statutory interpretation

Abbott v. United States; Gould v. United States

Issues

Which, if any, federal criminal statute with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years or more can trigger the "except" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)?

 

In two separate and unrelated cases, Kevin Abbott and Carlos Rashad Gould were convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by possessing weapons in the furtherance of a violent or drug trafficking crime. Abbott and Gould were also sentenced for their underlying crimes, both of which required a minimum sentence of greater than five years. Abbott's and Gould's respective sentencing judges both included an additional five-year sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), on the grounds that this was a mandatory minimum sentence. Abbott and Gould appealed, arguing that they qualified for an exception to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the minimum sentences for their underlying offenses were greater than five years. The appeals courts affirmed the lower courts' decisions. Certiorari was granted to answer which federal criminal statutes that carry a minimum sentence greater than five years, if any, trigger the "except" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Abbott

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) provides, in part, that a person convicted of a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence shall receive an additional sentence of not less than five years whenever he “uses or carries a firearm, or * * * in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” unless “a greater minimum sentence is * * * provided * * * by any other provision of law.” The questions presented are:

1. Does the term “any other provision of law” include the underlying drug trafficking offense or crime of violence?

2. If not, does it include another offense for possessing the same firearm in the same transaction?

Gould

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) requires a 5-year minimum sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime – “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by . . . any other provision of law.”

3. Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly hold, despite this “except” clause, that a defendant is subject to the 5-year minimum sentence for the firearm possession even though another provision of law requires a greater minimum sentence for another count of conviction?

Abbott

In 2004, Petitioner, Kevin Abbott, and Michael Grant were selling drugs out of a house in Philadelphia. See United States v. Abbott, 574 F. 3d 203, 204–05 (3d Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Findlaw.com: No Discretion for Judges with Mandatory Sentences (April 1, 2010)

· United States Sentencing Commission: 1991 Sentencing Commission Report

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Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Becerra

Issues

Are patients “entitled to” SSI benefits when they are eligible for SSI benefits or when they are receiving cash SSI benefits?

The Disproportionate Share Hospital adjustment (“DSH”) is a statutory provision administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) that increases payments to hospitals serving high percentages of low-income patients to account for their increased treatment costs. At issue here is how eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) affects these DSH payments. Advocate Christ Medical Center argues that the phrase “entitled to [SSI] benefits” in the DSH provision should include all patients enrolled in the SSI program, even if they do not receive monthly cash payments. HHS counters that only patients receiving cash benefits during hospitalization should count. This case has important ramifications on agency interpretation, administrative workability, and hospitals’ ability to accept low-income patients.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the phrase “entitled ... to benefits,” used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, means the same thing for Medicare part A and Supplemental Social Security benefits, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the Medicare program aims to provide health insurance to elderly or disabled individuals. Advocate Christ Med. Ctr. v. Becerra at 349, 351. Hospitals receive a fixed payment for treating a Medicare patient. Id. At 349.

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American Hospital Association v. Becerra

Issues

Is the Department of Health and Human Services entitled to deference in its interpretation of a statute that enabled it to reduce drug reimbursement rates for hospitals; alternatively, is the Department of Health and Human Services’ action unreviewable because of 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12)?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of authority granted to the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) in setting hospital Medicare reimbursement rates for outpatient drugs. The Medicare Modernization Act (“MMA”) prescribes two alternative reimbursement rate methodologies for outpatient drugs—hospital acquisition cost or average drug price—and conditions HHS’s choice on whether HHS collects hospital drug cost-acquisition data. American Hospital Association et al. argue that MMA prevents HHS from tailoring rates to hospital acquisition costs and varying rates by group unless HHS has the requisite data. Xavier Becerra responds that MMA gives HHS the authority to “adjust” reimbursement rates as necessary, and therefore deference under Chevron permits HHS discretion to set reasonable rates. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the financial health of 340B hospitals, and the Medicare system more broadly, as well as the scope of the administrative state and judicial deference under Chevron.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council permits the Department of Health and Human Services to set reimbursement rates based on acquisition cost and very such rates by hospital group if it has not collected adequate hospital acquisition cost survey data; and (2) whether petitioners’ suit challenging HHS’s adjustments is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12).

The Medicare program consists of Part A and Part B. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar at 820. Under Medicare Part B, which provides coverage for certain hospital-administered drugs, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) sets hospital reimbursement rates. Id. The “Outpatient Prospective Payment System” (“OPPS”) regulates the establishment of these rates.

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Anza v. Idea Steel Supply Corp.

 

Ideal Steel Supply Corporation and National Steel Supply Inc. were competitors for many years in the New York area, with facilities in Queens and later the Bronx. They each sold steel mill products and other hardware, and the owners were even related by marriage. As Ideal Steel’s sales in the Bronx dropped and National Steel’s increased, despite both companies charging the same price for their product, Ideal Steel became suspicious. In particular, Ideal Steel was concerned about National Steel’s “cash, no tax” policy, in which customers of National Steel that paid with cash did not have to pay the sales tax required by New York State. Ideal Steel filed a civil suit in federal district court alleging that the “cash, no tax” policy constituted racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, in that the failure to charge state sales tax and the filing of false sales tax returns was a pattern of mail and wire fraud intended to give National Steel an unfair competitive advantage over Ideal Steel. The district court dismissed Ideal Steel’s claim, ruling that Ideal Steel failed to allege that there was a sufficient connection between National Steel’s alleged illegal conduct and the harm to its business or lost profits. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and ordered that the suit should proceed, ruling that it was sufficient for Ideal Steel to prove that New York State relied on National Steel’s fraudulent conduct, which allowed the scheme to continue, and ultimately led to the harms alleged. The United States Supreme Court must now examine the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and determine whether a company such as Ideal Steel is injured by such violations where the company is not directly defrauded and did not rely on the illegal acts.  

The Alleged Scheme

Respondent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (“Ideal Steel”) and Petitioner Anza’s company, National Steel Supply Inc., are direct competitors in the business of selling steel mill products and other hardware in the Bronx and Queens, New York. Brief for Respondent at 3.

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Arlington Central School Dist. v. Murphy

 

In prior litigation the Murphys, parents of a disabled youth, were determined to be statutorily entitled to receive compensation from the Arlington Central School District  Board of Education for the youth’s private school tuition for a certain period. The Murphys claimed the compensation should include $29,350 paid as fees to an educational consultant. Arlington objected, claiming that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act only allowed payment of attorneys’ fees and the educational consultant was neither an attorney nor an “expert” within the scope of the statute. The District Court held that the statute does not allow payment of fees to a non-lawyer doing work similar to that of an attorney, but does cover expert consulting services. The Second Circuit affirmed, and Arlington petitioned to the Supreme Court, which will consider the scope of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s fee-shifting provision.

In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision requiring Arlington Central School District Board of Education (“Arlington”) to pay certain private school tuition fees for Joseph Murphy, a district student with a disability. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002).

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Astrue v. Capato

Issues

Is a child conceived after the death of a biological parent eligible to receive survivor benefits under the Social Security Act regardless of state intestacy laws?

 

Shortly after Robert Nicholas Capato’s death, his wife Karen Capato underwent in vitro fertilization using his frozen sperm and gave birth to twins in 2003. Karen Capato applied for Social Security benefits on behalf of her twins as survivors of a deceased wage earner. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied her claim. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) affirmed, ruling that state intestacy law controls eligibility for survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children under the Social Security Act ("Act"). Therefore, the twins were ineligible for benefits under the applicable Florida law. On appeal, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s reading. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled that the plain language of the Act entitles the Capato twins, whose parentage is not in dispute, to survivor benefits. Petitioner Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the SSA, argues that the Act requires the agency to apply state intestacy law to determine whether an applicant is the child of an insured wage earner for the purpose of receiving survivor benefits. In contrast, Respondent Karen K. Capato contends that the Act unambiguously entitles undisputed biological children of married parents to survivor benefits, without referring to state intestacy laws. The Supreme Court’s decision will authoritatively interpret the Act’s mandate on the determination of survivor benefits eligibility, and possibly reflect on the balance between legislative rulemaking and unanticipated progress of science and technology.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a child who was conceived after the death of a biological parent, but who cannot inherit personal property from that biological parent under applicable state intestacy law, is eligible for child survivor benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.

Shortly after Karen and Robert Nicholas (“Nick”) Capato were married in New Jersey in 1999, Nick Capato was diagnosed with cancer. See Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3rd Cir.

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Barrett v. United States

Issues

Can a court punish a criminal defendant with two sentences for a single act in violation of both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j), according to the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) allow for cumulative punishments for a singular criminal act that violates both provisions of this statute. Sections 924(c) and (j) punish the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug trafficking. Dwayne Barrett contends that § 924(c) and (j) are not separate crimes because they punish the same underlying singular act, and Congress has authorized cumulative sentences for the same act. Charles L. McCloud, as court-appointed amicus curiae, argues that § 924(c) and (j) are two separate crimes, and Congress intended to allow for cumulative punishments for a single act that violates both statutes. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case raises concerns regarding the justice of sentencing to punish multiple violations involving a singular act and the duties of the legislative and judicial branches in determining the scope of criminal punishment. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j).

From August 2011 to January 2012, Petitioner Dwayne Barrett belonged to a group that committed several robberies. United States v.

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Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe

Issues

Is requiring the Indian Health Service (“IHS") to pay contract support costs to cover the administrative costs of Indian tribal healthcare expenditures, which are funded by revenue earned from third-party Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance companies instead of directly funded by the IHS, consistent with the Indian Self-Determination Act?

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether the Indian Health Service (“IHS”) is required to pay contract support costs to cover the administrative burden of tribal healthcare expenditures of income the tribes earned from Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance companies. Secretary of Health and Human Services Xavier Becerra argues that the text and structure of the Indian Self-Determination Act (“ISDA”) unambiguously requires IHS to only pay contract support costs for activities the IHS directly funds, and to do otherwise would be overly burdensome. The San Carlos Apache Tribe and Northern Arapaho Tribe claim that the ISDA’s text mandates contract support payments for third-party revenue expenditures, and that the Indian canon, which states that any statutory ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the Indian party in a case, mandates that the Court must rule for them if they can show their interpretation of the ISDA is at least plausible enough to render it ambiguous. This case could have implications for the ability of tribes to fund tribal healthcare, as well as the funding of the IHS and its allocation of internal funds.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Indian Health Service must pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties.

The Indian Health Service (“IHS”) is a federal agency that administers healthcare programs for Indian tribes. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Xavier Becerra, et al. at 2. Most IHS funding comes from the federal government, but it also bills insurance companies and Medicare and Medicaid for its services. Id.

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Biden v. Texas

Issues

Is the Department of Homeland Security required by law to continue returning certain undocumented aliens to Mexico, consistent with the Migrant Protection Protocols; and, was the Fifth Circuit correct in holding DHS erred in terminating MPP?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) must continue enforcing the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). On October 29, 2021, DHS issued a decision terminating MPP, a Trump administration policy where Border Patrol returns certain undocumented aliens arriving at the southern border to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. The Biden Administration (“President Biden”) argues that DHS permissibly rescinded MPP via agency memoranda because the amended Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives DHS discretion over whether to remove, detain, or parole noncitizens. Texas and Missouri respond that DHS’s rescission of MPP has no legal effect because if DHS lacks capacity to detain undocumented aliens, the INA obligates DHS to remove such persons by continuing to enforce MPP. The outcome of this case has significant implications for undocumented aliens seeking asylum in the United States and immigrant communities within the United States, as well as the role of the executive in determining immigration policy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 requires the Department of Homeland Security to continue implementing the Migrant Protection Protocols, a former policy under which certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border were returned to Mexico during their immigration and proceedings; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred by concluding that the secretary of homeland security’s new decision terminating MPP had no legal effect.

In December 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). Texas v.

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