civil liberties

Chiles v. Salazar

Issues

Considering a state’s regulatory authority over professional conduct, does the First Amendment permit states to regulate the content of certain conversations between counselors and their clients?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Colorado’s Minor Conversion Therapy Law (“MCTL”), which prohibits mental health professionals from providing LGBTQ+ conversion therapy to minor clients, violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Kaley Chiles, a licensed professional counselor in Colorado, argues that MCTL infringes on constitutionally protected speech by discriminating against certain content and viewpoints. She asserts that Colorado failed to meet its burden of strict scrutiny because the statute does not further a compelling state interest, nor is it narrowly tailored. Patty Salazar, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, argues that states have the power to regulate professional conduct, even if doing so incidentally affects speech. Salazar maintains that Chiles’s position undermines a state’s ability to regulate the conduct of mental health professionals. The outcome of this case will also have significant ramifications for the availability of certain treatment methods.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

In 2019, the Colorado legislature added the Minor Conversion Therapy Law (“MCTL”) to the Mental Health Practice Act (“MHPA”), which regulates the practice and conduct of mental health professionals in the state. 

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Michael C. Dorf for his guidance and insights into this case.

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civil rights

Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi

Issues

Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, are claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 barred where a plaintiff who has already been punished under a law challenged as unconstitutional seeks purely prospective relief? Are such claims barred even where the plaintiff never had access to federal habeas relief?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the parameters for plaintiffs to seek relief for laws challenged as unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner Gabriel Olivier argues that the Fifth Circuit improperly applied Heck v. Humphrey to his case because he is not seeking to disturb his previous conviction under the ordinance he is challenging; rather, he is seeking to prevent future prosecution, which aligns with how the court has previously interpreted § 1983. Olivier also contends that because he was never in custody, he is not foreclosed from seeking relief under § 1983, unlike individuals in custody who must instead seek federal habeas relief. Respondents, the City of Brandon, Mississippi et al., (“the City”) counter that Heck bars § 1983 relief where civil lawsuit success would shorten the length of criminal punishment or imply the conviction is substantively invalid, which applies to Olivier’s challenge, since he attacked both his punishment and conviction. The City also maintains that Olivier’s eligibility for § 1983 relief does not depend on whether he has access to federal habeas relief. This outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for access to judicial review and state sovereignty.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether this court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional; and (2) whether Heck v. Humphrey bars Section 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they never had access to federal habeas relief.

This case concerns the intersection between claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal habeas corpus. See Olivier v.

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Virginia v. Moore

 

In 2003, Virginia police stopped David Moore for driving on a suspended license. The officers then violated Virginia law by arresting Moore instead of issuing a summons. A follow-up search revealed cash and cocaine in Moore's pockets. Moore moved to suppress this evidence on grounds that the illegal arrest made the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Virginia responded that while Moore's arrest violated state law, the search was reasonable under the U.S. Constitution because it was incident to an arrest based on probable cause that he committed a crime. The trial court found the search constitutional and convicted Moore on drug charges. The Virginia Court of Appeals initially reversed but reinstated the conviction after hearing the case en banc. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, and Virginia appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This case could affect many state laws concerning civil liberties and the way in which police think about illegal arrests.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence obtained incident to an arrest that is based upon probable cause, where the arrest violates a provision of state law?

In 2003, police in Virginia were discussing over the radio that someone nicknamed "Chubs" (David Lee Moore) was driving in the area. Moore v. Commonwealth, 622 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Va. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 636 S.E.2d 395 ( Va. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 28 ( U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (No.

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