Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

    Issues

    Can a federal district court use its equitable powers to set aside the thirty-day time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for defendants removing a case to federal court?

    Oral argument:
    February 24, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a federal district court can set aside the thirty-day time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for removing a case from state court to federal court. Enbridge Energy, LP, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (“Enbridge”) contend that the law is non-jurisdictional, and therefore, courts may set the time limit aside. Additionally, Enbridge argues that when the statute was enacted, Congress did not rebut the general presumption in favor of equitable tolling. The Attorney General of Michigan (“the Attorney General”) asserts that the time limit is mandatory. The Attorney General further argues that Congress did rebut the presumption of equitable tolling through the law’s text, the broader statutory scheme, and legislative history. This case directly impacts fairness to litigants across the United States as well as institutional stability in foreign affairs.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

    Facts

    Enbridge Energy, LP, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (“Enbridge”) collectively are an energy company responsible for transporting petroleum to oil refineries throughout the United States and Canada. Enbridge owns and operates petroleum pipelines, including the Line 5 Pipeline, which runs from Wisconsin into Canada through Michigan’s Straits of Mackinac.

    In June 2019, however, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel (“the Attorney General”) sought to enjoin Enbridge’s continued operation of Line 5 in Michigan’s 30th Circuit Court. The Attorney General alleged that Enbridge violated three state laws. Enbridge responded to the Attorney General’s lawsuit by arguing that federal law overrides her office’s state claims.

    In June 2020, the Attorney General asked the state court to temporarily stop Line 5’s operation while the litigation was pending. The Attorney General cited concerns about the risk of the Line rupturing, causing an oil spill. The court granted the Attorney General’s request and ordered Enbridge to halt Line 5 operations, allowing Enbridge to reopen once it satisfied federal safety regulations. In November 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer (“the Governor”) ordered Enbridge to cease Line 5 operations in Michigan by May 2021. The Governor then filed a lawsuit similar to the Attorney General’s in Michigan’s 30th Circuit. The Attorney General’s lawsuit against Enbridge continued in state court, although it was held in abeyance while the other suit moved forward. Enbridge removed the Governor’s lawsuit to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, and when the federal district court refused to remand the case back to the state court upon the Governor’s motion, the Governor moved to dismiss her suit.  

    On December 15, 2021, 887 days after Enbridge received the Attorney General’s complaint, Enbridge removed the Attorney General’s case from state court to the federal district court. Enbridge made two arguments in support of this removal. First, Enbridge argued the district court had already denied the Governor’s motion to remand a very similar case to state court. Second, Enbridge contended that federal law 28 USC § 1446(b)(3) gave defendants thirty days to remove a case to federal court after they “may… ascertain[] that the case is or has become removable.” Enbridge claimed that it could not have known it could remove this case to federal court until the district court denied the Governor’s motion to remand her lawsuit to state court.

    In January 2022, the Attorney General moved to remand the case back to state court, arguing that Enbridge untimely removed the case to district court under  and that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the Attorney General’s motion, holding that equitable principles excused Enbridge’s delayed motion to remove. The Attorney General appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit held that Enbridge could not remove the Attorney General’s case to the federal district court because Enbridge was more than two years late in removal and had not shown any statutory exceptions that applied to this rule.

    Enbridge petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted on June 30, 2025. 

    Analysis

    NON-JURISDICTIONAL RULES

    Enbridge argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is not jurisdictional—meaning that the statute does not touch on the court’s adjudicatory authority to hear a case—but names the procedural requirements for the defendant. Enbridge contends that a non-jurisdictional rule supports a finding that courts maintain the power to waive procedural defects. Enbridge asserts that for the Court to find a filing deadline—like the one in § 1446(b)(1)—jurisdictional, Congress must clearly state so within the law’s plain text. Enbridge points out that § 1446(b)(1) does not contain any jurisdictional terms and that the Court has treated similarly worded statutes as non-jurisdictional. Enbridge states that because Congress included the thirty-day time limit under the portion of the statute titled “Procedure for removal of civil actions,” this supports the notion that the filing deadline for removal is procedural instead of jurisdictional. Enbridge also points to a line of cases that interpret the “predecessor statute” of § 1446(b) as non-jurisdictional. Moreover, Enbridge cites language from a prior decision by the Court in which the Court referred to removal under § 1446(b) as a “nonjurisdictional argument.” Therefore, Enbridge contends, because courts retain jurisdictional authority, courts can equitably toll the thirty-day time limit for removal in § 1446(b)(1).

    The Attorney General counters that while § 1446(b)(1) is non-jurisdictional, that does not mean that the statute can be equitably tolled. Instead, the Attorney General argues that determining whether § 1446(b)(1) allows for equitable tolling requires examining congressional intent. The Attorney General contends that Congress did not design § 1446 as a statute of limitations and that the statute does not function as a statute of limitations. The Attorney General notes that while statutes of limitations foreclose the opportunity to litigate otherwise meritorious cases, the thirty-day time limit in § 1446(b)(1) does not operate as such because the thirty-day clock, among other things, does not start running when the event giving rise to the cause of action occurs. The Attorney General also asserts that, because removal statutes expressly involve transferring jurisdiction of cases from state courts to federal courts, the Court strictly construes removal statutes within the confines of their plain language. As such, the Attorney General suggests that Congress did not intend to encroach on state power with the removal statute. The Attorney General accordingly notes that Congress intended a strict interpretation of the thirty-day time limit without equitable tolling.

    A PRESUMPTION OF EQUITABLE TOLLING

    Enbridge suggests that the statute’s language is silent on a federal court’s equitable authority, so the common law rule that allows federal courts to exercise this equitable power applies. Enbridge contends the presumption in favor of equitable tolling can only be overcome by clear evidence that Congress intended to prevent equitable tolling. Enbridge looks first to the plain text of § 1446(b) for support. Specifically, because the statute does not explicitly bar equitable tolling, Enbridge contends this favors the presumption that equitable tolling is allowed under the plain language of the law. Enbridge further notes that while the defendant “shall… file”—invoking mandatory language—within a certain timeframe, the Court has allowed equitable tolling when it has interpreted similar statutes with similar language. Enbridge also points to the thirty-day time limit itself for support, noting that the filing deadline provides a very narrow window of opportunity for parties. Enbridge asserts that in cases where the Court has precluded equitable tolling of a statute, the window has been much broader, such as twelve years. Enbridge also analogized this case to one in which the Court considered a statute containing similar language to § 1446(b). The statute in that case, Enbridge remarks, also contained an exception to the deadline, which Enbridge contends the Attorney General argues decides the matter against equitable tolling. Yet, Enbridge counters, the Court allowed equitable tolling in that case. More broadly, Enbridge argues that the statutory scheme is consistent with equitable tolling. Enbridge points out that 28 U.S.C. § 1447 requires a court to remand a case back to state court when there is no subject matter jurisdiction, but not when there are procedural defects. Thus, because the issue here concerns a procedural issue and not a subject matter jurisdiction issue, Enbridge suggests that the statutory scheme implicitly supports a district court retaining the equitable tolling power in these cases.

    The Attorney General responds by arguing that any presumption of equitable tolling in § 1446(b)(1) is rebutted by the statute’s plain text. According to the Attorney General, § 1446(b)(1) sets a clear deadline with the words “shall be filed within 30 days.” The Attorney General contends a straightforward reading of the statute requires a court to apply this strict deadline. The Attorney General claims that statutory headings instruct courts in how to interpret a statute, noting that § 1446’s heading says “Requirements; Generally.” Therefore, the Attorney General argues that because the definition of “requirement” does not allow for deviation of all that falls under its heading, any presumption that a court has the power to equitably toll § 1446(b)(1) is rebutted by the plain text of the statute. The Attorney General also contends that the removal statute includes explicit exceptions to the thirty-day time limit, such as beginning the time limit from the day the last defendant was served in the case of multiple defendants. The Attorney General notes that equitable tolling is not included in these listed exceptions, blocking off any implication of an additional equitable tolling power. The Attorney General interprets the Court as previously holding that applying equitable tolling when enumerated exceptions are present contradicts the statute’s text. The Attorney General also points out that the listed exceptions in § 1446(b) include a variety of concerns that equitable tolling would resolve, so the Attorney General argues Congress must have considered and limited equitable tolling through these exceptions. For example, the Attorney General claims that § 1446(b)(3) ensures defendants can remove a case after they know, or should know, that the case is properly removable to federal court. Thus, the Attorney General contends that the explicit exceptions written by Congress would be rendered redundant by the court’s power to equitably toll. The Attorney General also argues that, throughout history, Congress has intentionally kept the time limit short for removal. The Attorney General, therefore, contends that the power to equitably toll that time limit contravenes Congress’s role as the final arbiter of setting the removal deadline.

    Discussion

    FAIRNESS TO PARTIES

    The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc. (“Chamber”), in support of Enbridge, posits that a business defendant’s right to remove a lawsuit to federal court is critical because of the perceived anti-business bias that can pervade state courts. The Chamber claims that removal may be the only way for the justice system to ensure fairness, as introducing federal issues can limit “local prejudices.” West Virginia and nine other states (“West Virginia”), furthering Enbridge’s position, highlight that while courts should rarely extend removal deadlines, extensions should at least be an option available to courts in “exceptional circumstances.” West Virginia explains that equity demands flexibilityin atypical cases like this one, where a state’s policies could impact an entire region’s energy supply and alter international law.

    The Great Lakes Business Network (“Business Network”), in support of the Attorney General, counters that loosening restrictions around deadlines encourages gamesmanship. The Business Network argues that liberalizing deadlines would enable parties to litigate heavily in state court before losing in that venue and then removing the lawsuit to federal court for more favorable results. The Business Network contends this shopping for courts hinges on self-interest rather than fairness and justice principles. Building on this argument, a group of Tribal Nations that hold treaty rights near the Straits of Mackinac argues that a party could delay removal due to a lack of diligence, potentially removing years after the start of a suit. The Tribal Nations fear a party could provide excuses framed as “extraordinary circumstances” for their delay. More than a theoretical fear, the Tribal Nations suggest that Enbridge took this precise course of action. The Tribal Nations contend that when Enbridge asked the Court to grant its delayed request for removal, Enbridge really asked for a “standardless” exception that would make procedural deadlines “toothless.”

    INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY

    The Washington Legal Foundation (“Foundation”) maintains, in support of Enbridge, that society should accept procedural delays when national and international interests are at stake. The Foundation reminds the Court that the United States has signed the Pipelines Treaty with Canada, prohibiting any government official from either country from impeding hydrocarbon transportation through energy pipelines. Stripping defendants of their right to move for delayed removal, the Foundation contends, could fuel tensions with foreign powers that have entered treaties and other international agreements with the United States, derailing U.S. foreign policy. Adding to this point, the Foundation suggests that federal courts can provide better-reasoned outcomes and resist aggressive state prosecutors’ manipulation. Professor Arthur R. Miller further argues that federal courts should be able to weigh important federal interests against a party’s noncompliance with a procedural time limit, ultimately reaching an equitable outcome. 

    Seven federal courts and civil procedure scholars (“Scholars”), in support of the Attorney General, assert that § 1446 has added uniformity and efficiency to the removal process. The Scholars add that ensuring courts apply removal rules consistently nationwide prevents lengthy and expensive litigation. Allowing equitable tolling, the Scholars warn, would create an “anything-goes environment” in which courts have little guidance over when to permit late removals. Aside from the unprecedented nature of delayed removals, the Scholars caution the dangers inherent in the federal district courts “pick[ing] and choos[ing]” which federal interests warrant permission for procedural delays. The Scholars claim that allowing equitable tolling could result in “a patchwork of . . . policy choices” prevailing over a “uniform national rule.” Minnesota, fifteen other states, and the District of Columbia further highlight that these concerns are worsened by the fact that equitable tolling would make federal court dockets busier without supplying more judges to handle the caseload. 

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Cameron T. Hines and Andrew R. Davis

    Edited by:      Sara Fischer

    Additional Resources