Aggravating circumstances refers to the factors that increase the severity or culpability of a criminal act. Typically, the presence of an aggravating circumstance will lead to a harsher penalty for a convicted criminal.
A jury found Allen Alleyne guilty of robbery under a federal statue, but the jury did not find him guilty of brandishing a weapon during the robbery. A federal criminal statute provides that a judge can raise the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a finding that it was more likely than not that the defendant brandished a firearm. Thus, a judge’s finding can raise the mandatory minimum prison sentence even when a jury was unable to come to that same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed such findings from judges in Harris v. United States. Now, the court will reconsider that position or have the opportunity to further clarify how much sentencing discretion can be given to judges under federal statutes.
Should the Supreme Court overrule Harris v. United States and require that a jury find facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a sentence beyond the ordinarily prescribed statutory maximum?
Whether the proper calculation of “good time credits” to shorten the sentence of federal prisoners, based on their good behavior, is based on actual time served or the sentence imposed, when considering both the rule of lenity and the deference due to the decisions of the Bureau of Prisons.
Petitioners Michael Barber and Tahir Jihad-Black are serving sentences in federal prison for various gun and drug charges. The Ninth Circuit allowed Petitioners to consolidate their cases with several earlier cases in order to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Petitioners are challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which allows well-behaved and compliant federal-prisoners to receive up to 54 days off their sentences for “each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Petitioners argue that “term of imprisonment” means the total sentence imposed by the court. Respondent contends that it refers to the prisoners’ actual time served. The standard of computation ends up differing because under Petitioners’ method, a prisoner receives good behavior credit for years they do not end up serving. Petitioners argue that the courts do not owe the BOP’s interpretation deference, because the statute is unambiguous and the record does not contain any reason for the BOP’s interpretation. Even if the statute is ambiguous, Petitioners argue that the rule of lenity should apply. The rule of lenity holds that when considering penal statutes, the courts should resolve any ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. Respondent agrees that the statute is unambiguous, but counters that it instead requires computation of good time credit on the basis of time served. Respondent also argues that even if the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is civil rather than penal.
The federal good time credit (GTC) statute provides for credits ‘‘up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Throughout federal sentencing statutes, and elsewhere in the same sentence, ‘‘term of imprisonment” means the sentence imposed. However, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") interprets ‘‘term of imprisonment” as unambiguously meaning time served. For each year of a sentence imposed, the BOP interpretation results in seven fewer days of available credits. The first question presented is:
Does ‘‘term of imprisonment” in Section 212(a)(2) of the Sentencing Reform Act, enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), unambiguously require the computation of good time credits on the basis of the sentence imposed?
The circuits, using a variety of rationales, have rejected the BOP’s claim that the statute was unambiguous, but deferred to the BOP interpretation under Chevron based on “term of imprisonment” being ambiguous. In this litigation, the BOP has conceded that the regulation implementing the GTC statute, and previously accorded deference, was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BOP rule under Skidmore. The second question presented is:
If “term of imprisonment” in the federal good time credit statute is ambiguous, does the rule of lenity and the deference appropriate to the United States Sentencing Commission require that good time credits be awarded based on the sentence imposed?
Under federal law, a federal prisoner serving a sentence of more than one year but less than life, “may receive credit toward the service of [his] sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). These good time credits (“GTCs”) are subject to a determination by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") that “the prisoner has displa
Does the Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), apply retroactively to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines?
The Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), makes the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines void for vagueness and, if so, whether this new rule gives relief to Petitioner Travis Beckles by retroactively applying to collateral cases challenging federal sentences under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Beckles argues that § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is void for vagueness under Johnson because the residual clauses in both cases are identical, and the Court held that the clause in Johnson was void for vagueness. Beckles also asserts that this new rule applies retroactively under the Court’s test in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Respondent the United States argues, however, that Beckles’s new rule would not apply retroactively because it is a procedural rather than a substantive rule, and thus the Court should reject his request at this threshold. The United States further argues that if the Court does reach the merits, § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness with respect to those applications expressly specified in the commentary to § 4B1.2(a)(2) because this commentary clarifies the otherwise vague guideline. This case will address whether retroactive resentencing for “career offenders” will burden the federal system and will clarify the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines in terms of due process concerns.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), deemed unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining "violent felony"). The residual clause invalidated in Johnson is identical to the residual clause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining "crime of violence").
The questions presented are:
In 2007, police arrested Travis Beckles after recovering a sawed-off shotgun in his residence. See United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 837–38 (11th Cir. 2009). At trial, the jury found Beckles guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Did the California Supreme Court err by upholding Sanders' death sentence despite the fact that it invalidated two of the four special circumstances used to determine the penalty in the lower court, and failed to reweigh the circumstance or determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?
Ronald Lee Sanders was found guilty of murder and other charges related to a 1981 attack in Bakersfield, California. At the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that there were four “special circumstances” related to his crimes, and accordingly sentenced him to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court invalidated two of the special circumstances, but upheld the death sentence without reweighing whether it was warranted by the remaining special circumstances. The California Supreme Court also failed to specifically find that the presence of the invalid circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and petitions for habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that it was unconstitutional for the California Supreme Court to uphold the death sentence without reweighing the special circumstances or finding the error to be harmless. Petitioner, the state of California, argues that the state's sentencing code is not the type of “weighing” statute that would render a death sentence invalid simply because certain special circumstances were found to be invalid. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will significantly impact the prospects for successful appeals or writs for habeas corpus by defendants similarly situated to Sanders.
At trial in the Superior Court of Kern County California, Ronald Lee Sanders was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, robbery, attempted robbery, and burglary, all stemming from an attempted robbery in Bakersfield, California. See People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 566–67 (Cal. 1990).
Law about... Criminal procedure, the death penalty
The Supreme Court in Blakely ruled that mandatory state sentencing guidelines are the statutory maximum for purposes of applying the Apprendi rule, which prohibits judges from enhancing criminal sentences beyond statutory maximums based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Is the holding in Blakely a new rule that cannot be applied retroactively, or is it instead dictated by the earlier holding in Apprendi?
A jury convicted Petitioner Lonnie Lee Burton of rape, robbery, and burglary. After initially choosing to run Burton’s robbery and burglary convictions concurrent with his rape conviction, the sentencing judge on remand imposed the same 562-month aggregate sentence but ran the three convictions consecutive to each other after finding that Burton’s earlier sentence was too lenient. As a result, Burton’s sentence was 258 months above the 304 month ceiling of the statutory sentencing range. Burton contends that the sentencing court acted in violation of Blakely v. Washington. Burton further contends that the rule from Blakely, decided after his sentence became final, is not a new rule, but rather a rule dictated by the earlier case Apprendi v. New Jersey. The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Blakely is a new rule or is in fact dictated by Apprendi. If Blakely is a new rule, the Court will decide whether it applies retroactively. A decision for either side has the potential to change the amount of discretion that judges exercise when sentencing defendants.
Petitioner was given an exceptional sentence of 258 months above the 304 month ceiling of the statutory sentencing range, a sentence that became final after Apprendi v. New Jersey, but before Blakely v. Washington:
On October 18, 1991, Petitioner Lonnie Lee Burton followed a 15-year-old Washington boy home from school. State v. Burton, 2000 WL 987045 (Wash.App. Div. July 17, 2000) at 1.
Whether a defendant’s failure to report for confinement creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person under the Armed Career Criminals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) such that it can be considered a violent felony.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2007) held that failure to report to a penal institution constitutes a violent crime under the Armed Career Criminals Act. Petitioner Deondery Chambers pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 188 months in jail under the Armed Career Criminals Act because of his prior conviction for failing to report on schedule to a penal institution. Without the additional punishment mandated by the Armed Career Criminals Act, Chambers’ sentencing range would have been 130 to 162 months. The U.S. Supreme Court considers in this case whether or not a defendant’s failure to report for confinement involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another such that it constitutes a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminals Act.
Whether a defendant’s failure to report for confinement “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” such that a conviction for escape based on that failure to report is a “violent felony” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminals Act, 18 U.S. C. § 924 (e).
Petitioner Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. See United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir.
Is a district court deciding not to grant a post-sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) in proportion to the amended Federal Sentencing Guidelines required to provide an explanation, or is no explanation necessary so long as the court uses a preprinted form order that provides a policy statement and certifies the applicable sentencing factors?
The Supreme Court will decide whether a court, in deciding not to grant a discretionary post-judgment sentencing revision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in proportion to the amended Federal Sentencing Guidelines, must provide an explanation or can issue its decision through a preprinted form order containing standardized language. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that § 3582(c)(2) does not require a judge to provide an explanation when refusing to grant a motion for a proportional sentencing reduction in accordance with the amended Guidelines. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, have found that judges are required to explain sentencing revision decisions. Petitioner Chavez-Meza argues that a judge must provide some explanation for a disproportional sentencing reduction when the reasons for the decision are not apparent from the record. Respondent United States argues that judges can use preprinted forms when granting sentencing revisions that are disproportional to the Guideline revisions, as long as the form order contains standardized language stating that the court has considered the policy and applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This case will clarify the extent to which application of the amended Guidelines reflects a bipartisan shift away from punitive sentences for drug offenses.
Whether, when a district court decides not to grant a proportional sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), it must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or whether it can issue its decision without any explanation so long as it is issued on a preprinted form order containing the boilerplate language providing that the court has “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth in U.S.S.G. § lBl.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable," as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held.
Following an investigation and sting operation in 2012, federal authorities arrested Petitioner Adaucto Chavez-Meza on charges of conspiring with the Sinaloa Cartel to distribute methamphetamine in the United States.
Jody Godoy, Judges to Weigh Resentencing Under New Guidelines, Law360 (January 16, 2018)
Humberto Cuellar was convicted of international money laundering after officers found large sums of illegal money hidden in a vehicle Cuellar intended to drive across the U.S. border into Mexico. A jury found Cuellar guilty under 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes money laundering a federal crime. An en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed Cuellar's conviction and Cuellar appealed. In this case, U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether an attempt to create the appearance of legitimate wealth is necessary to support a money laundering conviction. Cuellar argues that his conviction cannot stand because he did not attempt to create the appearance of legitimate funds. The United States argues that a money laundering conviction is appropriate if a criminal defendant physically concealed illegal funds during cross-border transportation. The Court's decision will resolve the current circuit split and clarify the scope of the federal money laundering statute.
Whether merely hiding funds with no design to create the appearance of legitimate wealth is sufficient to support a money laundering conviction.
In determining a sentence for the predicate felony underlying § 924(c), what is the scope of a trial court’s discretion in considering the statute’s mandatory consecutive sentence?
In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the scope of a trial court’s discretion in considering the mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (mandating a minimum sentence if a firearm is used in furtherance of a violent crime) when determining a sentence for the predicate offense. In deciding whether the lower courts erred by not further reducing the petitioner’s sentence for his predicate offense, the Court will look at whether United States v. Pepper (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 implied that a sentencing court should consider all relevant information about a defendant when determining an appropriate sentence) overruled United States v. Hatcher (holding that a trial court could not impose a mere one-day sentence for crimes that were not subject to a mandatory minimum just because the § 924(c)-mandated sentence had been 300 months). Petitioner Levon Dean, Jr. argues that trial courts should be given full discretion to consider all possible information and that Congressional support of a shorter sentence is evinced by the text of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1986. The United States, as respondent, counters that the Sentencing Reform Act cannot be used simply to lower the aggregate sentence and that Congress specifically intended to prohibit lighter sentences because of the unique dangers of a § 924(c) violation. If the Court rules that Pepper overruled Hatcher, this will give trial courts more discretion in fashioning shorter aggregate sentences for defendants who used a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime.
Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper v. United States―holding that a judge can adjust sentencing guidelines downward if the defendant is rehabilitated after his initial sentencing―overrule United States v. Hatcher and other Eighth Circuit opinions that limit the district court’s discretion in determining the appropriate sentence for the felony serving as the basis for a conviction for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)?
On April 15, 2013, brothers Levon Dean, Jr. (“Dean”) and Jamal Dean (“Jamal”), as well as some friends, were involved in an armed robbery of a drug dealer. On that day, Jessica Cabbell, a prostitute, had a “date” planned with J.R., a methamphetamine and marijuana dealer, at a motel in Sioux City, Iowa. See United States v. Dean, 810 F.3d 521, 525 (2015). According to Cabbell’s friend Sarah Berg, J.R.
