Congress as a significant priority of immigration law. Hammer argues that requiring such aliens to seek prompt judicial review of their removal determinations does not limit access to the courts but rather clearly reflects Congressional intent.

Conclusion

Kehan Rattani and Andrew Hallowell

Sean Lee

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