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Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services Of Chicago

Issues

Is Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) jurisdictional in nature or is it instead a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule?

The issue in this case involves whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is a jurisdictional rule or a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. Hamer argues that the Rule is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule because it has no statutory basis, while Neighborhood Housing Services argues that the Rule is a jurisdictional rule because it prescribes the types of cases over which a court has adjudicatory authority and has a statutory basis. The case is significant from a legal perspective because it will determine whether a violation of Rule 4(a)(5)(C) strips a court of appeals of its jurisdiction to hear a case on the merits, or whether the court may still consider the case on the merits based on equitable considerations or if a party waived or forfeited its right to seek dismissal under the Rule. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because its outcome will affect the judicial system’s interest in finality and because a decision affirming the Seventh Circuit would caution against relying on the legal accuracy of orders from district court judges regarding appeals. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) can deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction over an appeal that is statutorily timely, or whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is instead a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule because it is not derived from a statute, and therefore subject to forfeiture or waiver by an appellee, or subject to equitable considerations such as the unique-circumstances doctrine.

Petitioner Charmaine Hamer (“Hamer”) worked as an Intake Specialist for the Respondents, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae’s Mortgage Help Center (“Housing Services”), for several years. Brief for Respondents, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae at 3. Hamer applied for promotions during her time there but never received any.

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Velázquez v. Garland

Issues

Does the 60-day voluntary-departure period provided for in 8 U.S.C. 1229c extend to the next business day when the last day of the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday?

This case asks the Court to determine when a noncitizen has failed to voluntarily depart in a timely manner or move to reopen or reconsider an adverse decision under the 60-day voluntary departure period provided for in 8 U.S.C. 1229c. Petitioners argue that the common law has established a rule that extends deadlines when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, and that this rule is presumptively incorporated into the voluntary-departure statute because it was not expressly negated by Congress. Respondent counters that the common law rule only applies to judicial actions not private actions, only extends to judicial deadlines not statutory deadlines, and is not incorporated into the statute. This case raises significant questions of precisely when a noncitizen subject to removal must voluntarily depart the country in order to satisfy the statute, as well as broader consistency within the legal system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, a motion to reopen filed the next business day is sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1).

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (codified in 8 U.S.C. 1101) a noncitizen who is found removable from the United States in proceedings before an immigration judge, may be granted authorization to leave the country voluntarily rather than be removed from the country. Velazquez v.

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