equal protection

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The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely clarify the extent that state redistricting plans may take race into consideration when trying to comply with the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic Conference allege that Alabama’s 2012 redistricting plan impermissibly focused on race in drawing new district lines. Alabama responds that the 2012 redistricting plan’s primary motivations were compliance with the Constitution’s requirement of “one person, one vote” and prevention of retrogression under the Voting Rights Act. The resolution of this case will likely address the role courts play in policing redistricting plans enacted by state legislatures.

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The Supreme Court will resolve whether a local taxing authority violated the Equal Protection Clause when it forgave the outstanding debt of taxpayers who elected to pay a special assessment over the course of several years while refusing to refund similarly situated taxpayers who paid in full. The Indiana Supreme Court determined that Indianapolis did not violate the Equal Protection Clause despite the large disparity in tax obligations of identically situated taxpayers. Petitioners Christine Armour and other taxpayers argue that where a state has made a determination to treat a group of properties as the same class, it must treat the taxpayers of those properties with rough equality. They assert that forgiving the outstanding debt of some taxpayers without issuing refunds to those who made a single full payment violates the Equal Protection Clause. Respondent City of Indianapolis maintains that the differing treatment is based on legitimate governmental interests and is constitutionally valid.

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This case consolidates three lawsuits, together claiming that the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) policy is unlawful. Before the Supreme Court, DHS argues that the DACA rescission is unreviewable agency action, that it complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) requirements, and that DACA is unlawful. In response, various states, individual DACA recipients, and organizations argue that DHS did not consider all data, failed to offer a sufficient justification for its decision, and improperly relied on the conclusion that DACA was unlawful. The case’s outcome will have important implications for the hundreds of thousands of current DACA recipients and their communities, immigration enforcement policies, and the economy.

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Under what is known as the class-of-one theory, an individual plaintiff can bring an Equal Protection claim against a state actor for "irrational and wholly arbitrary treatment." The person is a "class-of-one" when she alleges that the government is subjecting only her to differing and unique treatment compared to others similarly situated. This differs from a traditional Equal Protection claim, in which a person alleges discriminatory acts by the government against an entire group of people treated differently because of a protected characteristic like race. Anup Engquist brought such a claim against her employer, the Oregon Department of Agriculture, alleging that it arbitrarily failed to promote her to a position for which she was qualified, allowed a supervisor with whom she had an acrimonious relationship to harass and degrade her, and eventually laid her off. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in overturning the District Court that found in her favor on the Equal Protection claim, held that the class-of-one theory is inapplicable to decisions made by state employers with regard to their employment decisions. Engquist has appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no basis in the Equal Protection Clause for a limitation on class-of-one claims in the employment context. The Oregon Department of Agriculture and the Ninth Circuit assert that class-of-one cases are appropriate when the government is acting as regulator, but not as employer.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the extent to which there is “room for play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, namely the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. While the Free Exercise Clause forbids the government from burdening religious practice, the Establishment Clause forbids the government from advancing it. But in some instances, the government may operate in the sphere of religion—what is known as the “room for play between the joints”—without running afoul of either provision. Article X, Section 6(1) of the Montana Constitution excludes religious entities from participating in some generally applicable funding programs. In drafting the provision, legislators sought to erect a greater barrier between church and state. However, the provision may also have unduly burdened religious practice. Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson, and Jaime Schaefer—mothers who wish to use state-administered scholarship funds to send their children to religious schools—argue that Article X, Section 6(1) violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by forbidding scholarship recipients from using the funds to cover tuition expenses at religiously-affiliated schools. The Montana Department of Revenue counters that Article X, Section 6(1) does not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the Equal Protection Clause and does not create hostility toward religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Department contends that Article X, Section 6(1) creates a greater barrier between church and state. The outcome of this case will impact other religious entities’ ability to participate in government benefit programs, and it will impact the national debate over school choice programs.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one-person, one-vote” principle requires states to apportion eligible voters equally across districts. See Reply Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 2. The Texas Constitution requires that the State legislature reapportion its legislative districts after each federal decennial census. See Evenwel et al. v. Perry et al., 14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, at 2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). In 2013, Texas adopted a new redistricting plan (“Plan S172”). See id. at 2. Texas drew its senatorial districts based only on total population. See id. at 2–3. Sue Evenwel is a registered Texas voter. See id. at 2. Evenwel argues that the one-person,  one-vote  principle requires states to divide their districts so that they each comprise a substantially equal number of eligible voters. See Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 19. Texas Governor Greg Abbott contends that the Constitution does not require states to utilize any specific measure, and thus they are free to equalize districts on the basis of total population. See Brief for Appellees, Greg Abbott et al. at 43–44. The Court’s decision could affect the voting power of eligible voters, and the method and amount of data collection states must engage in to constitutionally apportion voting districts.  

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Petitioner Abigail Fisher, a white Texan, was denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the Fall 2008 entering class. Fisher sued the university, arguing that the denial violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because she was denied admission to the public university in favor of minority applicants with lesser credentials. Fisher contends that the university’s admission policy cannot survive strict scrutiny as required by Grutter v. Bollinger. The university argues that its admissions policy is essentially identical to the policy upheld in Grutter. It asserts that its use of a holistic admissions process, considering race as one factor for admission, creates a diverse student body that benefits the entire university. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine Grutter, and it will have far-reaching implications for university admissions policies and racial demographics in schools throughout the United States.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”)’s admissions policy, which considers race, is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abigail Fisher applied to UT for admission to its 2008 freshman class. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, et al., 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). As part of its admission process, UT  computes  and considers Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”) Scores, which include various personal characteristics of applicants, including their race. UT does not assign a numerical score or value to the elements of an applicant’s PAI. See id. at 638. Ultimately, UT denied Fisher admission based on her PAI scores, and Fisher would not have received a seat in the 2008 class, even with a perfect PAI score, regardless of race. See id. at 639. In Fisher I, Fisher alleged that UT’s admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded that case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, so the appeals court could consider whether UT’s admission policy survives strict scrutiny under Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). The Fifth Circuit held that the policy did survive strict scrutiny. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Fisher argues that UT’s pursuit of intra-racial diversity is not a clearly articulated compelling government interest, and its admissions scheme is not narrowly tailored to achieving that interest. See Brief for Petitioner, Abigail Noel Fisher at 25, 30, 38. UT argues that the Court has already held that a university’s interest in diversity is  compelling,  and that UT’s admissions policy is narrowly  tailored,  because race-neutral approaches are insufficient to achieve its interest. See Brief for Respondents, University of Texas at Austin, et al. at 25, 40, 42. The outcome of this case will affect the admissions schemes and racial demographics of universities. 

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After his conviction for importing marijuana in 1997, Ruben Flores-Villar was deported to Mexico. Flores-Villar subsequently reentered the United States on several occasions, leading to his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 for being a deported alien found in the United States. Flores-Villar was born in Mexico, out of wedlock, to a United States citizen father and foreign mother. Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409, United States citizen fathers of non-marital children born abroad may only transmit United States citizenship if the father had resided in the United States continuously for at least five years after age fourteen. On the other hand, United States citizen mothers with foreign-born non-marital children are only required to have one year residence in the United States to transmit citizenship. Flores-Villar challenged his Section 1325 conviction on the grounds that the differential residency requirements of 1401 and 1409 make an impermissible classification based on gender that resulted in his alien status. The appeals court affirmed Flores-Villar's conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the gender-based differentiation in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409 is constitutionally permissible.

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