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Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allows parties who have agreed to arbitrate to move for a stay of trial proceedings until they have had a chance to attempt arbitration. In addition, Section 16 of the FAA allows an immediate appeal of judgments denying stay under such circumstances. At issue in this case is whether these sections of the FAA extend to non-signing parties affected by an arbitration agreement. Petitioner Arthur Andersen advised Respondent Wayne Carlisle on a business transaction. As a result of this transaction, Carlisle eventually signed a contract, to which Andersen was a not party, that contained an arbitration agreement. After a dispute developed, Andersen sought a stay in the litigation proceedings in order to arbitrate with Carlisle, despite the fact that Andersen had not signed the arbitration agreement. After Andersen appealed the initial denial of its request for a stay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Andersen's appeal because Sections 3 and 16 of the FAA only apply to signatories of arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court's decision in this case may clarify the scope of the FAA's application to non-signatories, including the availability of appellate review of denials of stays.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether the strict standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) always applies to a post-judgment request to vacate in order to file an amended complaint, or if a balancing test can be applied instead. Petitioner BLOM Bank SAL argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)’s stringent standard must apply to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint, contrary to the Second Circuit’s ruling. Respondent Honickman argues that Rule 60(b)(6)’s stringent standard need not apply to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint, because the Second Circuit’s decision to use a balancing test serves as a better standard to review the Rule. BLOM Bank SAL argues that ruling in favor of Honickman would undermine the finality of judgments by allowing post-judgment amendments under Rule 60(b)(6) too liberally. Honickman counters by arguing that ruling in BLOM Bank SAL’s favor would prevent victims of terrorism from obtaining justice, particularly in cases where new evidence emerges post-judgement.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether litigants can preserve purely legal issues for appellate review without having to raise such issues in a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. This case also asks whether a trial court’s rejection of a litigant’s motion for summary judgment as a matter of law constitutes a final judgment subject to appellate review. Petitioner Neil Dupree argues that the Court should allow the preservation for appeal of purely legal issues rejected by the trial court in summary judgment without raising them again in a Rule 50 motion, according to the principles of the final judgment rule and interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent Kevin Younger counters that the Court must require litigants to file a Rule 50 motion to preserve legal issues for appellate review because a rejection of a motion for summary judgment does not constitute an appealable final judgment. This case also has implications for judicial efficiency and economy.

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The Supreme Court will decide the scope and validity of appeal waivers balanced against a defendant’s right to file an appeal. Gilberto Garza, Jr. contends that Roe v. Flores-Ortega supports the proposition that there is a presumption of prejudice when an attorney fails to file an appeal when instructed, even if the defendant previously signed an appeal waiver and underlying plea bargain. The State of Idaho counters that Flores-Ortega does not create a blanket rule that an attorney’s failure to file prejudices a defendant because the defendant already waived their right and risks additional criminal charges in breaching their plea bargain agreement. The outcome of this case will affect States that use appeal waivers to prevent frivolous appeals in order to promote judicial efficiency and will determine whether an appeal waiver completely bars a defendant from seeking an appeal.  

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The issue in this case involves whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is a jurisdictional rule or a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. Hamer argues that the Rule is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule because it has no statutory basis, while Neighborhood Housing Services argues that the Rule is a jurisdictional rule because it prescribes the types of cases over which a court has adjudicatory authority and has a statutory basis. The case is significant from a legal perspective because it will determine whether a violation of Rule 4(a)(5)(C) strips a court of appeals of its jurisdiction to hear a case on the merits, or whether the court may still consider the case on the merits based on equitable considerations or if a party waived or forfeited its right to seek dismissal under the Rule. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because its outcome will affect the judicial system’s interest in finality and because a decision affirming the Seventh Circuit would caution against relying on the legal accuracy of orders from district court judges regarding appeals. 

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Petitioner Armarcion Henderson pled guilty in district court to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court judge gave Henderson a longer sentence than required to ensure that he could participate in a drug treatment program and Henderson did not object to the sentence. The district court denied Henderson's later motion to correct his sentence and he appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and, finding no substantial mistake by the district court, upheld the district court's sentencing. Henderson now argues that the Fifth Circuit should have reversed for plain error because, following Henderson's trial, the Supreme Court decided that judges cannot base a sentence on a defendant's rehabilitative needs.  The United States argues that because the law pertaining to sentencing was not settled at the time of his trial and the defendant did not object to his sentence, Henderson's claims do not meet the Rule 52(b) standard.  The Supreme Court's decision in this case will affect criminal defendants who use Rule 52(b) to appeal trial court decisions and will also impact judicial efficiency.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether a federal habeas petitioner must file a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”), a cross-notice of appeal, or even both before raising an argument at the court of appeals level that the district court rejected. Jennings, a prisoner on death row, asserts that he was not required to obtain a COA or a cross-notice of appeal in order to present a cross-point in support of the district court’s judgment. Stephens, the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions divisions, argues that the Fifth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear Jennings’ alternative claim because Jennings had not timely requested a COA or filed a cross-notice of appeal. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will have important consequences for habeas corpus applicants like Jennings, a death row inmate, as well as on the judicial efficiency of the courts in hearing habeas corpus appeals.

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In this case, the Supreme Court must determine whether a bankruptcy court’s denial of a debtor’s Chapter 13 reorganization plan is “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158 and thus immediately appealable by a debtor. Petitioner Louis B. Bullard argues that his Chapter 13 plan’s denial was “final” and thus appealable because the denial amounted to a court’s adjudication of a discrete issue within the bankruptcy process. In contrast, looking at an entire bankruptcy case as a “single judicial unit,” Respondent Blue Hills Bank argues that Bullard’s plan was not final and thus not appealable because Bullard’s plan was denied with leave to amend. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate practical considerations within the bankruptcy process and the appropriate balance between the bargaining power of debtors and creditors. 

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether an appellant must file a separate appeal if he wishes to challenge a restitution award that was determined after he appealed the original judgment. Manrique argues that an appeal of an original judgment should “mature” to perfect an appeal of the amended judgment. See Brief of Petitioner, Marcelo Manrique at 22. He claims that such a process would be practical and would conform to the rules of process governing criminal appeals. See id. The United States, on the other hand, contends that allowing the original appeal to mature would contradict the text and purpose of Rule 4(b)(2). See Brief for the United States at 17. The outcome of this case will determine how many appeals appellants must file in circumstances involving amended judgments.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether courts may apply equitable exceptions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)’s 14-day deadline to petition for permission to appeal. After the district court decertified the consumer class suing Nutraceutical and denied Lambert’s motion for reconsideration, Lambert filed a petition for permission to appeal under Rule 23(f) in June 2015. The Ninth Circuit held that the petition was proper because equitable exceptions applied. Nutraceutical now argues that the petition was not timely because it was filed well beyond the 14-day deadline and that equitable exceptions do not apply to Rule 23(f). Lambert contends that the petition was filed in a timely manner and that equitable exceptions make the petition proper even if the filing was not timely. This case will have implications for protecting unsophisticated litigants in class action suits as well as for judicial economy and resources.

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