Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana

    Issues

    Where a federal contractor attempts to remove a case to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute, what is the correct standard for determining whether removal is proper where the activity giving rise to the lawsuit is not expressly the subject of the government contract on which removal is based?

    Oral argument:
    January 12, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal officers and persons “acting under an officer” to remove lawsuits from state to federal courts, applies to federal contractors after a 2011 amendment. In this case, it specifically asks whether three gas and oil’s companies’ production of crude oil sufficiently relates to their contracts to furnish refined aviation gasoline for the federal government during World War II. Chevron, one of the companies involved in this suit, argues that the federal-officer removal statute applies broadly to defendants requesting removal and that wartime oil refining was inherently related to its production of crude oil at the time. Plaquemines Parish, one of multiple jurisdictions that sued the companies for environmental damage, counters that, because Chevron’s refining contracts with the federal government did not address crude production, that production does not sufficiently “relate to” the refining, as required by the 2011 amendment. This case raises significant issues regarding the scope of federal contractors’ ability to litigate in federal forums, the willingness of companies to contract with the federal government, and the effectiveness of congressional amendments over established federal caselaw.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    (1) Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute, which provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against “any person acting under [an] officer” of the United States “for or relating to any act under color of such office”; and (2) whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract.

    Facts

    Under the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), a defendant may remove a state-court suit to federal court if, among other things, the defendant was “acting under” a federal officer and if the suit is “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” A 2011 amendment to the law added the phrase “or relating to.”

    Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana parishes (county-equivalent jurisdictions), joined by the state of Louisiana, filed forty-two suits in Louisiana state court against multiple oil and gas majors, alleging violations of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (“SLCRMA”). The parishes alleged that the companies’ oil and gas exploration and production activities in Louisiana’s coastal zone damaged wetlands and waterways and that the companies failed to obtain required coastal use permits or comply with permits. One example of an oil and gas activity in Louisiana is the refining of aviation gasoline during World War II, which was integral to fighting in the war. The parishes sought damages and remediation costs to restore the affected coastal areas.

    The companies attempted to remove the cases to federal court multiple times on various grounds, and they failed each time. But following disclosures that placed their production activities during World War II at issue, the companies again attempted to remove. The companies asserted federal-officer removal, arguing that their World War II-era contracts with the federal government to refine aviation gasoline brought the cases within the federal-officer removal statute because they were acting under federal direction. The district courts in both the Eastern District of Louisiana and the Western District of Louisiana granted the parishes’ motions to remand the cases back to state court, concluding that the oil companies failed to satisfy the requirements for federal-officer removal. The oil companies appealed. In a consolidated appeal, Chevron and the other oil companies (collectively “Chevron”) argued for removal under the federal-officer removal statute because Chevron was a federal contractor.

    In 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ decision to remand. The Fifth Circuit held that while Chevron satisfied the “acting under” requirement because producing aviation fuel pursuant to federal contracts during World War II constituted assistance to the federal government, Chevron failed to show that the oil production was adequately “connected or associated with” that refining, as required by Fifth Circuit caselaw. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the federal contracts governed refinery operations and were silent as to the crude oil production, exploration, and permitting practices challenged by the parishes. Although crude oil was a necessary input for refining aviation gasoline, the Fifth Circuit found the relationship between production activities and federally-directed refining activities to be too attenuated.

    Chevron filed a petition for certiorari on January 29, 2025, which the Supreme Court of the United States granted on June 16, 2025. 

    Analysis

    “ACTING UNDER” IN THE FEDERAL-OFFICER REMOVAL STATUTE 

    Chevron argues that it satisfies the “acting under” requirement of the federal-officer removal statute (“the statute”) because it operated under the direction and control of the federal government during World War II.  Chevron concedes that simply complying with federal regulations, on its own, cannot be considered “acting under” the direction of a federal officer. However, Chevron maintains that this fact does not impact deciding whether a defendant’s conduct and a defendant’s actions under federal direction are related. Chevron points out that the Fifth Circuit, despite ultimately ruling against Chevron, held unanimously that Chevron was “acting under” the federal government for purposes of removal. Chevron also highlights that Plaquemines Parish and other Louisiana parishes conceded that Chevron met the “acting under” prong in front of the Fifth Circuit. Therefore, Chevron argues that whether Chevron satisfied the “acting under” prong is not an issue in front of the Court.  Chevron further argues that Plaquemines Parish and other Louisiana parishes’ current arguments confuse the “acting under” and “connected or associated with” requirements of the statute.

    Plaquemines Parish and other Louisiana parishes (collectively “Plaquemines Parish”) argue that the Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that Chevron satisfied the “acting under” requirement of § 1442(a)(1).  Plaquemines Parish highlights that the lawsuits at issue revolve only around Chevron’s crude production activities and that, as conceded by Chevron itself, Chevron was not acting under a federal officer in the course of those production activities. Plaquemines Parish then argues that the “acting under” element requires that the allegation focuses on “the relationship between” the “defendant and a federal officer.” Plaquemines Parish also asserts that the text of § 1442 limits a defendant’s conduct to actions involving a federal officer’s official duties, and notes that Congress did not amend the text of “acting under” in 2011. And in any event, Plaquemines Parish cautions against a broad reading of the statute after the 2011 amendment because a defendant who acts under a federal officer for one purpose does not act under that officer in all its activities. Ultimately, Plaquemines Parish disputes Chevron’s claim that the “acting under” element is met even when a defendant had carried out activities not mentioned in the relevant complaint. Similarly, Louisiana and the Louisiana Department of Energy and Natural Resources (collectively “Louisiana”) reject Chevron’s so-called “mix-and-match” theory—using different activities for the “acting under” prong (refining) and “relating to” prong (drilling).  Specifically, Louisiana argues that Chevron did not cite any cases that directly use a “mix-and-match” theory, so it is unsupported by precedent. In addition, Louisiana claims that Chevron’s described test overrides statutory law, which Louisiana claims asks whether harm occurred while a defendant had the appearance of federal authority. Louisiana concedes that government contractors can potentially satisfy the “acting under” requirement. However, Louisiana maintains that government contractors can only satisfy this requirement when the acts that are the subject of the complaint are the federally directed acts. So, since Chevron is not being sued over its refining activities, Louisiana and the Plaquemines Parish argue that Chevron does not meet the “acting under” requirement of the statute.

    “RELATING TO” IN THE FEDERAL-OFFICER REMOVAL STATUTE

    Chevron maintains that, because the statute was amended in 2011 to encompass suits “relating to” acts under federal direction, a defendant seeking removal need not show that federal officials directed the defendant to partake in the challenged conduct itself. Chevron points to cases decided before the 2011 amendment of the statute and highlights the then-existing requirement that a defendant show a specific federal directive to engage in the challenged conduct in order to remove a case to federal court. Chevron asserts that, by adding “relating to” in 2011, Congress meant to reject this requirement. In further support of this point, Chevron notes that legal precedent has long supported a broad reading of “relating to,” and that Congress is assumed to be aware of legal precedent when it legislates. Chevron also highlights that seven courts of appeals have held that the amended version of the statute does not require a causal connection between acts taken under federal direction and the lawsuit. Chevron ultimately contends that by adding the words “relating to” to the statute, Congress meant to allow for the removal of a lawsuit even if that lawsuit does not specifically address acts performed under federal direction. Additionally, Chevron questions why the Fifth Circuit referenced the pre-2011 causal-nexus test when the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged the 2011 amendment to the statute. Specifically, Chevron claims that the Fifth Circuit majority erred because the Fifth Circuit required that the federal government specifically limit the defendant with respect to the challenged conduct in cases of removal. Chevron argues that limiting the breadth of the statute through this causal-nexus test contradicts the plain text of § 1442(a)(1). In addition, Chevron claims that this test would limit removal to situations where a defendant’s actions were the only way to fulfill the federal contract. In other words, Chevron argues that under the Fifth Circuit test, removal would not be granted if a defendant’s actions were useful to complete a federal contract but not required. Chevron highlights that the federal government required Chevron to produce aviation gasoline by contract, but the government also required through regulation that Chevron refine the oil. Chevron claims that these requirements, through contract and regulation, illustrate the close relation between the challenged conduct (producing crude oil during World War II) and the federally directed conduct (refining aviation gasoline during World War II). Chevron highlights that in a vertically integrated company, the production of raw materials is intertwined with the manufacture of a final product. Chevron claims that since there is at least “some relation” between the production of raw materials and the finished product, the test defined in the statute has been fulfilled. In addition, Chevron argues that the federal contracts accentuate the connection between oil production and oil refining; for instance, Chevron claims that the price of the aviation gas and related taxes connect the relationship between production and refining. Based on these reasons, Chevron argues that it has adequately satisfied the “relating to” requirement.

    Conversely, Louisiana argues that there is no need to consider Chevron’s arguments of the “relating to” prong. Louisiana argues that if Chevron’s theory of the phrase “acting under” was accepted, the prong of § 1442 for relation would need a close connection between the federally directed conduct and the alleged wrongdoing. Louisiana highlights that without that limitation, the statute would allow removal for conduct only loosely or incidentally related to federal work. Louisiana accentuates that this would effectively erase the requirements that the defendants were “acting under” federal authority at the time of the alleged harm. Louisiana argues that the Fifth Circuit properly avoided that result by emphasizing that Chevron’s federal contracts contained no direction regarding crude oil production.Louisiana claims that allowing removal based on such remote connections would impermissibly expand federal-officer jurisdiction and permit almost any federal contractor to remove state-law claims unrelated to federal direction. Similarly, Plaquemines Parish argues that because there was no directive in the refinery contracts that related to the crude production of oil, Chevron does not satisfy the “relating to” portion of § 1442. So, Louisiana and Plaquemines Parish therefore argue that Chevron has not adequately satisfied the “relating to” requirement.

    Discussion

    FEDERALISM AND FAIRNESS

    The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, in support of Chevron, argue that a ruling in favor of Plaquemines Parish would bar federal contractors from a forum necessary for them to avoid potential bias from a state jury and judicial bench. The Pelican Institute for Public Policy, in support of Chevron, agrees and further argues that allowing the litigation of federal contracting issues in state courts leads to partisan incentives, forum shopping, and bias from state joint prosecution agreements.The Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”) and Atlantic Legal Foundation (“ALF”), in support of Chevron, argue that, even if construed broadly, the federal-officer removal statute includes limits to its scope that would not cause excessive litigation in federal courts. WLF and ALF argue that the circuit courts that have construed the standard in the removal statute broadly have not suffered from a flood of federal contractors to their courts, which shows that there will not be excessive litigation if the Court decides in favor of Chevron.

    The Environmental Defense Fund and Father Lawrence Moore (collectively “EDF”), in support of Plaquemines Parish, responds that state courts do not necessarily face more influential bias from local courts than federal ones.The EDF argues that small-town juries are not necessarily biased against large companies, particularly in Louisiana’s coastal parishes, where oil and gas defendants have frequently won in environmental jury trials. John Bel Edwards, a former governor of Louisiana, in support of Plaquemines Parish, argues that a jury is unlikely to be influenced by actions taken by private contractors in the 1980s, unrelated to the impact of crude oil production on the Louisiana coast, which is at issue in the case.  The American Association for Justice and Louisiana Association for Justice, also in support of Plaquemines Parish, assert that Chevron’s requested interpretation of the federal-officer removal statute will, in fact, lead to excessive litigation in federal courts. Russel Honoré, a retired general, in support of Plaquemines Parish, adds that this is likely to happen because, if the Court rules in favor of Chevron, any federal contractor could remove a case to federal court based on a small connection between challenged conduct and federal conduct. General Honoré argues that this would disturb the basic tenets of federalism because many of these issues would be ones where the federal government has no interest and may have already expressly allowed the state to regulate.

    PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY

    The America First Policy Institute (“AFPI”), in support of Chevron, argues that construing the federal-officer removal statute narrowly will weaken national defense because it will deter the incentives of federal contractors from aiding the government during times of crisis.Richard B. Myers and Michael G. Mullen, a retired general and retired admiral, respectively, in support of Chevron, agree that private parties will not want to take on national security contracts if they do not have assurance that any legal action relating to their contracts can be removed to federal court.Myers and Mullen posit that if this case were decided in favor of Plaquemines Parish before 9/11, the United States may not have been able to procure the specialized protective equipment needed to prosecute the war on terror due to paralysis from contractors based on the threat of litigation outside of federal court.

    Russel Honoré, in support of Plaquemines Parish, argues that national security will not be put at risk if the Court rules in favor of the respondents because the federal-officer removal statute has not been construed broadly since its enactment in 1815 and companies like Chevron still “stepped forward” during World War II. Honoré also argues in support of allowing Chevron’s case to be litigated in a Louisiana court because Louisiana is better able to protect national security from harm caused by the destruction of Louisiana wetlands and climate change in general, which he argues Chevron has contributed to. Honoré further stresses that these wetlands are essential for maintaining critical infrastructure that is vital to national defense, such as the Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, the Port of New Orleans, and the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:   Emma Babashak and Audrey Hager

    Edited by:      Andrew Carpenter

    Additional Resources