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STARE DECISIS

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization

Issues

Are all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions unconstitutional?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Mississippi’s ban on all elective abortions after fifteen weeks of pregnancy is constitutional. Petitioner Thomas Dobbs argues that the Court should overturn the precedent establishing a constitutional right to pre-viability abortions—Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey—or alternatively, reject viability as a measuring tool. In response, Respondent Women’s Health Center contends that the Court should uphold the constitutional right to abortion because there is no compelling reason to overrule the previous abortion precedents finding such a right. The Court’s decision on this case has serious implications for the rights of women, the role of religion in law-making, and stare decisis.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional or not?

In 2018, Mississippi passed the Gestational Age Act (“HB 1510”), which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks, except for in cases of medical emergency or severe fetal abnormality. Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Dobbs at 269.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson for her insights into this case.

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Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt

Issues

Should Nevada v. Hall, which held that a sovereign state can be sued in another state’s courts without its consent, be overruled?

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The Supreme Court will determine whether or not to overrule Nevada v. Hall, which held that states do not enjoy immunity from suit in the courts of their sister states. Petitioner Franchise Tax Board of California (“Franchise Tax Board” or “the Board”) contends that historical evidence and Hall’s inconsistency with the Court’s other precedent regarding sovereign immunity require that the Court overrule Hall. Franchise Tax Board further argues that preserving Hall’s holding, thereby allowing states to be sued in the courts of other states, infringes on state sovereignty and unfairly burdens state tax collection practices. Respondent Gilbert Hyatt (“Hyatt”) counters that the Constitution does not grant states sovereign immunity in each other’s courts and that Hall is consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence on sovereign immunity. Hyatt also asserts that states have a vested interest in protecting their citizens and providing them with a forum to vindicate their rights—if Hall were overruled, individuals similarly situated to Hyatt would have no means of litigating this type of dispute. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will determine whether states can be sued in the courts of other states without their consent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Nevada v. Hall, which permits a sovereign state to be hailed into another state’s courts without its consent, should be overruled.

Respondent Gilbert P. Hyatt filed suit against Petitioner Franchise Tax Board of California (“Franchise Tax Board”) in 1998, alleging that it had committed certain intentional torts, causing him damages, and claiming that its tax auditors acted in bad faith while auditing Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns.

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Friedrichs, et al. v. California Teachers Association, et. al

Issues

Do unions violate public employees’ First Amendment rights through public sector “agency shop” arrangements or by requiring them to affirmatively object to subsidizing public sector union nonchargeable speech? 

 

Under California law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public school employees in a particular school district if it can show that a majority of the employees agree to be represented by that union. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). Such a union may establish an “agency shop” arrangement with the school district, under which employees, not members of the union, are required to pay an agency fee, and may only opt out from funding union activities not related to collective bargainingSee Friedrichs, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1. Friedrichs asserts that because of the political nature of collective bargaining, compelled agency fees are a violation of the First Amendment, and the opt-out system takes advantage of dissenters unaware of the affirmative objection requirement. See Brief for Petitioner, Rebecca Friedrichs, et al. 22, 30, 55–56, 61. In opposition, the Union argues that there is no justifiable reason to modify the opt-out arrangements, and that “agency shop” arrangements do not infringe employees’ First Amendment rights but are necessary to prevent a free riding problem. See Brief for Respondent, California Teachers Association, et al. at 15–17, 32, 55. The Court’s  decision in this case  will impact unions’ abilities to raise funds and the First Amendment rights of non-members of the union. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, in Support of Respondents at 19–20, 26–29.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Should Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), be overruled, and should public sector “agency shop” arrangements be invalidated under the First Amendment?
  2. Does requiring public employees to affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public sector unions, rather than requiring employees to affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech, violate the First Amendment?

Under California law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public school employees in a school district if it can show that a majority of the employees consent to its representation. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec.

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June Medical Services LLC v. Gee

Issues

Under Supreme Court precedent, can a state law require physicians who administer abortions to obtain admitting privileges at hospitals?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Louisiana’s law, requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at local hospitals, comports with the Court’s precedent. The parties agree that the Louisiana law at issue in this case is substantially similar to the Texas law that the Supreme Court struck down in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. June Medical Services argues that precedent from Whole Woman’s Health and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey control and that Louisiana’s Act is unconstitutional because it unduly burdens women seeking abortions. Doctor Rebekah Gee on behalf of Louisiana argues that June Medical Services lacks standing to bring forth a claim on behalf of their patients and further asserts that Whole Woman’s Health does not control the outcome of this case because the Louisiana Act does not unduly burden women seeking abortions. The outcome of this case has important implications on access to abortion services for women of color and could impact lower courts’ fact-finding authority.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding Louisiana’s law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital conflicts with the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.

In 2014, the Louisiana Legislature passed the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act (“Louisiana Act”), which required abortion providers who perform abortions at local clinics to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the clinic. June Medical Services LLC v.

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Kisor v. Wilkie

Issues

Should the Supreme Court overrule Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., which direct courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Auer deference—a rule that requires a court to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation—ought to be overruled. James Kisor contends that the Auer doctrine is not part of the lawmaking authority that Congress has delegated to agencies, but it instead circumvents the limits that Congress has placed on their authority, is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, and lacks any policy justification. Robert Willkie, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, counters that, while there should be significant limitations on Auer deference, altogether discarding the doctrine would have heavy practical consequences for both agencies and regulated parties. The outcome of this case will affect the ability of regulated individuals and entities to comply with agency regulations and to challenge agency interpretations of their own regulations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., which direct courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.

Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran who served on active duty in the Marine Corps from 1962 to 1966. Kisor v. Shulkin at 1361. Kisor filed a claim for disability compensation benefits with the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) Regional Office in Portland, Oregon in 1982, claiming that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).

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Minerva Surgical Inc. v. Hologic Inc.

Issues

When a party transfers a patent to a third party and the third party later sues the transferring party for patent infringement, can the transferring party claim the patent is invalid?

This case asks the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of the assignor estoppel doctrine. Under this doctrine, an assignor of a patent may not, in a suit against the assignee, claim that the patent is invalid. Petitioner Minerva Surgical Inc. argues assignor estoppel is not supported in the Patent Act and Court precedent favors the doctrine’s abolition. Respondent Hologic Inc. counters that assignor estoppel is implicit in the Patent Act and that stare decisis dictates that the Court uphold assignor estoppel. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications regarding the proper balance of the public interest in challenging potentially invalid patents and the interest in promoting equity and fair dealing in the assignor–assignee relationship.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, may have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits.

This case involves U.S. Patents Nos. 6,782,183 (“’183 patent”) and 9,095,348 (“’348 patent”). Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical at 1260. Both patents lay claim to various devices and procedures related to endometrial ablation treatment, which are used to treat abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Id. at 1260–61. Csaba Truckai is listed as the inventor of both patents.

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right to confront witness

Overview

The Sixth Amendment provides that a person accused of a crime has the right to confront a witness against him or her in a criminal action.  This includes the right to be present at the trial (which is guaranteed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 43).

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Riley v. Bondi

Issues

Is 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1) a jurisdictional statute that requires filing for appeal within 30 days; and, does it allow a person to appeal a Board of Immigration Appeals decision by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision?

The case asks the Court to determine if 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1), which creates a 30-day deadline to appeal a final order for removal, is a jurisdictional barrier that must be met for an appeal to be heard, or if it is simply one of many factors the Court can consider. Additionally, the case asks the Court to determine if § 1252(b)(1) is satisfied if the petitioner appeals the case after a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals within 30 days of its decision. Petitioner argues that § 1252(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional rule and even if it was, § 1252(b)(1) was satisfied. Respondent argues that § 1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional rule which was not satisfied. The case decision will affect both the noncitizen’s ability to access immigration proceedings and the courts’ administrative burden in handling them. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited; and (2) whether a person can obtain review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision.

Under 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1), to review an order of removal, the “petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

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South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.

Issues

Should state and local governments be allowed to require out-of-state online retailers to collect sales and use taxes?

The Supreme Court will decide whether to overturn Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, which held that the Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing sales or use taxes on out-of-state sellers. Petitioner South Dakota argues that in modern times, a business may not have a physical presence in a state, yet still satisfy the “substantial nexus” requirement as articulated in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady. South Dakota further argues that increases in electronic commerce, concerns with states’ ability to collect adequate revenues, and overall changes in the national economy favoring online sellers weigh in favor of overturning Quill, despite stare decisis. In contrast, Respondent Wayfair, Inc. argues that changes in market conditions do not justify overturning Quill, especially when the underlying constitutional concerns of restraints on interstate commerce remain. Wayfair further argues that imposing sales taxes on remote sellers will unfairly burden small businesses with appreciable compliance costs, especially as the largest online sellers, such as Amazon, already voluntarily pay state sales taxes. If the Court rules in South Dakota’s favor, online retailers will be subject to state sales and use taxes, and likely raise the prices of the goods they sell. If the Court instead rules in Wayfair’s favor and upholds Quill, online retailers will continue to have an apparent advantage compared to local brick-and-mortar businesses.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should abrogate Quill Corp. v. North Dakota's sales-tax-only, physical-presence requirement?

In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, which held that a state cannot force a business without a physical presence in the state to collect sales taxes. State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d. 754.

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