Martin v. United States

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Martin v. United States

Issues

Is the United States immune to a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) when law enforcement agents raided the wrong home; and, what takes precedence in wrong-house raid cases: the government’s liability for intentional wrongdoing of law enforcement officers, or the “discretionary-function exception” in the FTCA that exempts government liability when any government employee carries out government functions that require discretion?

Oral argument:
April 29, 2025
Court below:
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

The Federal Tort Claims Act allows people to sue the United States government for wrongful acts by law enforcement officers in situations where a private person could be liable under the same circumstances. However, there are two key exceptions. The “discretionary-function exception” shields the government from lawsuits when federal employees are performing government functions. The “intentional-torts exception” also protects the government from lawsuits involving intentional torts committed by federal employees. Nevertheless, the “law enforcement proviso” within the intentional-torts exception allows people to sue for certain wrongful acts when committed by law enforcement officers specifically as opposed to other government employees. Curtrina Martin and other petitioners argue that the law enforcement proviso allows them to recover monetary damages when the FBI raided their house because their house was not the correct target. Martin also argues that the Supremacy Clause does not shield the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The United States, on the other hand, argues that the discretionary-function exception is a separate exception from the law enforcement provision and shields the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The court-appointed amici curiae also counters that the United States can raise the Supremacy Clause as a defense against liability since the government can raise any defense that a private individual could have in the case. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the legal remedies that civilians have when mistakenly identified as suspects and harmed by law enforcement officers along with the ability of law enforcement to effectively perform their duties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Constitution’s supremacy clause bars claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law; and (2) whether the discretionary-function exception is categorically inapplicable to claims arising under the law enforcement proviso to the intentional torts exception.

Facts

Curtrina Martin, her minor child G.W., and Hilliard Cliatt lived in the suburbs of Atlanta, Georgia. In 2017, the FBI executed a search warrant at their house believing it to belong to a known gang member. Despite the FBI surveying the target house, the SWAT team mistakenly conducted the raid on Martin’s house, using a flashbang grenade, handcuffing Cliatt, and pointing guns at both Martin and Cliatt. Eventually, the FBI agents realized that they were at the wrong house, apologized, and advised that the FBI would handle the damage repairs for their house.

Martin, her minor child G.W., and Cliatt filed a lawsuit in federal court in Georgia against the United States in 2019. Martin brought a Bivens claim against Special Agent Lawrence Guerra and the unidentified FBI agents who raided her home, alleging violation of her family’s Fourth Amendment rights. Martin also brought state-law claims, including negligence , false imprisonment , assault , and battery under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).

The United States government has sovereign immunity and cannot be sued unless Congress has passed a law waiving the government’s immunity to lawsuits. The FTCA allows private individuals to sue the United States for certain wrongful acts of federal employees if a private individual could be held liable under the same circumstances in the state where the acts occurred. However, the government is still immune from FTCA lawsuits in some cases. The FTCA carves out a discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a), making the federal government immune to lawsuits for state-law tort claims arising from a government official’s performance of a discretionary duty or function. The FTCA also carves out an intentional-torts exception in § 2680(h), preserving the government’s immunity in those cases. But there is an exception to the exception: the law enforcement proviso in § 2680(h) (“law enforcement clause”) allows private citizens to sue the government and waives immunity for claims involving a subset of intentional torts, such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment.

Additionally, the federal government has some protections against state law tort claims. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States prevents states from impeding the function of federal law. The United States may invoke the Supremacy Clause defense against state-tort lawsuits if there is some nexus between the government official’s acts and furthering federal policy, such as complying with the full range of federal law.

The district court ruled in Martin’s favor on the Bivens claim and state law claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress , and trespass . However, on cross-motions for reconsideration, the district court held that the Supremacy Clause barred Martin’s remaining FTCA tort claims under the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent in Kordash v. United States . The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the discretionary-function exception barred Martin’s FTCA claims. The Eleventh Circuit also found that the United States met both requirements for the Supremacy Clause bar analysis and affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Supremacy Clause barred Martin’s FTCA remaining claims.

Martin petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to hear this case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 27, 2025.

Analysis

DO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE § 2680(h) AND DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION § 2680(a) CONFLICT?

Martin contends that the discretionary-function exception does not conflict with the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso (“law enforcement clause”) because it does not apply to claims that arise under the law enforcement clause. Martin asserts that the law enforcement clause waives the government’s immunity to lawsuits for certain intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers, independently of the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a). Martin points to the language of § 2680(h), where the FTCA “shall apply” to claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment due to the act or omission of an act by a law enforcement officer: the very intentional torts that Martin is attempting to sue the government for in this case. Martin contends that this creates an exception to the exception, so even if the discretionary-function exception applies to protect the government, the law enforcement clause acts to waive the government’s immunity again. Martin also maintains that the discretionary-function exception and the law enforcement clause do not conflict because the conditions triggering the discretionary-function exception and the clause are so different from each other that the lawsuits involving the law enforcement clause do not trigger the discretionary-function exception.

On the other hand, the United States agrees that the law enforcement clause of § 2680(h) does not conflict with the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a), but argues that § 2680(a) is the exception that applies in this case. The United States asserts that the law enforcement clause in § 2680(h) only applies to the specific subsection that it appears in, and has no power over the other exceptions in § 2680. The United States points to the overarching structure of § 2680 and the phrase that appears before each the exceptions, which states that “[t]he provisions of [the FTCA] shall not apply ” if any of those exceptions are triggered. The United States contends that since this language applies independently to each of the exceptions, it does not matter whether § 2680(h) has a condition that triggers the government’s waiver of immunity and allows it to be sued; § 2680(a) independently protects the government from lawsuits. Additionally, the United States counters that the same conduct by law enforcement which triggers the clause in § 2680(h) may also trigger the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a), in which case the exception still preserves the government’s immunity to FTCA lawsuits.

IF THERE IS A CONFLICT, WHICH CONTROLS: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE § 2680(h) OR THE EXCEPTION § 2680(a)?

Martin contends that if the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a) and the law enforcement clause in § 2680(h) do conflict, § 2680(h) should prevail to waive the government’s immunity to lawsuits. Martin points to the language of the law enforcement clause in § 2680(h): “ Provided , That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply.” Martin contends that the affirmative language of “shall apply” overcomes the lead-in language at the start of § 2680 where the FTCA “shall not apply” if the exceptions in § 2680 are triggered. Martin also points to the location of the phrase “[f]or the purpose of this subsection [§ 2680(h)]” which appears after the start of the law enforcement clause, and contends that since the limiting phrase “for the purpose of” is after the introduction of the law enforcement clause which “shall apply” the FTCA, the law enforcement clause can affect other exceptions in the subsection like § 2680(a). Further, Martin notes that the law enforcement clause in § 2680(h) was enacted by Congress 28 years after the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a), so the later-enacted provision by Congress should prevail over the earlier-enacted provision. Thus, Martin maintains that the law enforcement clause in § 2680(h) should prevail over the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a) if there is a conflict between the two subsections of the Act.

On the other hand, the United States counters that regardless of whether there is a conflict, § 2680(a) should prevail to preserve the government’s immunity to lawsuits. The United States contends that since the language in § 2680(h) states it “shall apply” the FTCA to specific tort claims against law enforcement officers, but § 2680(a) does not, the power of §2680(h) to apply the FTCA and waive the government’s immunity cannot affect the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a). The United States also points to the language “for the purposes of this subsection [§ 2680(h)]” but argues that this phrase limits the reach of the definition of “law enforcement officer” to § 2680(h) since this phrase is located only in § 2680(h) and exists to provide a different definition than the one used in other parts of § 2680, such as § 2680(c). The United States argues that Congress intended to remove the barrier of the intentional torts exception § 2680(h) in holding law enforcement officers accountable for their actions resulting in tort claims – not to impact the government’s immunity to lawsuits when the actions of federal employees trigger the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a). Further, the United States counters that although a provision that was later enacted by Congress, like § 2680(h), generally takes precedence over a provision enacted earlier, this only happens if the provisions conflict in such a critical way that it requires such prioritization of one provision over another.

CAN THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE BAR CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT?

Martin contends that the Supremacy Clause cannot be used to bar claims under the FTCA. Martin argues that the FTCA incorporated state tort law into federal law, thereby making the state law requirements to sue a law enforcement officer into federal law requirements. Martin claims that as a result, Congress has the authority to waive the government’s immunity from FTCA lawsuits. Martin contends that the evidence required to overcome the Supremacy Clause bar effectively squelches many of the claims that the FTCA was meant to enable victims to bring against law enforcement officers. Martin maintains that Congress explicitly carved out a condition under which the government loses its immunity to lawsuits, so courts cannot use the Supremacy Clause to re-establish the government’s immunity and circumvent Congress’s intent in passing the FTCA.

The United States responds that the question of the Supremacy Clause and whether it bars FTCA lawsuits does not need to be addressed if the Court agrees that the discretionary-function exception applies. The court-appointed amicus curiae Christopher Mills, in support of the judgment below, argues that the analysis in determining the success of a Supremacy Clause defense is different from assessing substantive liability for FTCA claims under the discretionary-function exception. Mills contends that previous decisions by the Supreme Court have allowed private individuals to raise the Supremacy Clause as a defense to tort liability, and because the FTCA’s § 2674 specifies that the United States can raise any defense that would have been available to a private individual, the United States can use the Supremacy Clause as a defense here. Mills maintains that the application of the Supremacy Clause is based on whether the lawsuit fails on the merits under state law, so Congressional authority is respected.

Discussion

IMPACT ON CIVILIANS

The North Central Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, in support of Martin, argues that an increasing number of civilians are impacted by substantial harms, including “wrongful arrest,

detention, incarceration, and deportation,” due to law enforcement’s mistakes. The New Civil Liberties Alliance (“NCLA”), in support of Martin, highlights the difficulty that innocent civilians who have been assaulted, terrorized, detained, or even killed face when trying to hold law enforcement accountable.

Without the FTCA, NCLA contends that law enforcement officers would essentially have “blanket immunity” for any harm they commit while on duty, leaving innocent Americans without remedies. NCLA argues that no legitimate policies are advanced by protecting law enforcement from the consequences of their wrongful actions; rather, public policy favors government liability, which will incentivize the government to ensure that officers are adequately trained and motivated to exercise basic care in their work.

Conversely, Mills, in support of the judgment below, acknowledges that protecting innocent civilians against wrongful harm by law enforcement is within the public interest; however, Mills also identifies significant public interest in protecting responsible officers from “harassment” and “vindictive or ill-founded damage [law]suits.” Mills argues that FTCA lawsuits preoccupy the attention of responsible officers who would otherwise focus on serving the public. Additionally, Mills highlights that when the United States faces liability in these types of intentional tort cases, the damages that the government is required to pay out create a “financial burden” that would inevitably shift public resources away from other critical government services.

IMPACT ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

The National Police Accountability Project and The Rutherford Institute (“NPAP et al.”), in support of Martin, argue that holding law enforcement officers accountable for wrongful actions such as wrong-house raids will not discourage officers from responding to crime because the FTCA holds the United States, rather than any individual officer, liable for intentional torts claims. NPAP et al. contend that since officers face no personal liability and do not need to contribute to monetary damages awarded by the court or to settlement agreements, it is unlikely that the work of law enforcement will be chilled by FTCA actions. NPAP et al. also argue that FTCA liability provides the United States with the necessary economic and political incentives to ensure that federal law enforcement officers properly perform their duties. However, NPAP et al. assert that without any government liability for “harmful and undesirable officer action[s],” the government will have little incentive to enforce policies that reduce harmful conduct on innocent civilians.

Mills, in support of the judgment below, counters by emphasizing how the reputational damage to federal law enforcement officers from FTCA actions may chill their “fearless, vigorous, and effective administration” of law enforcement. Further, the United States emphasizes that the work of federal investigative and law enforcement officers requires a “high degree of judgment and discretion” to respond to high-pressure situations, which often requires engaging in tortious activity such as entering private buildings and using force. , Without the application of the discretionary-function exception, the United States asserts that officers would be wrongly charged like private individuals while performing their duties, which will undermine their ability to engage in essential law enforcement activity, including performing arrests, searches, and seizures.

Conclusion

Esther In and Alexandra “Lexie” Kapilian

Sarah Stevenson-Peck

Additional Resources