Federal Tort Claims Act

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a judgment against the plaintiff on a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim, alleging violations under state tort law, bars the plaintiff from pursuing a constitutional remedy under Bivens. Petitioner Douglas Brownback contends that the district court’s dismissal of Respondent James King’s FTCA claims on the basis of his failure to establish the elements of Section 1346(b) constitutes a final judgment on the merits of all claims pertaining to the same subject matter. Brownback argues that consistent with the purpose of the statute, Section 2676 of the FTCA bars King from pursuing his Bivens action. King counters that the judgment bar should be interpreted to incorporate the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes subsequent claims only if a court with jurisdiction has entered a judgment on the merits. King argues that since no such jurisdiction exists over the claims in this case, his Bivens action should not be barred. The outcome of this case has significant implications for plaintiffs’ access to courts and the avenues for relief plaintiffs may pursue to hold government officials accountable for state tort and constitutional violations.    

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Petitioner Barbara Dolan sustained serious injuries when she tripped over a stack of letters, packages, and other mail that an employee of the United States Postal Service left on her porch. She sued the United States Postal Service and the United States in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the United States Postal Service employee's negligence that led to her fall made them responsible for her injuries. The district court dismissed Dolan's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that the "negligent transmission" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act barred claims for physical injury, as well as those for damaged or delayed mail. In granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court must determine the scope of the statutory exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and whether it truly extends to "any claim" arising out of negligent transmission, including those for physical injury to individuals, or whether it is limited to claims for damaged mail.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a federal military contractor can be sued on state-law tort claims provided that the contractor breached its contract and violated military orders. Winston Hencely, a veteran who was injured in a suicide bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, argues that Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, which created federal military contractor immunity, does not apply in such circumstances, and that Boyle’s reasoning should not be extended to apply in such circumstances. Fluor Corporation counters that the federal interests at stake in bold military operations require broad immunity for military contractors. The outcome of this case will determine the scope of military contractors’ liability and the Supreme Court’s willingness to rely upon and expand doctrines made by courts rather than Congress. This case will also impact future military safety and defense contracting.

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This case involves a lawsuit brought by the estate of decedent, Mr. Castaneda, against two Public Health Service (“PHS”) officials (collectively, the “Petitioners”) for failing to provide proper medical care to Mr. Castaneda during his custody in a state immigration facility. Mr. Castaneda had a growing, fungating lesion on his penis but was denied a simple skin biopsy from PHS officials. Consequently, Mr. Castaneda died of penile cancer at the age of 36. At issue here is whether the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (“FTCA”), providing that federal employees are not protected from constitutional tort claims, extends to 422 U.S.C. § 233(a) of the Emergency Health Personnel Act, which covers PHS officials. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case may significantly affect the extent to which prisoners may seek recourse if denied constitutionally guaranteed access to adequate medical care while under state custody. This case may also affect public health personnel: while a decision for Respondents may discourage federal employees from committing constitutional violations, it may also negatively impact employment.

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Steven A. Levin sued his military doctor and the United States for medical malpractice and medical battery for a procedure performed at the United States Naval Hospital in Guam. The United States substituted itself for the military doctor and claimed that they had sovereign immunity which barred the claim under the Gonzalez Act. Levin argues that the Gonzalez Act only removes liability from armed services medical personnel and does not create an immunity that would remove any possibility for recovery in medical battery suits against armed forces medical personnel. The United States contends that no waiver of sovereign immunity exists unless a statute’s explicit language creates a waiver. The lower courts dismissed Levin's case by stating that the United States' sovereign immunity did apply under the Gonzalez Act, therefore barring this case from continuing. Levin contends that to bar his claim because of sovereign immunity would be to prevent patients injured by military medical personnel from having an opportunity to recover for the pain and suffering caused by the medical mistake. The United States argues that to find an implied waiver of sovereign immunity in the Gonzalez Act would overturn the Supreme Court's long-standing precedent regarding waivers of sovereign immunity and create questions about when sovereign immunity is waived. 

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The Federal Tort Claims Act allows people to sue the United States government for wrongful acts by law enforcement officers in situations where a private person could be liable under the same circumstances. However, there are two key exceptions. The “discretionary-function exception” shields the government from lawsuits when federal employees are performing government functions. The “intentional-torts exception” also protects the government from lawsuits involving intentional torts committed by federal employees. Nevertheless, the “law enforcement proviso” within the intentional-torts exception allows people to sue for certain wrongful acts when committed by law enforcement officers specifically as opposed to other government employees. Curtrina Martin and other petitioners argue that the law enforcement proviso allows them to recover monetary damages when the FBI raided their house because their house was not the correct target. Martin also argues that the Supremacy Clause does not shield the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The United States, on the other hand, argues that the discretionary-function exception is a separate exception from the law enforcement provision and shields the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The court-appointed amici curiae also counters that the United States can raise the Supremacy Clause as a defense against liability since the government can raise any defense that a private individual could have in the case. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the legal remedies that civilians have when mistakenly identified as suspects and harmed by law enforcement officers along with the ability of law enforcement to effectively perform their duties. 

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Kim Millbrook, a federal inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for the alleged sexual assault and battery he suffered from three correctional officers at the prison. The important issue in the case is how to understand the sovereign immunity provisions of the FTCA, and when federal correctional officers can be sued for their tortious conduct. Millbrook contends that while the FTCA generally provides sovereign immunity to the Government for torts committed by their employees while at work, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for specific intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers during the scope of the officers’ employment. The Third Circuit has limited this waiver of sovereign immunity to instances where the enforcement agent is executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest for violations of federal law. The Supreme Court will resolve a circuit split over how narrowly the waiver of sovereign immunity should be read. How the Court decides this case will determine when a federal correctional officer can be sued for his tortious conduct, and has significant implications for the protection of vulnerable prisoners against assault and abuse.

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Walter Himmelreich brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) suit against the United States during his federal prison sentence in 2010. The suit was subsequently dismissed under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception. The exception states that courts do not have jurisdiction over claims “based upon the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or [a government] employee.” Himmelreich later brought suit against prison officials, alleging various constitutional violations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision to dismiss that complaint on the basis of the FTCA's judgment bar, which the district court determined barred plaintiffs from bringing claims against government employees that had previously received judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a dismissal under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception in Section 2680 is a “judgment” that would bar future claims under the FTCA’s judgment bar. Simmons argues that a dismissal on the grounds of the discretionary-function exception constitutes a judgment, and that the judgment bar should apply. Himmelreich argues that a dismissal on the grounds of the discretionary-function exception has no claim-preclusive effect and thus fails to trigger the judgment bar. The decision in this case will clarify the proper scope of the FTCA's judgment bar and may impact government employees’ exposure to liability.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of a federal agency’s sovereign immunity to private lawsuits. The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), while attempting to raise a submerged power line in the river, injured Gary Thacker, who was participating in a fishing tournament. In their lawsuit against the TVA, Gary Thacker and his wife, Venida Thacker, contend that the TVA is not immune to their negligence claim because the TVA is not entitled to a discretionary-function exception—which immunizes a federal agency from private claims that arise from any of its discretionary governmental functions—and, therefore, the TVA may be sued under its statute’s sue-or-to-be-sued clause. The TVA counters that, pursuant to separation-of-powers principles, the TVA Act in fact implies a discretionary-function exception, and, even if it does not, the Suits in Admiralty Act, which indisputably has a discretionary-function exception, would apply and thus immunize the TVA from the Thackers’ suit. At stake here is the balance between a private citizen’s right to sue and the extent that sovereign immunity covers discretionary decisions of administrators and legislators.

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