Parrish v. United States

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Parrish v. United States

    Issues

    When a court grants a motion to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 4(a)(6) — and that motion itself could have functioned as a notice of appeal — must a litigant file an additional notice of appeal within 14 days?

    Oral argument:
    April 21, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a motion to reopen the window to file a notice of appeal can itself constitute a premature, yet permissible notice of appeal filed within the reopened window should that motion be granted. If yes, a litigant who, for good reason, fails to file a notice of appeal within the standard 30­–day deadline will often only have to make one filing in order to successfully appeal nonetheless. If no, that litigant will have to first seek leave to appeal and then, if that leave is granted, file a notice of appeal within 14 days. Donte Parrish argues that the forgiving purpose of late-appeal provisions and common sense plainly dictate that because a motion to reopen that puts the opposing party on notice of appeal functions as a notice of appeal, such a motion should later be treated as a notice of appeal filed if that motion is granted. The United States — the opposing party in this case — agrees. But the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, and Michael Huston, an attorney appointed by the Supreme Court to defend that ruling, argues that regardless of whether Parrish’s position is reasonable or not, caselaw and statute reject it. The outcome of this case will resolve a split between the Courts of Appeals and determine the proper to balance to be struck between protecting pro se litigants and ensuring that procedural law functions predictably.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b) expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened under subsection (c) of the statute and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.

    Facts

    Under 28 U.S. Code § 2107 (b), a party seeking to challenge the decision of a federal court in a court of appeals when one of the parties is the United States must file a notice of appeal within 60 days of the original decision.  However, under § 2107 (c), a court may open a new 14-day window for a party to submit a notice of appeal under certain circumstances. Those circumstances include the appellant not receiving the decision within 21 days of its entry, the appellant filing a timely motion to reopen the case, and there being no prejudice to any party of the case because of the case being reopened. The rules for the timing of notice for appeals, in addition to being stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (b), are also described in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  

    In 2017, Donte Parrish, proceeding pro se, sued the United States for unlawful detention while Parish was serving a sentence in federal prison. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed Parrish’s complaint on March 24, 2020. On July 8, 2020, Parrish filed a notice of appeal in which Parrish claimed that he had not received the district court’s ruling to dismiss his case until June 25, 2020. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that Parrish’s notice of appeal was untimely, but treated Parrish’s notice of appeal as a motion to reopen the case and remanded the case back to the District Court to determine if the appeal window should be opened because Parrish received the District Court’s judgment to dismiss 93 days after it had been entered and Parrish submitted a notice of appeal within 14 days of receiving notice of that decision. On remand, the District court reopened the window to file a notice of appeal for 14 days. Parrish did not file a notice of appeal within 14 days and submitted what was considered by the Fourth Circuit as an informal brief five days after the window closed.

    Parrish argued that because the district court reopened the window for Parrish to file a notice of appeal, the district court validated the notice of appeal Parrish filed on July 8, 2020. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, focusing on the language of “reopen” in the statute, which, according to the Fourth Circuit, meant that Parrish had to file a new notice of appeal within the 14-day window and that the reopening of a window did not validate the prior notice of appeal. Because the Fourth Circuit found that Parrish did not file a timely notice of appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear that appeal.  

    Accordingly, on September 9, 2024, Parrish petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to hear this case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 17, 2025. 

    Analysis

    EFFECTIVENESS OF PREMATURE NOTICE OF APPEAL

    Parrish proposes that his notice of appeal, though filed before the 14-day window reopened by the district court, became effective once that window was opened. First, Parrish argues that it is a “long recognized” principle of procedural law that an early notice of appeal nevertheless becomes effective once the window to appeal opens. In FirsTier Mortgage Company v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Company (“FirsTier”) Parrish notes, the Supreme Court held that a notice of appeal filed after the district court announced its order but before the entry of judgment — that is, before the official window to appeal actually opened — was nevertheless effective because “the technical defect of prematurity . . . should not be allowed to distinguish an otherwise proper appeal.” Emphasizing that Parrish’s notice of appeal was premature as to his reopened, 14-day window to appeal, Parrish contends that the same “background ripening principle” in FirsTier should apply in this case. Second, Parrish contends that § 2107(c)’s text, statutory context, and purpose support the application of the background ripening principle in this case. As to text, Parrish notes that if § 2107(c) did not allow ripening, then actual filing within the 14-day window would be a jurisdictional requirement. And jurisdictional requirements, Parrish maintains, arise only from clear statutory statements. Thus, Parrish’s argument goes, actual filing within the 14-day window cannot be a jurisdictional requirement because § 2107(c)’s text contains no clear statement to that effect. Additionally, even though other procedural provisions expressly allow ripening while § 2107(c) and FRAP § 4(a)(6) (which implements § 2107(c)) do not, Parrish’s argument implies that this difference is not decisive. Yet other procedural provisions, Parrish emphasizes, have expressly disallowed ripening. Thus, Parrish essentially contends that FirsTier’s background ripening principle should speak in place of § 2107(c)’s and FRAP 4(a)(6)’s silence. With respect to statutory structure, Parrish insists that § 2107(a), which creates the notice-of-appeal requirement in the first place, incorporates ripening. Thus, inasmuch as § 2107(c) contains no freestanding notice-of-appeal requirement but simply sets forth a different window in which to complete § 2107(a)’s requirement, § 2107(c) should be interpreted to allow for ripening too. Finally, as to purpose, Parrish emphasizes that Congress enacted § 2107(c) to assist pro se litigants — especially the incarcerated — and enacts procedural rules in general to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of lawsuits on the merits. In this light, Parrish maintains, § 2107(c) should not be construed to introduce a “trap for the unwary” that places form over function, such as an unintuitive rule requiring the filing of multiple notices of appeal.

    Michael Huston, whom the Court appointed as an amicus curiae to defend the judgment below because the United States refused to do so (“the Appointed Amicus”), contends that the Fourth Circuit rightly concluded that Parrish’s failure to file an actual notice of appeal within the reopened 14-day window deprived that court of jurisdiction. In response to Parrish’s background ripening principle argument, the Appointed Amicus contends that to the extent such a principle exists, it does not apply in this case. Emphasizing that Parrish’s notice of appeal was tardy as to Parrish’s original, 30-day window to appeal, the Appointed Amicus maintains that even a general principle allowing premature notice to ripen would be of no help to Parrish. FirsTier, the Appointed Amicus insists, held that tardy notice of appeal “cannot benefit from ripening.” And FirsTier does not even stand for the proposition that all premature notices of appeal can benefit from ripening, the Appointed Amicus argues. The FirsTier Court reasoned that the ripening principle was “cabined by the enacted text of Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4)(B)(i)” — rules which expressly provide for ripening — and the accompanying “consideration of Congress” not to provide for ripening in other circumstances, the Appointed Amicus emphasizes. Additionally, the Appointed Amicus maintains that Parrish’s arguments ignore § 2107’s text and structure. As to text, the Appointed Amicus first maintains that FRAP 4(a)(6), which implements § 2107(c), differs from the text of Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4)(B)(i), which allow for ripening — for example, 4(a)(2) expressly defines the proper date on which a premature notice “is treated as filed. Even worse, the Appointed Amicus insists, Parrish’s position effectively reads the 14-day window out of the § 2107(c) because that position would let most any motion to reopen suffice as notice to appeal. Next, the Appointed Amicus argues that Parrish’s structural argument ignores key differences between § 2107 (a) and (c). Section 2107(a) defines only the deadline by which notice must be filed and thus can be read to allow the ripening of premature notice, the Appointed Amicus concedes; by contrast, § 2107(c) defines both the end and the beginning of the window in which notice must be filed and thus cannot so easily be read to allow ripening. Finally, the Appointed Amicus concedes that strict application of the 14-day window may lead to a harsh result in this case and prevent litigation on the merits; he highlights, however, the Supreme Court’s remark that all filing deadlines “necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals” but must nevertheless be enforced.

    ABUSE OF DISCRETION

    Alternatively, the Appointed Amicus argues that the Fourth Circuit permissibly rejected Petitioner’s notice of appeal even if it was allowed to do otherwise. Specifically, the Appointed Amicus contends that courts commonly use discretionary language when discussing premature notices of appeal, saying that such notices “may be” regarded as timely and that courts have “the right” not to dismiss them. Thus, the Appointed Amicus frames the issue of whether to accept Parrish’s appeal as one that was within the Fourth Circuit’s discretion. And given that Parrish failed to offer any excuse for his failure to file within the 14-day window and district court’s order clearly spelled out that window, the Appointed Amicus contends that the Fourth Circuit did not abuse its discretion by refusing to treat Parrish’s appeal as timely. 


    While not directly addressing abuse of discretion, Parrish frames the issue of ripening as a mandatory one, arguing that a court is always obliged to allow a premature notice of appeal to become effective if certain conditions are met. Specifically, Parrish contends that because Congress intended § 2107(c) to allow more appeals and because § 2107(c) allows the window for appeal to be reopened on the condition that the opposing party not be prejudiced, ripening—which, on Parrish’s broader argument is merely a way that notice of appeal may become effective within that reopened window — “is always warranted.”

    Discussion

    POSSIBILITY OF DISADVANTAGING VULNERABLE LITIGANTS

    In support of Parrish, the University of Illinois Chicago School of Law—Pro Bono Litigation Clinic (“UIC”) argues that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the rules of procedure would unfairly harm vulnerable groups, such as those who are incarcerated and those proceeding pro se.  UIC contends that incarcerated litigants face barriers to legal communication that other populations do not face. For example, UIC claims that some facilities only allow incarcerated individuals to receive one envelope per week or face time limits on their legal calls. UIC argues that pro se litigants are uniquely vulnerable because they often cannot afford the legal representation that others can. UIC posits that pro se litigants are especially disadvantaged when it comes to procedural issues, such as the timing and filing of notice of appeals, because they do not have the same education and experience as lawyers. Additionally, UIC contends that the Fourth Circuit’s holding would require Parrish, and other incarcerated and pro se litigants, to file duplicative notice of appeals. This, UIC argues, especially disadvantages these vulnerable populations because they often have less research time and more financial burdens than do litigants represented by lawyers. UIC posits that dismissing cases brought by vulnerable populations based on procedural requirements, instead of the substantive merits of litigants’ arguments, promotes broader public distrust in courts. UIC claims that public trust is required for courts to operate well and that there is currently public distrust in the judicial system.  

    In support of the United States, the Appointed Amicus argues that the Court should not create special exceptions to its reading of statutes in favor of sympathetic litigants, including incarcerated and pro se litigants.  The Appointed Amicus posits that rules should be applied equally to all litigants, even if those rules are perceived as “technicalities,” because all procedural rules are ultimately technicalities. The uniform treatment of the rules, the Appointed Amicus claims, will allow for an orderly judicial process that will lead to the right judicial decisions in the aggregate. The Appointed Amicus argues that the procedural rule is not unfair to incarcerated litigants because the prison mailbox rule means that incarcerated litigants need only enter their filing in the prison’s mail system within the required timeframe to be considered a timely filing. Moreover, the Appointed Amicus argues that the possibility of reopening the window to file a notice of appeal is already how Congress intended to balance the equities of people who did not receive a timely notice of judgment. Additionally, the Appointed Amicus argues that procedural rules are, and should be crafted, with the assumption that lawyers normally conduct litigation, and the timing rules for filing a notice of appeal are easily understood by lawyers. The Appointed Amicus adds that the Court should not interpret the rules by assuming that litigants, including pro se litigants, will ignore the rules in place. Additionally, the Appointed Amicus argues that the procedural rule is not unfair to incarcerated litigants because the prison mailbox rule means that incarcerated litigants need only enter their filing in the prison’s mail system within the required timeframe to be considered a timely filing. Moreover, the Appointed Amicus argues that the possibility of reopening the window to file a notice of appeal is already the means by which Congress intended to balance the equities of people who did not receive a timely notice of judgment.

    Conclusion

        Andrew W. Carpenter and Domnick Q. Raimondo

          Alex Strohl

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