Mullin v. Doe

    Issues

    Can the Trump administration terminate Temporary Protected Status designations for Syrian and Haitian nationals? 

    Oral argument:
    April 29, 2026
    Court below:
    United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

    This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Trump administration can end the Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) program for Syrian and Haitian nationals. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, asserts that the former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security appropriately consulted with other agencies about the TPS decisions as required by statute, and that neither the President’s nor the Secretary’s comments about immigration support equal-protection claims. Mullin argues that Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of all TPS decisions, including the process and methodology preceding those decisions. TPS Applicants counter that judicial review of compliance with required procedures is permitted even if judicial review of the ultimate decisions by the Secretary are not. TPS Applicants argue former-Secretary Noem’s consultations were insufficient and did not comply with the statute, and President Trump’s speech and actions have exhibited a pattern of impressible racial animus. The case implicates the safety of Haitian and Syrian TPS holders, national security, and the understanding of judicial-review bars.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Trump administration can end the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrian nationals.

    Facts

    Congress implemented the Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) program in 1990 to place guardrails on the executive branch’s ability to alter “pre-existing humanitarian relief programs.” The program allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to extend refuge and work privileges to people who would face “armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions” in their home country. These protections apply only to people who were physically in the United States when their home country received the TPS designation and last only as long as their home country maintains its designation. Once a country receives TPS designation, the designation will automatically extend every six months until the country no longer meets the criteria for designation. The statute prohibits the Secretary from revoking TPS designations from countries that still meet the relevant criteria.

    Laila Doe, Dahlia Doe, Dr. Sara Doe, et al. (collectively, “Doe”) are Syrians currently living and working in the United States under work authorizations given because of Syria’s TPS designation, which was first granted in 2012. Most recently, Syria’s TPS designation was renewed in 2024 due to “dire economic and humanitarian conditions” resulting from civil war, government repression, violence, and a major earthquake. However, following a campaign promise to revoke TPS, President Trump directed then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem to re-evaluate the program. Noem terminated Syria’s TPS designation on September 19, 2025, concluding that the country was now safe for its citizens to return home to and emphasizing that there is a national interest in not having Syrian nationals in the United States. Doe sued Noem and the United States to halt the termination of their TPS protections.

    Miot et al. (collectively, “Miot;” with Doe, “TPS Applicants”) are Haitians currently living in the United States under Haiti’s TPS designation, which it received in 2010 after a major earthquake. Similar to Syria, Haiti has had its TPS designation renewed by multiple administrations due to the “inadequate food, shelter, and medical care” in the country. Although the first Trump administration attempted to revoke Haiti’s TPS designation, the designation prevailed through the Biden administration and was renewed again for eighteen months in 2024. In 2024, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas concluded that “political corruption, human-rights abuses, escalating gang violence, limited health care, food insecurity,” and natural disasters supported his decision to extend the protections for Haitian nationals. Then-Secretary Noem terminated Haiti’s TPS status on November 28, 2025. Noem again pointed to Haiti’s safety and a national interest in removing Haitian nationals from the United States. Miot sued President Trump and the United States to halt the termination of their TPS protections.

    In both cases, the lower courts have not reached a judgment on the merits. While litigation proceeds, TPS Applicants were granted a motion for a preliminary injunction, which temporarily prevents the Trump administration from terminating TPS designation for Syria and Haiti. Noem petitioned for but was denied a stay of both preliminary injunctions. Markwayne Mullin replaced Kristi Noem as Secretary of Homeland Security in March 2026 and became the new named petitioner in each of these cases. On March 16, 2026, the Supreme Court consolidated Mullin (formerly Noem) v. Doe and Miot v. Trump into Mullin v. Doe and granted Mullin, officially representing the federal government, certiorari before judgment.

    Analysis

    JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SECRETARY’S DECISIONS

    Mullin argues that U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of all temporary-protected status designations, terminations, and extensions.Mullin explains that the provision explicitly designates decisions about TPS to the Secretary of Homeland Security and precludes “judicial review of any determination of the Secretary with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation.” Mullin emphasizes that the provision bars review of not only final TPS determinations, but specifically “any” determination having to do with TPS outcomes. Mullin argues that if the statute bars judicial review of TPS decisions, it also bars judicial review of the Secretary’s methods and procedure taken to reach those decisions. Mullin explains that because procedural or preliminary agency actions are subject to judicial scrutiny only on “review of the final agency action,” and review of final agency action is prohibited here, the procedures logically also cannot be reviewed. Mullin highlights that the executive branch historically had the authority to grant temporary immigration relief without adhering to any specific criteria, and Congress intended to preserve this authority through the § 1254a language. Mullin posits that Congress placed checks on the executive branch’s TPS-related discretion other than judicial review, such as limitations on the duration of TPS and a requirement that the Secretary regularly review TPS. Mullin argues that Doe’s claims that the TPS terminations were discriminatory, predetermined, or politically motivated are similarly barred by the statute because they effectively just criticize the Secretary’s methodology.

    TPS Applicants argue that while U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) might bar judicial review of the Secretary’s final determination to award, extend, deny, or revoke TPS designation to a country, the judiciary is not prevented from reviewing the procedure(s) with which then-Secretary Noem made her determinations. Doe argues that the Court has repeatedly interpreted congressional intent to preserve the judiciary’s ability to review agency compliance with prerequisite procedures, so, Doe explains, the judiciary should be able to follow that pattern and review the Secretary’s compliance with these procedures. Doe further explains that Congress had the opportunity after these judicial decisions to amend its statutes and clarify its intent, and in some cases did. Since Congress made no such adjustments to § 1254a(b)(5)(A), Doe posits, Congress most likely agreed with the judicial interpretation of its statutes; in other words, Doe argues that Congress has implicitly granted the Court permission to review the Secretary of Homeland Security’s compliance with required procedures. Miot adds that where there may be confusion over the true meaning of a statute, as is the case here, the default is for executive and administrative actions to be reviewable. Miot explains that this presumption of reviewability is especially strong in cases, such as this one, where there is a “colorable constitutional claim” at issue, and without the power of judicial review, the federal courts would be unable to address the constitutional question. Miot further contends that the Court has previously held that the presumption of reviewability can only be defeated by “clear and convincing evidence,” which Miot argues is not present here.

    THE SECRETARY’S CONSULTATION OBLIGATIONS 

    Mullin maintains that even if the judicial-review bar does not preclude TPS applicants’ claims, they fail on the merits because the Secretary satisfied her statutory obligations by consulting with other agencies before terminating TPS for Haitian and Syrian nationals. Mullin emphasizes that, although § 1254a requires “consultation with appropriate agencies,” it does not define “consultation” or which agencies are “appropriate,” so the Secretary has discretion to determine which information from which agencies would be useful.Mullin asserts that the Secretary appropriately considered external input to assess whether Syria continues to meet the grounds of “extraordinary and temporary conditions” for TPS designation.Mullin counters the lower court’s suggestion that the State Department should have provided a “formal recommendation” on the matter by arguing that “judicial micromanagement” is not appropriate where Congress has not proscribed specific consultation requirements in the statute. Mullin refers to an email exchange in which the State Department advised the Secretary that ending Syria’s TPS designation produced “no foreign policy concerns” to argue that the Secretary did consult with an agency. Mullin argues that the Secretary is entitled to a “presumption of legitimacy,” where the Court should presume that the Secretary properly discharged her duty to consult unless there is substantial credible evidence to support otherwise. Mullin contends that national interest is a relevant justification for the termination decision, and the Secretary made reasonable factual determinations about the nation’s interest based on the change in conditions in Haiti and Syria.

    On the other hand, TPS Applicants argue that the Secretary did not fulfill her obligation to meaningfully consult with other agencies about current conditions in Syria and Haiti. TPS Applicants maintain that although then-Secretary Noem had communications with the State Department regarding the TPS designations of Syria and Haiti, the communications were both brief (one short email each way) and failed to discuss any conditions in either country. Miot further argues that Noem had an obligation to “solicit and receive other agencies’ views,” so her duty was not discharged by the State Department’s short response. Rather, Miot claims, Noem should have followed up until she received the agency responses she needed. Furthermore, Miot points to the government’s own admission that it could not revoke South Sudan’s TPS designation in 2025 without receiving and considering a current report on South Sudan’s conditions from the State Department, arguing that it follows that Noem also should have required such a report in this case. Finally, Doe argues Noem’s reliance on national interest as justification for removing Syria’s TPS designation is irrelevant because alignment with national interests is not a condition for designation. Doe explains that under the statute, national interests can be used as an exception to deny TPS designation in the first place, but it is not a continual condition of the designation, so it is therefore not a factor to be considered during the review process for redesignation.

    EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 

    Mullin also argues that TPS termination for Haitian nationals does not violate equal protection. Mullin asserts that the correct standard to evaluate the equal-protection claims is rational-basis review under Trump v. Hawaii, which requires governmental action to “plausibly relate to the Government’s stated objective.” Mullin explains that this case is like Hawaii because the Hawaii challengers similarly invoked the President’s statements about immigration to argue that the President was motivated by racial animus, and the Court upheld the President’s entry restrictions because they plausibly related to the government’s national-security interest. Mullin argues that there is no invidious discrimination like in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. because the Secretary and President “simply advocate for curbing illegal immigration” without respect to a specific race.

    Mullin contends that the TPS terminations meet rational-basis review because the Secretary made the decisions based on foreign-policy and national-security considerations. Mullin argues that the termination’s effect on “predominantly nonwhite” Haitian TPS holders does not support an inference of racial animus because the racial demographics of the TPS holders reflect the racial demographics of Haiti generally. Mullin emphasizes that even if the President and Secretary made comments about race, the comments were made at other times and unrelated to the TPS determinations.

    Miot argues that the Court should apply strict scrutiny under Arlington Heights instead of rational-basis review under Trump v. Hawaii. First, Miot argues, Arlington Heights, not Hawaii, has governed every challenge to TPS terminations on equal protection grounds. Miot further argues that Hawaii is different, and therefore not relevant, because it dealt with presidential power and the entry of aliens whereas this case implicates the power of a lower officer, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and protections for foreign nationals already residing in the United States.

    Applying the Arlington Heights standard, Miot argues that the former Secretary’s actions do violate equal protection. Miot points out that Arlington Heights requires only that “a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor” of the government action to find a violation of the equal protection. Citing quotes from President Trump, including claims that Haitians were “eating the pets” of Ohioans, Trump’s announced plan to revoke TPS designations for certain majority non-white countries, and his request for immigrants from Scandinavia, Miot posits that racial animus within the Trump administration can be inferred sufficiently to fail both the rational-basis and strict scrutiny tests.

    Discussion

    JUDICIAL CLARITY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

    Iowa and twenty-one other states (collectively, “Iowa”), in support of Petitioners, argue that the lower courts’ assertion of jurisdiction over TPS decisions leaves the states uncertain about whether federal TPS decisions are final. Iowa asserts that the lower courts are using the lack of clarity following the postponement of TPS decisions to ignore the substance of those decisions, leading to “jurisdictional chaos.” America’s Future, Citizens United, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund (collectively, “America’s Future”), in support of Petitioners, assert that the lower courts violated the Constitution’s allocation of immigration policy authority to the legislative and executive branches, unconstitutionally overreaching the role of the judiciary.

    Former federal and state judges (“Former Judges”), in support of Respondents, counter that the lower courts did not disregard the TPS terminations but are looking to other precedents to determine the appropriate applicable law given the interim orders. Former Judges explain that, by looking to other precedents to determine the applicable law, the lower courts do not overreach but instead honor the judicial responsibility to interpret laws. Former senior government officials (“Former Officials”), in support of Respondents, argue that Congress sought to guide Executive discretion by enacting the TPS statute, so engaging in the interpretive process will protect the purpose of the statute and the legislative role. Former Officials posit that the Executive has strayed from Congress’s guidance by failing to meaningfully consult other agencies about TPS decisions, inflating the Executive’s power over TPS beyond Congress’s intent.

    NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMY, AND SAFETY

    Mullin argues that terminating Syria’s TPS designation will help maintain national security because the United States cannot “reliably vet” Syrian TPS applicants after the fall of the Assad regime. Mullin explains that removing the TPS designation for Syrian nationals will ease the United States’s diplomacy with Syria and encourage Syrians to return to Syria. Federation for American Immigration Reform, in support of Petitioners, contends that preventing the President from making TPS terminations would prevent the executive branch from effectively managing foreign threats and national security.

    Mullin further argues that terminating TPS will benefit the United States’ economy because TPS holders strain public resources and the immigration-enforcement system. Mullin contends that allowing Haitian TPS holders to remain in the United States will pose additional economic costs by straining an already limited job market because the TPS holders would work in jobs that would otherwise go to American workers.

    Haitian TPS Holders, in support of Respondents, assert that removing TPS for Haitians would inflict irreversible harm on over 350,000 Haitian nationals. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and eighteen states (collectively, “Massachusetts”), as well as the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre and The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, in support of Respondents, collectively argue that forcing TPS holders to return to Haiti and Syria when those countries face ongoing conflict would separate families and create widespread humanitarian concerns due to lack of infrastructure, gang violence, and poverty. .

    The American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”), in support of Respondents, contend that terminating Haitians’ TPS designations will harm U.S. workers and the national economy by removing hundreds of thousands of workers from crucial parts of the labor market. By removing Haitian TPS holders from the workforce, AFL-CIO explains that American employers may be unable to sustain their services and have to lay off American workers. AFL-CIO further emphasizes that the removal of over 100,000 Haitian healthcare workers in concentrated areas would affect the quality of patient care in those areas.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:     Caroline “Kiki” Plowe and Quinn E. Ackerman

    Edited by:       Garrett Taylor

    Additional Resources