Little v. Hecox

    Issues

    Do laws that limit participation in women’s and girls’ sports to biological females violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment?

    Oral argument:
    January 13, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether laws that limit participation in women’s and girls’ sports to biological females violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Petitioner Bradley Little, the Governor of Idaho, argues that the prohibition on males participating in women’s sports does not violate equal protection because it is substantially related to the important state interest of promoting women’s equality in athletics. Respondent Lindsay Hecox counters that the prohibition violates equal protection by discriminating against a quasi-suspect classification of transgender people. Moreover, Hecox argues the prohibition is not substantially related to the government’s interest in fair athletic competitions. The outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for participation in women’s sports and the ongoing interpretation of gender discrimination law.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether laws that seek to protect women's and girls' sports by limiting participation to women and girls based on sex violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

    Facts

    In March 2020, Idaho categorically banned transgender women’s and girls’ participation in women’s student athletics with the enactment of the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act (“FWSA”).  The FWSA mandates that all school-sponsored athletic teams, unless coed, must be exclusive to men or women.The FWSA specifies that athletic teams for women and girls cannot include biological males but does not similarly restrict men’s teams from excluding biological females. Additionally, when a student’s biological sex is disputed, the FWSA requires students to provide a health examination or a statement signed by the student’s physician verifying the student’s sex. The FWSA limits the bases for any sex verification statement to “reproductive anatomy, genetic makeup, or normal endogenously produced testosterone levels.”Finally, the FWSA creates a private cause of action for any student harmed by violations of the act. Prior to the FWSA’s passage, state athletic associations allowed transgender girls in grades 9–12 to compete on girls’ athletic teams if they had completed at least one year of testosterone suppression therapy.

    On April 15, 2020, a transgender woman and a cisgender woman sued Governor Bradley Little and other state officials (“Little”) for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman who wanted to try out for Boise State University women’s athletic teams, and Jane Doe, a cisgender woman who feared her sex would be disputed given her masculine appearance, argued that the FWSA violates both Title IX and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted Hecox and Doe a preliminary injunction for their equal protection claims in August 2020, blocking Little from enforcing the FWSA during the pendency of the lawsuit.Little appealed the injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but the case was remanded to the district court for further factual findings on June 24, 2021.

    On June 7, 2024, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as applied to Hecox, vacated the preliminary injunction as applied to others, including Jane Doe, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the scope of the injunction. Although the court acknowledged that excluding transgender women from women’s sports denies transgender youth equal educational benefits, such as personal and social enrichment, the court declined to address whether any possible restriction on transgender participation in sports violates equal protection. However, the court found that Hecox had a likelihood of success on equal protection grounds, concluding that the FWSA discriminates based on transgender status and does not survive the “demanding standard” of intermediate scrutiny. The court also found the injunction proper because exclusion from college sports constitutes harm.  The court found Little would not suffer comparable harm.

    On July 11, 2024, Little appealed the injunction and petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which was granted on July 3, 2025.  Subsequently, on September 2, 2025, Hecox filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with the district court and a Suggestion of Mootness with the Supreme Court. 

    Analysis

    MOOTNESS

    Petitioner Bradley Little argues that the case was not rendered moot by Hecox’s motion for voluntary dismissal.  Little asserts that because the district court issued a stay of proceedings pending appeal to the Supreme Court, the motion to dismiss is void. Little points out that Hecox could resume participation in women’s sports and therefore retains an interest in the case. Further, Little asserts that because the circuit court ruled in Hecox’s favor, the precedent created from its decision would prevent Idaho from enforcing the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act (“FWSA”) even if this case is vacated. Therefore, Little maintains that the Court can find the FWSA constitutional and allow Idaho to enforce it. Little argues that the Court should be especially critical of Hecox’s mootness claims because they were raised after the grant of certiorari. Little claims that allowing Hecox and Doe to assert post-certiorari mootness provides an avenue to manipulate the Court’s jurisdiction to avoid an unfavorable decision.

    Respondents Lindsay Hecox and Jane Doe (“Hecox”) argue that the case is moot and the Court therefore lacks the Article III jurisdiction required to reach a decision on the merits.  Hecox contends that it is irrelevant to Article III whether Hecox’s motion to dismiss is immediately effective; rather, a case becomes moot when a party no longer has a stake in the outcome.  Hecox explains that she permanently quit participating in sports and swears to abandon all present and future claims regarding the FWSA.Hecox claims that, even if she resumed participating in sports, she would be bound by her commitment to never challenge the FWSA again.Further, Hecox reasons that she gains no advantage from abandoning her claims because the favorable circuit court decision must be vacated, depriving the decision of any precedential authority. Hecox emphasizes that Little’s interests can be addressed by the Court in West Virginia v. B.P.J., leaving no reason to reach those interests in this case. Hecox notes that Jane Doe’s claims were also mooted because, during the pendency of the suit, she graduated from high school and chose to attend college in another state. 

    SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATION

    Little acknowledges that, by making women’s teams sex-exclusive but not doing the same for men’s teams, the FWSA classifies based on sex and is subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, Little argues that FWSA’s sex-based classification is substantially related to the purpose of promoting equal opportunity for women in sports.Little reasons that, because sex-based classification is permissible when promoting equal opportunities for women, the FWSA’s goal is an important state interest. Further, Little claims that limiting participation in women’s sports based on specified sex characteristics is substantially related to the FWSA’s important interest in promoting equality. Little explains that the FWSA addresses biological differences that provide male athletes with an inherent advantage over female athletes in nearly every sport. Little provides examples of advantages resulting from male puberty, including higher testosterone levels, larger hearts, and greater bone density and lung volume. Little denies that these advantages are mitigated by using puberty blockers or hormone replacement therapy. Thus, Little asserts that making women’s teams exclusionary to females serves to equalize athletic opportunities between the sexes.Little notes that the same reasons do not exist for excluding women from men’s teams. Additionally, Little argues that the court should reject the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to include gender identity under the concept of sex in Equal Protection jurisprudence. Little contends that sex and gender identity are distinct concepts because sex is an objective and inherent biological fact, while gender identity is subjective and can be fluid.

    Hecox responds that the FWSA’s sex-based classification does not automatically satisfy intermediate scrutiny because of its alleged basis on the biological differences between the sexes. , Hecox challenges that, prior to the FWSA, cisgender men were already prohibited from playing on women’s teams, so the FWSA only effectively excluded transgender women.Hecox asserts that the FWSA’s legislative findings regarding the inherent biological advantages of male athletes do not imply that all transgender women possess those same advantages. Specifically, Hecox finds the scientific evidence in the record addressing transgender women with testosterone levels within the natural range for cisgender women lacking.Hecox points out that the expert report that Little relies on for the claim that medical treatments do not substantially decrease any prior biological advantages was not provided to the district court. Further, Hecox explains that the extra-record report directly contradicts the findings of the district court, despite Little not formally challenging the lower court’s findings in their Petition.Hecox argues that the Court cannot consider the extra-record evidence and therefore the FWSA must fail intermediate scrutiny. Hecox reasons that, because Little cannot prove that transgender women have an inherent advantage regardless of hormone levels, the FWSA’s sex-based classification is overbroad and not substantially related to equality in sports.

    DISCRIMINATION BASED ON TRANSGENDER STATUS

    Little argues that transgender status is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  First, Little objects that transgender status is neither obvious to third parties nor immutable because gender identity is subjective and fluid.Little points out that the Court refused to recognize poverty or immigration status as suspect classes for similar reasons.Second, Little denies that transgender people are a discrete group defined by a consistent characteristic. Little reasons that transgender status does not have a defining characteristic because of the variety of gender identities and the fact that some transgender people do not medically transition or conform to traditional gender norms. Third, Little asserts that transgender people were not historically subject to widespread de jure discrimination that would require extraordinary legal protections to counteract. Lastly, Little insists that transgender people are not politically powerless because some states prohibit gender-identity-based discrimination, and the Biden Administration recognized Transgender Day of Visibility. Little also points to examples of transgender public figures as proof that transgender people have social and political capital.

    Little maintains that, even if transgender status is a suspect classification, the FWSA does not indirectly discriminate on that basis and survives intermediate scrutiny. Little reasons that discrimination based on transgender status requires differential treatment because of gender identity. Little asserts that the FWSA classifies based on sex alone and therefore does not treat transgender people of either sex differently from cisgender people of the same sex.Further, Little claims that the legislature did not pass the FWSA to target transgender women; it merely intended to protect female athletes participating in women’s sports. Little contends that the disparate impact on transgender women was merely a consequence of the legitimate goal of protecting women’s sports.Little explains that the legislative history focused on transgender women because cisgender men were already categorically excluded from women’s sports.Little argues that the FWSA’s definition of sex should not be subject to heightened scrutiny because the purpose of scrutiny is to ensure the government has appropriate reasons for a classification, not to question how the government defines the classification being used.Therefore, Little concludes that the FWSA’s definition of sex should be analyzed under rational basis review, which it will pass because the legislature had plausible reasons to define sex based on anatomy, genetics, and natural hormone levels.

    Hecox responds that transgender status is a quasi-suspect classification because transgender people as a class fit the criteria used to identify quasi-suspect classes: (1) historic discrimination, (2) a defining characteristic unrelated to the ability to contribute to society, (3) distinguishing characteristics that make the class a discrete group, and (4) lack of political power.  Hecox first explains that transgender people faced discrimination by laws that considered transgender status degenerate or defective, such as eugenic sterilization laws. Second, Hecox asserts that transgender status has no effect on an individual’s ability to contribute to society. Third, Hecox argues that transgender people make up approximately one percent of the population and share the defining characteristic of not identifying with their assigned gender or sex.Hecox disputes the requirement that suspect classifications be immutable from birth or obvious to third parties because illegitimacy, religion, and alienage are recognized suspect classifications that contradict those premises.Fourth, Hecox maintains that transgender people have not had the ability to “meaningfully vindicate their rights through the political process,” evidenced by the amount of recent legislation introduced to limit transgender rights. Hecox asserts that a handful of transgender individuals having political influence and the existence of some favorable policies do not show that transgender individuals as a class have political power.

    Hecox argues that the FWSA classifies based on transgender status by defining biological sex in a manner intended to categorically exclude transgender women. Hecox explains that including circulating testosterone levels as a permissible criterion for sex determination would have allowed some transgender women to compete on women’s teams. Prior to the FWSA, Hecox points out, Idaho did allow transgender women to participate in women’s sports based on their testosterone levels. Hecox observes that the legislature explicitly justified its choice to define sex without reference to circulating hormone levels by referencing the goal of excluding “transgender individuals.” Hecox concludes that the Idaho legislature passed the FWSA because of its discrimination against transgender women rather than despite it.Hecox insists that the FWSA cannot survive intermediate scrutiny because excluding all transgender women is not substantially related to promoting equal opportunities for women in sports. Hecox points out that despite claiming to alleviate unfairness rooted in biological advantages, the FWSA does not permit the consideration of current testosterone levels, which are more determinative of whether transgender women retain advantages than any other factors. Hecox maintains that the FWSA does not vindicate fairness for women and instead only serves to deprive transgender women of the opportunity to compete.

    Discussion

    FAIRNESS AND SAFETY IN WOMEN’S SPORTS

    The American College of Pediatricians, in support of Little, argues that there are material, sex-based differences between biological males and females in athletics. The American College of Pediatricians elaborates that males perform better across a variety of athletic performance metrics, and testosterone suppression does not counteract these advantages. Building on this concern, a group of 124 female athletes, including thirty-one Olympians, (“thirty-one Olympians”) assert that females are uniquely harmed when forced to compete against biological males.  Thirty-one Olympians emphasize that because males experience significant physical advantages, competitions against biological males create unfair and humiliating athletic competitions for females. According to True Blue Sapphires, organizations exclusively for biological females provide distinct benefits from coed organizations, including instilling greater confidence, shaping positive educational outcomes, and debunking gender stereotypes.  Citing interests in bodily privacy and preventing sexual harassment, Pennsylvania School Board Directors maintain that sex-based athletic facilities are necessary for safety.  Additionally, Women’s Liberation Front agrees that allowing transgender women in women-only spaces leads to sexual assault and harassment. 

    The Information Society Project, in support of Hecox, counters that there is insufficient data to support the contention that males have a “substantial and consistent biological advantage” over females in athletics.  Ten coaches, teammates, competitors, and allies of transgender athletes add that, in their experience, transgender women do not foreclose biological females from fair competitive opportunities or physical safety.  Instead, the American Psychological Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy claim that excluding transgender youth from sports and the socialization that comes with athletics jeopardizes their health and safety, increasing the risk of mental health challenges and suicidality.  Safety concerns surface when limiting transgender sports participation, according to 130 members of Congress, who contend that sex verification enables harassment by subjecting all players in women’s athletics to invasive investigations and bullying.  Additionally, twenty-seven individual athletes in professional, Olympic, and international women’s sports argue that excluding transgender youth from sports harms all athletes by damaging team morale and depriving teams of contributions from transgender teammates.  

    INTERPRETING TITLE IX AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

    Liberty Counsel, in support of Little, argues that interpreting Title IX as requiring transgender participation in women’s sports contradicts Title IX’s express goal of equal educational and athletic opportunities.  Women’s Declaration International USA adds that Title IX explicitly permits sex separation under circumstances such as housing facilities, locker rooms, scholarships, and sports teams.  Furthermore, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops claims that separating sports teams by sex is consistent with equal protection because these classifications do not stem from irrationality and bigotry, but instead from legitimate concerns over fairness and helping transgender individuals accept their sex.  Finally, the Equal Protection Project posits that contested theories of gender identity are a weak foundation for constitutional law because they undermine consistent and neutral legal adjudication. 

    National Women’s Law Center, in support of Hecox, counters that Title IX carries a broad mandate to eradicate any form of sex discrimination in education, such as the exclusion of transgender women from athletics.  Seventeen scholars of equal opportunity and antidiscrimination law elaborate that permitting transgender participation in sports is the only way to comply with Title IX’s requirement of “reasonable” protection for equal athletic opportunities.  For equal protection purposes, thirteen scholars of constitutional law maintain that defining sex as an immutable trait risks shielding discrimination against transgender people from heightened scrutiny.  Finally, the Constitutional Accountability Center expands that the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment support a broad interpretation that protects individuals from any form of state-sanctioned discrimination, including exclusion from sports. 

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    V. Carter and Olivia Hussey

    Edited by:      Sara Fischer

    Additional Resources