Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

    Issues

    Must a plaintiff bringing a claim under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government in which the plaintiff holds a claim, or instead in property the plaintiff would have owned at the time of trafficking had no expropriation occurred?

    Oral argument:
    February 23, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (“the Act”), passed to compensate United States nationals for property seized by the Cuban Regime, provides a private cause of action only for property interests held at the time the Act was passed. Petitioner Havana Docks Corporation, whose facilities were confiscated by the Cuban government in 1960, argues that limiting the cause of action to present-day interests violates the original objectives of the Act. Although its ownership would have expired in 2004, Havana Docks asserts that it retains a continuing property interest according to the Act. Respondent cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, contend that the Act only protects specific types of property interests and that they did not “traffic” in Havana Docks’ property according to the statute’s definition. The outcome of the case has implications for United States foreign policy goals in Cuba as well as U.S. nationals’ ability to receive compensation for past confiscations by the Cuban government.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a plaintiff under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim, or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world “as if there had been no expropriation.”

    Facts

    In 1905, the Cuban government granted a company, Compañia del Puerto, a concession—an agreement to build and operate a pier at Havana’s port at its own expense. The concession gave Compañia del Puerto a “usufruct.” One who possesses a usufruct has the right to use property and make a profit from it but lacks permanent ownership. The agreement was extended to ninety-nine years; thus, in 2004, the property would revert back to Cuba when the ninety-nine-year term expired. Compañia del Puerto was allowed to operate cargo services under Cuban government supervision and fee structures. The company never had exclusive rights to the piers, as the Cuban government could cancel the agreement at any time with compensation. In 1928, Compañia del Puerto transferred ownership to Havana Docks. In 1960, following the Cuban revolution, the Cuban government confiscated the piers and compelled Havana Docks to surrender all corporate assets.

    In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (“the Act”). Congress sought to discourage foreign economic involvement with property seized from U.S. citizens by the Cuban Government without compensation.  Accordingly, Title III of the Act provides a “private right of action,” authorizing individual U.S. nationals to sue individuals or entities “trafficking” in property expropriated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959. The Act also allows the President to suspend these lawsuit provisions if doing so serves the national interest and supports “a transition to democracy in Cuba.” In May of 2019, this private right of action went into effect after a twenty-year suspension.  

    From 2016 to 2019, the cruise lines Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises (“the Cruise Lines”), disembarked and embarked passengers at one of the piers confiscated by the Cuban government from Havana Docks Corporation (“Havana Docks”). Havana Docks brought a lawsuit against the four cruise lines under Title III of the Act for trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban Government. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, ruled in favor of Havana Docks, and entered judgment totaling over 400 million dollars against the Cruise Lines.  

    On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment. The court analyzed whether Havana Docks’ “usufructuary concession” constituted a property interest under Title III. The Court of Appeals determined that because the Cruise Lines did not traffic in confiscated property between 2016 and 2019, Compañia del Puerto’s usufructuary concession, which was later acquired by Havana Docks, would have expired by 2004. The Court added that Havana Docks did not have the ability to renew the agreement on its own terms and without input from the Cuban government. The Court held that the trafficking must involve the property as it existed at the time of confiscation, and that Title III did not convert a time-limited interest in a property into permanently owned property.

    Havana Docks petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on October 3, 2025. 

    Analysis

    THE LIBERTAD ACT’S TEXT

    Havana Docks argues that Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (“the Act”) imposes liability on the Cruise Lines for “trafficking” in confiscated property through the use of the piers because Havana Docks has an ongoing property interest in the piers. Havana Docks asserts that as long as the piers remain confiscated, it is able to bring a claim against the Cruise Lines under Title III of the Act. In Havana Docks’ reading of the Act, Title III applies to property that was confiscated by the Cuban government and remains confiscated, independent of whether its property rights would have ceased had the expropriation not occurred. Havana Docks explains that the Act defines “confiscated” property as remaining confiscated until Cuba returns it, pays compensation, or settles claims related to the property. Furthermore, Havana Docks asserts that any theoretical transfer of its property interests back to the Cuban government in 2004 is not applicable because the property interests do not keep running after the property was confiscated. Moreover, according to Havana Docks, because the Act applies to the property that was and remains confiscated by the Cuban government, the Act’s protections are ongoing until Cuba returns the property, pays compensation, or settles the property claims. Moreover, Havana Docks posits that the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”), which identifies the property as it existed at the time of confiscation, provides the basis for Title III liability. Therefore, relying on the FCSC-certified claim that establishes that Cuba confiscated Havana Docks’ piers and concession rights in 1960, in addition to the fact that the piers remain confiscated by the Cuban government, Havana Docks argues it may bring a claim against the Cruise Lines for their use of the piers.

    The Cruise Lines argue that their use of the docks does not constitute trafficking under Title III of the Act because, since 2004, Havana Docks has held no property interest in the piers. According to the Cruise Lines, the straightforward application of the Act only imposes liability for trafficking in the property interest that was actually confiscated from the plaintiff. The Cruise Lines explain that, because the Act defines “property” by reference to the specific interest confiscated, a plaintiff may only recover damages for trafficking in that specific interest—which, in Havana Docks’s case, was not permanent ownership of the docks themselves, but a concession that expired in 2004. Hence, the Cruise Lines assert that Title III applies to property interests that would have been ongoing, not to expired property interests. For this reason, the Cruise Lines argue that to bring a claim under Title III of the Act, a plaintiff must prove that it would have had property interests at the time of the alleged trafficking. Accordingly, the Cruise lines counter that FCSC-certified claims do not establish Title III liability. Noting that the FCSC certified Havana Docks’s claim as a concession “to expire in the year 2004,” the Cruise Lines argue that FCSC certification did not alter the nature of the limited property interests to permanent interests. The Cruise Lines reason that the FCSC-certified claim simply reflects a time-limited property interest, a nonpermanent concession with the Cuban government that expired in 2004, which no longer existed at the time of the alleged trafficking. Thus, theCruise Lines maintain that Havana Docks cannot bring a claim under Title III because Havana Docks did not have any property interests in the piers at the time of the alleged trafficking.

    OTHER TOOLS TO INTERPRET THE LIBERTAD ACT

    Havana Docks contends that a narrow reading of the Act, limiting the application of Title III to property in which a plaintiff would hold present-day property interests, clashes with the Act’s objective: to deter and prevent unjust enrichment. Havana Docks asserts that Title III provides remedies designed to prevent traffickers from keeping profits obtained through unjust enrichment, consistent with common-law equitable lien principles. Havana Docks explains that the broadly defined terms in the statute convey Congress’s intent to deter trafficking in confiscated property and prevent unjust enrichment by broadening the reach of the Act. For instance, Havana Docks highlights that the Act defines the terms “property” and “traffics” broadly, noting, specifically, that the Act defines “property” to include “any interest,” and “traffics” to include indirectly benefiting from the confiscated property. Therefore, Havana Docks contends that an FCSC-certified claim remains attached to the confiscated property and can be enforced against anyone who later uses or profits from it; otherwise, it would render the application of Title III ineffective. Furthermore, Havana Docks adds that the Acts’ treble damages framework—awarding the plaintiff three times the their actual damages if the defendant is found to have trafficked in confiscated property—emphasizes Congress’s deterrence objective.

    On the other hand, the Cruise Lines argue that while it is correct that the Act sought to deter unjust enrichment, the Act does not authorize vast windfalls to plaintiffs by converting the plain language of the Act to the benefit of the claimant. The Cruise Lines also contend that Title III’s underlying property law principles do not permit extending property interests beyond their original boundaries. Furthermore, the Cruise Lines argue that the constitutional avoidance canon advises against interpreting the Act in a manner that would implicate significant constitutional concerns. The Cruise Lines argue that a ruling finding FCSC-certified claims to establish property rights under Title III raises significant constitutional concerns. They posit that such a finding would preclude future defendants from contesting the nature and scope of the property interest in a judicial forum. The Cruise Lines explain that FCSC proceedings are administrative and ex parte in nature, involving only the claimant and the government, which would deprive future defendants of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Moreover, the Cruise Lines argue that interpreting the statute to grant dispositive weight to FCSC findings would raise concerns with respect to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. To avoid raising these constitutional concerns, the Cruise Lines argue that the Court should limit the Act’s focus to the specific property interest that was actually confiscated, rather than treating FCSC-certified claims as binding on Article III courts. An alternative ruling, the Cruise Lines contend, would risk conflict with fundamental constitutional principles and is therefore inadvisable. 

    Discussion

    FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

    Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart, along with several fellow members of Congress (“Díaz-Balart”), argues that requiring a plaintiff to show a current property interest effectively nullifies their cause of action under the Act, defeating the original foreign policy objectives of the Act. Díaz-Balart contends that the Act was originally intended to undermine the Castro regime by denying the Cuban government funds received from unlawfully confiscated property. According to Havana Docks, the Act did so by creating a private cause of action to dissuade American companies from using stolen property and providing financial resources to the Castro Regime. Havana Docks recounts that the restriction was to be lifted when a democratically elected government returned to Cuba. Díaz-Balart argues that any defendant can easily come up with a hypothetical set of facts in which plaintiffs did not retain ownership of their property after it was seized, effectively nullifying the private cause of action and foreign policy goals of the statute.

    The Cruise Lines International Association (“CLIA”) argues that travel to Cuba furthers Obama-era policy objectives of promoting democracy by increasing the United States’ cultural power in Cuba.CLIA cites remarks made by former President Barack Obama, who stated in 2016 that an isolationist policy had failed to promote democracy in Cuba. CLIA emphasizes President Obama’s belief that re-establishing diplomatic relations with the nation and supporting Cuba’s civil sector would empower its citizens. CLIA further argues that cruise ship voyages, which facilitate cultural exchange, benefit the American people by creating meaningful interactions between Americans and Cubans, strengthening diplomatic relations. CLIA further contends that through use of the Act’s exception for “lawful travel,” cruise lines advance foreign policy goals of encouraging democracy by docking at Cuban ports and building up Cuba’s private sector. CLIA expresses concern that a narrower interpretation of the “lawful travel” exception could diminish future travel to Cuba, undermining policy goals clearly outlined by the executive branch.

    FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF TRAVEL INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS

    Havana Docks argues that under the test announced by the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. nationals will have no adequate legal remedy for property seized by the Cuban government. According to the United States, the Act was passed to allow victims of wrongful confiscations to obtain direct compensation for their losses. Havana Docks recounts that the Cruise Lines made over $1 billion in profits through their use of Havana Docks facilities confiscated by Cuba and paid $130 million to the Cuban government for use of these facilities, while Havana Docks received nothing. Havana Docks argues that claimholders with future or contingent interests in seized property will be denied relief if the Act only provides a cause of action for current property interests. Havana Docks asserts that this leaves a broad swathe of U.S. stakeholders with no feasible way to receive compensation for their seized property, while entities such as Respondent Cruise Lines make millions of dollars in profits through their use of this property. The United States further argues that even after property interests expire, victims continue to suffer because they never received the full benefit of their property.

    The U.S. Travel Association, along with a group of other organizations within the travel industry (“U.S. Travel”), argues that allowing Havana Docks’ suit under the Act will have a significant financial impact on the American travel industry. U.S. Travel points out that the Act carves out an exception for “lawful travel” using facilities seized by the Cuban government, and that the Cruise Lines’ actions have historically constituted lawful travel under federal policy. U.S. Travel asserts that both American travelers and travel industry professionals rely heavily on executive branch guidance, which previously stated that travel to Cuba was lawful and encouraged. U.S. Travel argues that any uncertainty regarding this travel exception will negatively impact the travel industry, as companies are likely to restrict travel to Cuba for fear of violating regulations. This financial harm is likely to impact American workers, including travel advisors, agents, operators, and owners of small businesses in the industry.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Brenda Narvaez and Ria Panchal

    Edited by:      Andrew Carpenter

    Additional Resources