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Artis v. District of Columbia

Issues

In a case involving both federal- and state-law claims, if a federal court dismisses a plaintiff’s federal claim and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does the tolling provision in § 1367(d) suspend the limitations period for the plaintiff’s state-law claim while the claim is pending and for an additional thirty days after the claim is dismissed, or does the tolling provision simply provide an additional thirty days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to re-file without suspending the limitations period?

The court will decide whether the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)—which addresses cases involving both federal- and state-law claims suspends the limitations period for a state-law claim while the federal claim is pending and provides an additional thirty days after the federal claim is dismissed, or whether it simply provides thirty days beyond the dismissal of the claim to re-file in state court. Stephanie Artis argues that § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for state-law claims while the federal claims are pending and provides an additional thirty days in which to re-file after claims are dismissed. On the other hand, the District of Columbia argues that the approach taken by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which only provides an additional thirty days after a state-claim is dismissed, is the appropriate standard. This issue arises in every case in which a district court ultimately declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the case will impact the way in which plaintiffs bring state-law claims in federal courts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 1367 of Title 28 authorizes federal district courts in certain circumstances to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under State law. Section 1367 further provides that “[t]he period of limitations for any [such] claim … shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The question presented is whether the tolling provision in § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for the state-law claim while the federal suit is pending and for thirty days after the claim is dismissed, or whether the tolling provision does not suspend the limitations period but merely provides thirty days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to refile.

Beginning in August 2007, Petitioner Stephanie C. Artis was employed, under temporary status, as a Department of Health inspector. Artis v. District of Columbia, 135 A.3d 334, 335 (D.C. 2016). During her employment, Artis had a combative relationship with her supervisor, Gerard Brown. Id. Artis contends that Brown constantly treated her unfairly in the workplace.

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California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.

Issues

Does the timely filing of a class action lawsuit stop the running of the three-year time limit for individual class members to bring their claims under Section 13 of the Securities Act? 

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the applicability of the time limitations in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 for individual claims brought after a class action lawsuit has been filed in the same matter. Petitioner California Public Employees' Retirement System (“CalPERS”) argues that Section 13 is a statute of limitation, which may be overridden by judge-made rule, as opposed to a statute of repose, which is not subject to judicial extension even in cases of extraordinary circumstances. Accordingly, CalPERS asserts that a prior Supreme Court decision, American Pipe, establishes that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitation as to all putative members of that class. Respondent ANZ Securities, however, argues that Section 13 is a statute of repose, and under the Second Circuit precedent the American Pipe tolling rule does not extend to statutes of repose. The outcome of this case could encourage litigation strategies that decrease court efficiency or, alternatively, benefit large investors at the expense of smaller ones. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the timely filing of a valid class action satisfy or toll the three-year filing period set by Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 with respect to subsequent opt-out suits by individual class members?

This case arose out of the 2008 collapse of Respondent Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“Lehman Brothers”). See In Re Lehman Bros. Securities and ERISA Litigation, 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Lehman Brothers was a large investment bank, which traded its securities on the New York Stock Exchange.

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Rico v. United States

Issues

When an individual on supervised release absconds, does the clock on their supervision time pause, such that the time while missing does not count toward serving the supervised release term?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a term of supervised release automatically extends if a releasee absconds from supervision. Petitioner Isabel Rico absconded while serving a term of supervised release related to a drug trafficking offense. If Rico’s timer for supervised release was paused while in abscondment, her total punishment would be longer than if it were running. The district court applied the fugitive tolling doctrine, which means that the timer stopped when the releasee is missing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed her extended sentence. Rico argues that the timer on a term of supervised release does not stop while a releasee is missing. Rico claims that the statute authorizing supervised release clearly does not authorize the use of the fugitive tolling doctrine. In response, the United States argues that the fugitive tolling doctrine must extend to absconders like Rico, that supervision only counts when the defendant is actively under oversight, and that the court should not allow for absconders to manipulate their sentence. This case’s outcome has significant implications on the fairness and rehabilitation for supervised releasees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release?

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