Esteras v. United States

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Esteras v. United States

Issues

When determining whether to revoke supervised release, does a district court commit error if it relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s sentencing factors despite their absence from 18 U.S.C § 3583(e)’s enumerated list?

Oral argument:
February 25, 2025
Court below:
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

This case asks the Court to determine whether a district court presiding over a revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) may consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) despite their absence from Section 3583(e)’s enumerated list. Section 3553(a)(2)(A)’s sentencing factors include reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, and providing just punishment for the offense. Petitioner argues that Section 3583(e)’s list is exhaustive, and omission of the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors precludes a district court from considering them to determine revocation of supervised release. Respondent counters that the consideration factors set out in Section 3583 are not exhaustive, and the factors in Section 3553 may be relied upon by a district court when determining the modification or revocation of supervised release. This case touches on important questions regarding the purpose of supervised release, a court’s discretion to revoke and reimprison violators, and the impact that judicial discretion has on the carceral system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, even though Congress excluded 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)’s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, a district court may rely on the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release.

Facts

In 1984, through the Sentencing Reform Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583 ), Congress abolished the federal parole system and created a new form of post-imprisonment supervision called supervised release. Two years later, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act amended section § 3583, adding a provision to allow district courts to revoke supervised release (“revocation sentencing”) and require that the defendant serve some or all of their remaining supervisory term in prison. To guide revocation sentencing, section 3583(e) cross-references the traditional sentencing factors that courts use in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and enumerates eight factors for judicial consideration. Notably, it omits the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(A), including: the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.

The petition for certiorari concerns three separate judgments issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit . In each case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgment revoking supervised release. Petitioners Edgardo Esteras, Timonthy Jaimez, and Toriano Leaks, Jr., were each charged with and convicted of a federal crime. At sentencing, each of their respective district court judges imposed a term of supervised release. Later, the district courts found that each of them had violated a condition of their supervised releases.

In 2023, Edgardo Esteras violated his supervised-release conditions and was sentenced at a revocation hearing to a twenty-four-month imprisonment term. As part of imposing the sentence, the presiding judge expressly considered “the need to promote respect for the law.” On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Esteras argued that the district court erred in considering a section 3553(a)(2)(A) factor as part of its sentence. The Sixth Circuit panel affirmed Esteras’ sentence. In deciding so, that panel held that it was bound by its prior decision in United States v. Lewis , where the Sixth Circuit held that “it does not constitute reversible error to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a sentence for violation of supervised release, even though this factor is not enumerated in § 3583(e).”

Timothy Jaimez, serving his second term of supervised release, admitted to three supervised-release violations brought by the United States. During the revocation hearing, the court expressly considered all three of Section 3553(a)(2)(A)’s factors and sentenced Jaimez to the maximum advisory sentence of sixty months incarceration. On appeal, Jaimez similarly objected to the court’s reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A), but the Sixth Circuit relying on both Lewis and Esteras found no error.

Lastly, Toriano Leaks admitted to various violations of his supervised-release conditions. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Leaks to twelve months in prison. In issuing its sentence, the court explained that an alternative sentence would “not punish Mr. Leaks” and was “not justice.” On appeal, Leaks argued the court erred by considering Section 3553(a)(2)(A); the Sixth Circuit, relying on both Lewis and Esteras , found no error.

On May 15, 2024, Esteras, Jaimez, and Leaks (collectively “Petitioners”) joined in a single petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari . The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 21, 2024.

Analysis

TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION

Petitioners argue that the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) alone demonstrates that 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A)’s sentencing factors may not be considered by a district court when revoking supervised release. Petitioners assert subsection 3583(e) provides district court judges with an exhaustive list of factors to consider when deciding whether to terminate, modify, or revoke a defendant’s supervised release. Pointing to the absence of 3553(a)(2)(a)’s factors from subsection 3583(e)’s enumerated consideration factors, Petitioners argue that Congress thereby impliedly limited judicial discretion. Petitioners emphasize the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius , “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other,” a negative-implication canon . They argue that 3583(e)’s enumerated list reflects a deliberate choice by Congress to exclude otherwise unmentioned factors, especially 3553(a)(2)(A)’s factors.

To support an exclusion approach, Petitioners cite Tapia v. United States to categorically differentiate 3553(a)(2)’s factors with reference to the four purposes of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation; 3553(a)(2)(A) corresponds with retribution. While Tapia concerned a neighboring provision, 18 U.S.C. 3582(a), Petitioners contend the Court’s rationale to exclude rehabilitation as a factor from judicial consideration when imposing imprisonment similarly applies to categorically exclude factors on the basis of purposes. Petitioners specifically invoke the Court’s language in Tapia that “a court may not take account of retribution . . . when imposing a[n initial] term of supervised release” under section 3583(c). Further, Petitioners argue that exclusion is supported by Congress’s limiting instructions for other sentencing determinations (imprisonment, probation, and fines) because each impliedly includes 3553(a)(2)(A) while omitted in the context of supervised release determinations. Ultimately, they argue, it would defy congressional directives and judicial principles for courts to “enlarge” the statutory directive by reading in omitted text under the guise of “construction.”

In contrast, Respondent, the United States, asserts that section 3583(e) does not prohibit a court from considering section 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding to terminate, modify, or revoke supervised release. Instead, it argues that section 3583(e) sets forth a list of prerequisite considerations and does not otherwise “divest” a district court’s otherwise broad sentencing discretion . Specifically, it argues that the language, “after considering,” in section 3583(e) merely issues a procedural command, denoting obligatory judicial-considerations before revoking supervised release. Importantly, the United States emphasizes, nothing in the text of section 3583(e) expressly forbids a court from considering otherwise unmentioned factors. Thus, the United States argues that courts may consider factors beyond those enumerated, such as those in section 3553(a)(2)(A). The United States argues an omission does not amount to a prohibition, especially where Congress employed express limiting language in neighboring provisions (e.g., “only,” and “except that,” “to the extent that”). Further, the United States contends that Tapia is not controlling, and none of the Court’s precedents have directly addressed the supervised release provision at issue.

HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT

Petitioners assert that the categorical exclusion of 3553(a)(2)(A)’s “retributive factors” aligns with the supervised release’s forward-looking nature. Petitioners emphasize the critical difference between parole, which the SRA abolished, and supervised release: supervised release is a separate sentence of imprisonment while parole replaced a sentence of imprisonment. Petitioners note that the congressional purpose of supervised release was to create a system that helped “ease the defendant’s transition into the community.” They contrast this focus on rehabilitation with the SRA’s punitive approach to imprisonment, probation, and fines. Petitioner argues that because supervised release was instituted to promote rehabilitation following the completion of a prison term, retributive considerations are inapplicable—retribution was served by the initial and completed term of imprisonment. Put another way, Petitioners assert that supervised release is not a punishment for a defendant’s convicted crime, nor is the revocation of supervised release a punishment for violation of a supervised release conviction. Finally, they point to repeated amendments to the list of factors in Section 3583(a), including one that added Section 3553(a)(2)(C), but that notably never added Section 3553(a)(2)(A), as further evidence of Congress’s intent to exclude the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when modifying or revoking supervised release.

The United States contends that Petitioners’ reliance on the legislative history of the SRA is misplaced. It notes that the SRA did not originally provide for revocation of supervised release for a violation of the release conditions. As a result, it argues that the intentions of the Congress that adopted the SRA are not particularly relevant here. Even if the intentions of that Congress are relevant, the United States contends that its considerations were directed at the imposition of supervised release, rather than the violation of that release, and it is the latter at issue here. The United States argues that the imposition of supervised release may have been rehabilitative, but the revocation for a violation was built to “sanction the breach of the Court’s trust” and thus was punitive in nature. Beyond that, the United States points out that the phrasing in the original SRA was that the courts “shall consider” factors not including the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. It argues that this implies a list of factors courts must consider, rather than a limit on what a court may consider. Finally, the United States argues that Congress’s inaction by not adding Section 3553(a)(2)(A) to the list of factors in Section 3583(e) in subsequent amendments may be interpreted in multiple ways, including that they may not view those factors as critical, and as such this inaction cannot be used to determine Congress’s intent.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Petitioners also raise constitutional challenges under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the use of retributive factors like those in Section 3553(a)(2)(A) when considering modifying or revoking supervised release. They point to the Supreme Court’s opinion in to say that reimprisonment as a punishment for violating supervised release may be unconstitutional . They argue that violative conduct has a lower standard than other criminal conduct. They also argue that violative conduct that is also criminal may result in two prosecutions against the same person and thus punish that person twice.

The United States argues that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply when considering modifying or revoking supervised release. To support this, the United States points to parole revocation hearings, to which the same concerns under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply. They also argue that any constitutional problems would not be due to the factors listed in Section 3553(a)(2)(A), but instead due to other procedural issues. As such, these constitutional problems do not impact the use, or lack of use, of the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when considering modifying or revoking supervised release.

Discussion

SENTENCING THEORIES AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REIMPRISONMENT

In support of Petitioners, criminal law scholars (collectively, “the Scholars”) argue that probation/parole and supervised release serve different purposes, and conflating the two would undermine the Unites States’ punishment and rehabilitation models. The Scholars contend that unlike probation and parole, which grants defendants the benefit of early release from prison, supervised release imposes a period of restricted liberty after a defendant has served a complete prison sentence. Because supervised release does not grant a benefit to defendants, such as early release, the Scholars argue that a violation of supervised release does not betray the Government’s trust and is not morally wrong. The Scholars contend that supervised release is therefore inconsistent with the retributive theory of sentencing that justifies punishing a defendant because his actions are morally wrong. In fact, Counsel of Record for the Scholars, Jacob Schuman, in his article Revocation and Retribution , argues that eliminating retribution as a permissive consideration factor in supervised release determinations is not only philosophically consistent with how our courts punish defendants but would shorten prison sentences and limit the implicit racial bias that tends to punish black defendants with greater retribution.

The United States, on the other hand, considers a violation of supervised release conditions to be a breach of trust and consistent with retributivist punishment. The United States asserts that when Congress provided the courts with the ability to revoke supervised release, it did so as a way to sanction the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust. The United States argues that since a violation of supervised release is a breach of trust, then the defendant engaged in a moral wrong that justifies punishing the defendant. Further then, the United States posits that a court’s consideration should not be limited only to deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but should include retribution as a way to sanction the breach of trust. The United States ultimately argues that courts are entrusted with “wide sentencing discretion” to conduct an informed inquiry and impose the proper sentence; thus, requiring courts to take into account retribution in revocation sentencing.

WORKABILITY OF REVOCATION

Jacob Schuman also argues that the expansive authority granted to federal courts to impose and monitor supervised release has created an unworkable system of supervision and reimprisonment. Schuman contends that courts have used their authority over community supervision expansively, resulting in a fivefold increase of people sentenced to supervised release than were ever subjected to probation. Schuman asserts that, rather than use their authority sparingly, courts have imposed supervised release on nearly every defendant who was sentenced to more than a year in prison resulting in upwards of 100,000 people being placed under the court’s supervision. Schuman asserts that courts revoke supervised release in one-third of cases, amounting to about 17,000 revocations per year, supporting his concern that the increase of those under court supervision also increases the number of individuals at risk of reimprisonment. Revoking supervised release, Schuman argues, is a major contributor to mass incarceration. He contends that the conditions that apply to those under supervised release have the increased potential of sending them back to prison, and the retributive factors of Section 3553(a)(2)(A) that courts have been used which needlessly increase defendants’ sentences.

The United States responds that Petitioners’ formulation of permissible and impermissible factors only creates more judicial confusion and taxes an already burdened judiciary. The United States argues that it is difficult for a court to consider the factors listed in Section 3583(e) without also considering Section 3553(a)(2)(A)’s factors because they are “inextricably intertwined.” The United States outlines factors listed for consideration in Section 3583(e), including protecting the public from further crimes and the nature and circumstances of the offense, and argues these factors cannot be properly considered if the court cannot also consider Section 3553(a)(2)(A)’s seriousness of the offense. The United States insists that those factors that must be considered, necessarily require a court to indulge in seriousness-related considerations, such as whether a weapon was used or the amount of harm done. Contending there is substantial overlap among many of the factors, the United States argues that Petitioners’ interpretation of the statute could only ever be implemented in name, but not in practice, therefore making it an unnecessary burden on the courts.

Conclusion

Authors

Written by: Gregory Jameson and Kayla Espinoza

Edited by: Grace Braider

Additional Resources