Velázquez v. Garland

COMMON-LAW RULE AND PRESUMPTIVE INCORPORATION

Velázquez argues that a longstanding common-law rule—specifically, that time periods expiring on weekends or holidays are extended until the next business day—governs when the voluntary departure period ends. Brief for Petitioner at 15. He asserts that the Supreme Court has generally presumed that common-law rules are incorporated into federal statutes unless Congress expressly negates them. Id. at 16. Velázquez surveys the American court tradition, which has long recognized the English common law principle that deadlines falling on a “dies non juridicus”—a non-juridical day—run to the next business day. Id. at 19. Specifically, Velázquez traces the origins of this principle back to ancient Rome where Sunday was regarded as a non-juridical day and highlights how England’s Lord Chief Justice extended the rule to holidays when the judicial term ended on a Wednesday holiday. Id. at 19–20. Velázquez turns next to American case law, referencing Cock v. Bunn, where the court held that when the time to plead ends on a Sunday, the defendant will still be permitted to plead on the following day. Id. at 22. He states that numerous subsequent cases, relying on Cock, held that various deadlines extended when the last day was to fall on Sunday, including the times for taking appeals, settling a bill of exceptions, and even performance in private contracts. Id. at 22–23.

Velázquez explains that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as originally written, was a codification of the pre-existing practices that extended deadlines ending on a weekend or holiday and courts have invoked Rule 6(a) and its background principles even when the rule does not directly apply. Id. at 27. According to Velázquez, Rule 6(a) was further amended to include Saturday as Saturday came to be recognized as a non-business day in the twentieth century (due to decreased working hours and Jewish Sabbath observance). Id. at 28. Furthermore, Velázquez alleges that even the BIA has previously acknowledged this approach by Rule 6(a), holding in one case that Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays should be treated equivalently, despite the rules for immigration deadlines at that time not explicitly addressing how deadlines that fell on Saturdays should be treated. Id. at 28–29. According to Velázquez, courts generally assume that statutes incorporate traditional legal and common law principles unless that statute expressly negates them. Id. at 29. Thus, Velázquez concludes, § 1229c(b)(2) should be presumed to include, rather than negate, these established principles because nothing in the text of the relevant statute indicates the contrary. Id. at 30.

Conversely, Attorney General Merrick Garland (Garland) argues that the common-law principle dies non juridicus is not applicable to the statutory deadline for voluntarily leaving the country. Brief for Respondent at 23–24. Garland explains that common law differentiated between actions requiring a judicial presence—which could only be done when the Court was sitting—and those that did not. Id. at 24–25. Garland argues that only the former allowed an extension if the deadline fell on a holiday. Id. Therefore, Garland asserts that the dies non juridicus principle does not apply in this case because Velázquez’s obligation to voluntarily depart did not involve any judicial acts that common law would have disallowed on a Sunday. Id. at 26. Garland adds that Velázquez could have left on any day of the week, making an extension unnecessary since the travel was possible on any day. Id. Garland further alleges that, because every federal district court and court of appeals is always open for filing, it would not have had a reason to incorporate the dies non juridicus principle when Congress enacted § 1229c with a non-court-filing deadline. Id. at 26–27. Garland suggests that, while Velázquez correctly notes that state courts generally extended deadlines falling on a Sunday when those deadlines were established by the court, the court only extended court-created deadlines and did not engage in this practice for deadlines created by statute. Id. at 27. Furthermore, Garland clarifies that Cock does not extend to the calculation of statutory periods, noting that the same New York high court in a later decision declined to apply Cock to the calculation of a statutory period to appeal. Id. at 29. Garland claims that by 1851 in New York, Sunday was always counted when a statute declared an act to be performed within a set period of time. Id.

Garland argues that courts have not applied the dies non juridicus principles to private conduct on Sundays. Id. at 31. Garland claims that in former cases where courts extended deadlines for private contracts on Sundays, the courts were simply enforcing pre-existing specific statutes that regulated private acts, such as performing specific types of work on Sunday, rather than applying a general principle. Id. Consequently, Garland asserts that those court decisions are irrelevant to Velázquez’s conduct because no statute prohibited Velázquez’s ability to depart the country on a Sunday. Id. at 34. As for private conduct on Saturdays or non-Sunday holidays, Garland contends that the dies non juridicus principles only apply to actions taken on Sundays, not ones taken on non-Sunday holidays or Saturdays. Id. at 36. First, Garland points to an 1860 Supreme Court decision, which held that delivery under a contract on a Thursday holiday was still valid, indicating that the court did not automatically extend deadlines based on non-Sunday holidays. Id. Second, Garland emphasizes that Saturdays have traditionally been treated the same as weekdays, unless the legislature enacted provisions to the contrary, distinguishing Saturday from the common-law principles that apply to Sundays. Id. at 36–37.

APPLICABILITY OF THE REGULATORY DEFINITION OF “DAY”

Velázquez argues that a longstanding immigration regulation, Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations §§1.2 and 1001.1(h), defines the word “day” and is instructive as to how the phrase “60 days” in § 1229c(b)(2) should be read. Brief for Petitioner at 34. Velázquez points out that the immigration regulation states that if the last day of a given period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period shall extend to the next day. Id. Velázquez argues that because Congress did not negate this pre-existing regulatory definition, the 60-day period cannot conclude on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, but must extend to the next business day. Id. at 34–35. Velázquez assumes that when Congress enacts a statute, it is aware of any already-established regulatory definitions. Id. at 35. Therefore, Velázquez argues that it is natural to conclude that Congress incorporated such a longstanding regulatory definition into the voluntary-departure statute in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Id. Velázquez further argues that this regulatory definition controls the time period for any action in Title 8, and that Title 8 “contains all of the regulations related to immigration matters,” including the deadlines for voluntarily departing the country. Id. at 38. Velázquez therefore argues that “60 days” in § 1229c(b)(2) should be understood to extend the voluntary departure period when the last day of the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Id.

Garland conversely argues that Congress would not have expected Title 8’s regulatory definition of “day” to apply to the voluntary-departure period newly created by statute. Brief for the Respondent at 42. Garland contends that the definition’s language “as used in this chapter” is important because that chapter was the only chapter within Title 8 at the time of legislation and could therefore only apply to itself. Id. Garland maintains that the applicability of the regulatory definition of Title 8 is necessarily limited in two additional ways. Id. First, Garland contends that the regulatory definition’s use of the phrase as “used in this chapter” means it could only apply specifically to regulations in which the term “day” appeared, not statutes. Id. at 43. Second, Garland alleges that the regulatory definition only applies to periods of time for actions provided for “in this chapter.” Id. Garland argues the language “in this chapter” means the definition is only applicable to prescribed time periods provided for in immigration regulations, but not beyond. Id. Therefore, Garland argues that the definition would not apply to the period for voluntary departure, which is provided for by statute, not regulation. id.