Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi

    Issues

    Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, are claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 barred where a plaintiff who has already been punished under a law challenged as unconstitutional seeks purely prospective relief? Are such claims barred even where the plaintiff never had access to federal habeas relief?

    Oral argument:
    December 03, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the parameters for plaintiffs to seek relief for laws challenged as unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner Gabriel Olivier argues that the Fifth Circuit improperly applied Heck v. Humphrey to his case because he is not seeking to disturb his previous conviction under the ordinance he is challenging; rather, he is seeking to prevent future prosecution, which aligns with how the court has previously interpreted § 1983. Olivier also contends that because he was never in custody, he is not foreclosed from seeking relief under § 1983, unlike individuals in custody who must instead seek federal habeas relief. Respondents, the City of Brandon, Mississippi et al., (“the City”) counter that Heck bars § 1983 relief where civil lawsuit success would shorten the length of criminal punishment or imply the conviction is substantively invalid, which applies to Olivier’s challenge, since he attacked both his punishment and conviction. The City also maintains that Olivier’s eligibility for § 1983 relief does not depend on whether he has access to federal habeas relief. This outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for access to judicial review and state sovereignty.  

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    (1) Whether this court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional; and (2) whether Heck v. Humphrey bars Section 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they never had access to federal habeas relief.

    Facts

    This case concerns the intersection between claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal habeas corpus. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statute that allows plaintiffs to bring civil rights claims when their federal rights have been violated under color of state law.  The federal habeas corpus statute provides an avenue for federal post-conviction review for state prisoners whose custody violates the Constitution or federal law.

    Gabriel Olivier is an evangelical Christian who habitually preaches to the public.  In 2019, the City of Brandon, Mississippi passed an ordinance that restricts any demonstrations to a specific area outside of the Brandon Amphitheater—a local open-air venue—for three hours before and one hour after any live events hosted inside. In May of 2021, Olivier was charged with violating the 2019 ordinance for preaching outside the protest area after receiving a warning. Olivier pled nolo contendere to the charge and was sentenced to a fine and imprisonment for ten days. Olivier paid the fine and did not appeal his conviction or seek post-conviction relief.  

    Instead, Olivier sued the City of Brandon and its chief of police under § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Olivier alleged that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments on their face, and he sought damages as well as injunctive relief. The city moved for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment on the grounds that Olivier’s § 1983 claims were barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey. Heck held that a prisoner seeking damages could not proceed under § 1983 if the claim would impliedly invalidate the prior conviction and that the proper avenue for challenging the constitutionality of a conviction was through state and federal habeas statutes. The district court dismissed Olivier’s claims without making explicit which of the city’s motions the court was granting.

    Olivier appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which treated the lower court’s decision as a grant of summary judgment. The appeals court held that Heck required Olivier to prove that his request to enjoin the ordinance would not necessarily invalidate his conviction. The Fifth Circuit relied on its own precedent, under which Heck applies to all facial challenges seeking prospective injunctions. Further, the appeals court held that Heck applies regardless of custodial status, despite non-custodial plaintiffs being ineligible for habeas relief. The appeals court therefore affirmed the district court.

    Olivier petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari on March 14, 2025. The Supreme Court granted the petition on July 3, 2025.

    Analysis

    SECTION 1983 CLAIMS BARRED BY HECK

    Petitioner Gabriel Olivier argues that § 1983 expressly authorizes claims in equity for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Olivier contends that he seeks relief for prospective violations of his constitutional rights and that Congress designed § 1983 to let him do just that. Olivier stresses that common law rules used to interpret § 1983 must be consistent with the “values and purposes” of the constitutional right in question, and he adds that First Amendment rights will not always have an analogous common law tort with remedies outside of § 1983. Moreover, Olivier explains that his past conviction not only establishes standing to sue for prospective relief under § 1983, but that he is the “perfect plaintiff” for §1983’s purposes because his standing is so clear. Olivier maintains that in prior First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has allowed litigants to pursue § 1983 relief where a “genuine threat of prosecution” exists. Olivier urges that it would go squarely against federalism for federal courts to not intervene in a potential violation of constitutional rights where there is no pending state prosecution.

    Furthermore, Olivier asserts that he does not seek to undermine his prior conviction but rather to prevent a future conviction, which is far outside the scope of Heck. Olivier explains that eHecHeck dealt with a tort-like malicious prosecution, which is why the Court imposed a requirement that the state court proceeding must have ended in the plaintiff’s favor for a § 1983 claim to survive. Olivier differentiates his First Amendment claims from malicious prosecution as more closely resembling “equitable bills for antisuit injunctions,” which do not require favorable termination of a prior criminal proceeding. Olivier adds that the Supreme Court distinguishes permissible forward-looking relief from impermissible backward-looking relief: the former is outside of Heck’s prohibition because it does not necessarily imply the invalidity of prior punishment. Olivier contends that prior decisions reflect the court’s stance that injunctive relief for future punishment does not necessarily imply that prior convictions are invalid because injunctive relief does not interfere with prior convictions.  

    Respondents, the City of Brandon, Mississippi, and its former police chief, (collectively “the City”) counter that, to challenge a First Amendment violation, litigants have the options of facial or as-applied challenges, between which Olivier fails to distinguish.  The City elaborates that the Fifth Circuit only ruled that Heck prohibits injunctive relief when a convicted plaintiff brings a facial challenge, not an as-applied one.  The City asserts that while Heck did not clearly rule on as-applied challenges, Olivier fails to allege that his future actions are sufficiently different from his conviction, which is required for a successful as-applied challenge.  In addition, the City argues that there is no exception to § 1983 that classifies the requirements for a First Amendment challenge differently from any other constitutional right.  The City explains that as a result, a litigant must exhaust remedies that were available during their criminal proceeding, such as the opportunity to appeal, before seeking § 1983 relief.  The City also emphasizes that Olivier’s First Amendment challenge fails because he has alternative channels for expression. Finally, the City contends that by staking standing on his past criminal conviction, Olivier necessarily alleges harm from the criminal proceedings.

    Moreover, the City argues that Olivier’s §1983 claim is barred by Heck because his constitutional challenge necessarily implies the invalidity of the conviction.  The City asserts that because Olivier filed his lawsuit while on probation, success would have reduced his punishment and indirectly deemed his conviction invalid. The City highlights that if Olivier alleges the statute that he was convicted under is unconstitutional, it follows that his conviction also suffered a “legal infirmity.” The City adds that Heck differentiates between intertwined requests and requests solely for prospective relief, with the latter allowed. The City explains that Olivier’s request falls under the former category because he failed to separate past conduct resulting in a conviction from future conduct for which he seeks relief. The City also differentiates between procedural and substantive challenges to a conviction, with Heck barring substantive challenges without termination of a prior conviction. The City clarifies that Olivier is attempting to bring a substantive challenge because he argues that the law under which he was convicted is unconstitutional, which necessarily makes his conviction illegal, as opposed to challenging the procedures under which he was convicted. The City concludes that the analogy between Olivier’s challenge and malicious prosecution is sound because malicious prosecution is one application of Heck’s conviction termination requirement for a litigant to pursue § 1983 relief.  

    ROLE OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE CUSTODY REQUIREMENT IN §1983 RELIEF 

    Olivier argues that § 1983 does not bar claims where a plaintiff never had access to federal habeas corpus relief. Olivier contends that Heck reconciles the habeas corpus statute with § 1983 by barring a § 1983 claim brought by an incarcerated plaintiff. Olivier adds that § 1983 does not include incarcerated individuals because a successful § 1983 claim would necessarily invalidate prior convictions, whereas that is precisely what habeas is for. Olivier explains that § 1983 is a distinct remedy for violations of constitutional rights, as opposed to a method for plaintiffs to seek speedier remedies than habeas relief. Olivier asserts that when two federal statutes cover the same topic, courts must fashion an interpretation that gives effect to both laws. Olivier claims that while damages are not a remedy in federal habeas proceedings, a litigant can seek damages under § 1983 after he successfully secured a favorable termination of his sentence.  

    Additionally, Olivier contends that while prior decisions reconciled situations where a litigant had both habeas and § 1983 claims, an individual who was never in custody—and who therefore could not bring habeas claim—can bring a § 1983 claim. Olivier emphasizes that where there is no conflict between a general statute like § 1983 and a more specific one like the habeas statute, courts need not attempt to apply the more specific one. Olivier also maintains that the Fifth Circuit improperly extended Heck’s prohibition on § 1983 relief to plaintiffs who were never in custody. Olivier clarifies that Heck did not and could not resolve whether a formerly incarcerated plaintiff could seek § 1983 relief with a showing of an overturned conviction, given that the plaintiff in Heck was in fact incarcerated during the lawsuit. Olivier concludes that the City incorrectly describes Heck as rooted solely in tort law. And in any event, Olivier argues, this case does not implicate Heck’s tort-law considerations because Olivier seeks forward-looking relief to stop a constitutional violation, not backward-looking damages for detention.

    The City counters that Olivier wrongly asserts that he was never in custody, given that he was sentenced to probation under a suspended sentence.  The City explains that, for Heck, custody not only includes incarceration but also restrictions that “significantly confine and restrain freedom.”  Moreover, the City argues that there is no meaningful distinction between incarcerated and non-incarcerated plaintiffs as it pertains to § 1983 relief, given that the Supreme Court adopted a bright-line rule in Heck barring collateral attacks to reduce or overturn criminal convictions.  The City emphasizes that § 1983’s broad language is inconclusive and should not be construed to create previously non-existent avenues for collateral attacks.  The City adds that there is ample common law support for a blanket prohibition on collateral attacks that implicitly invalidate a criminal conviction outside of habeas relief.  

    Furthermore, the City argues that Olivier was not deprived of a remedy because there are many avenues for relief outside of habeas corpus.  The City emphasizes that Olivier had available several state remedies, including direct appeal, postconviction relief, expungement, and gubernatorial pardon.  The City asserts that Heck’s prohibition on § 1983 relief that implies the invalidity of a prior conviction was not just a reconciliation of  conflict between § 1983 and the habeas statute but also a bar on collateral attacks under § 1983 in the interests of finality, consistency, and federalism.  The City continues that Olivier’s position would require Heck to be overruled, given that Heck created a common law rule requiring favorable termination of a prior conviction before pursuing § 1983 relief.  The City concludes that the termination requirement applies regardless of what remedy the litigant seeks, and regardless of whether habeas relief is available. 

    Discussion

    ACCESS TO FEDERAL RELIEF

    In support of Olivier, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (“FIRE”) argues that barring § 1983 plaintiffs who have experienced prior enforcement would conflict with standing doctrine.  FIRE points out that plaintiffs bringing prospective challenges must show a credible threat of prosecution, which can be done by referencing prior enforcement. Thus, FIRE contends that ruling in favor of the City would result in a paradox where standing requires harm to bring a claim but Heck bars suits by those who have experienced actual harm. Chike Uzuegbunam—who successfully challenged Georgia Gwinnett College’s restrictions of on-campus proselytizing in Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski— adds that applying Heck to non-custodial plaintiffs will prevent plaintiffs in unusual circumstances from vindicating constitutional rights. Uzuegbunam provides the example of plaintiffs who never had access to habeas review and who do not have evidence of constitutional violations until they are ineligible for the traditional appellate process. Further, Uzuegbunam argues that an overbroad application of Heck would allow state officials to evade review for unconstitutional acts by refusing to incarcerate defendants, which would bar access to both habeas and § 1983.

    In support of the City, the Local Government Legal Center (“LGLC”) argues that requiring favorable termination does not wholly bar plaintiffs with prior convictions from bringing § 1983 suits. LGLC notes that many states provide avenues for post-conviction relief for non-custodial defendants. Specifically, LGLC points to Mississippi and Texas as examples of states with statutory habeas procedures for non-custodial individuals. LGLC also asserts that executive pardons could provide state-level favorable termination. In response to the contention that Olivier may be time-barred from Mississippi’s statute, LGLC argues that plaintiffs should not be permitted to evade the favorable-termination requirement due to their own failure to pursue available state level options. The City adds that Olivier could have utilized Mississippi’s direct appeal avenue, which allows municipal convictions to be retried de novo by the county court and subsequently appealed through the state’s appellate system. The City also highlights that Olivier could have sought expungement under either of two Mississippi statutes.

    STATE SOVEREIGNTY

    In support of vacatur, the United States argues that allowing plaintiffs who are not in custody to bring § 1983 petitions does not implicate federalism concerns. The United States acknowledges that federal courts generally avoid interfering with ongoing state prosecutions. However, the United States argues that the same concerns do not apply where no active state proceedings are pending. The United States contends that wholly prospective relief does not usurp state authority because any effects of a successful challenge on prior convictions can only arise from state laws providing for additional relief. Further, the United States points out that facial challenges under § 1983 by any plaintiff would affect the validity of prior convictions under the challenged statute, but federalism principles do not bar all pre-enforcement challenges to state law. The United States asserts that plaintiffs with prior convictions who are not in custody are not uniquely situated and therefore should not be barred from asserting their constitutional rights.

    In support of the City, the LGLC also argues that maintaining the favorable-termination requirement for § 1983 claims is necessary to protect state authority. LGLC claims that any federal suit under § 1983 that impliedly invalidates a state conviction undermines the finality of state court judgments. Therefore, LGLC asserts that plaintiffs with prior convictions must be subject to the favorable-termination requirement regardless of what relief they seek and whether they are in custody. Absent this requirement, LGLC contends that parties who wish to challenge their state convictions will be incentivized to forgo state remedies such as appeals or post-conviction review. Texas Association of Counties, in support of the City, adds that the favorable-termination requirement protects the right of state courts to make initial decisions on the constitutionality of state convictions.  

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    V. Carter and Olivia Hussey

    Edited by:      Andrew Carpenter

    Additional Resources